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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Motivation and Summary  
 Goodwill as a proportion of assets acquired in business combinations has been 
growing in recent years, resulting in an increased demand for more useful information 
about goodwill.1  Before the recent changes in accounting standards, goodwill was 
viewed as a depreciating asset and systematically amortized over an arbitrary ceiling of 
40 years.  Prior studies examine the effect of goodwill amortization on the usefulness of 
earnings and find that goodwill amortization is not value relevant (Moehrle et al. 2001; 
Jennings et al. 2001).  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) acknowledges 
that users of financial statements do not consider goodwill amortization in making 
investment and credit decisions, and entities ignore goodwill amortization in evaluating 
the performance of management (SFAS No. 142, Appendix B, par B90).  These findings 
suggest that eliminating goodwill amortization should not reduce the usefulness of 
earnings.  In addition, as previous standards provided little guidance about how to 
determine and measure the write-offs of goodwill when the values decrease, the 
accounting for voluntary goodwill write-offs was not consistent or comparable, and 
                                                 
1
 Goodwill is an important component of a firm’s value, representing approximately 20 percent of the total 
assets of business combinations that occurred between 1990 and 1994 (Henning et al. 2004).  The 
percentage of goodwill to the purchase price for the acquisitions that occurred from 1997 to 2002 is 
approximately 68 percent, which is larger relative to the acquisitions over 1990-1994 (Long 2005). 
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information usefulness was questionable. 
In June 2001, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
(SFAS) No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (FASB 2001b), which provides 
more specific guidance for determining the amount and timing of goodwill impairment 
recognition.  This standard changes the accounting for goodwill from an amortization 
method to an impairment testing approach.  SFAS No. 142 requires goodwill to be tested 
for impairment under a two-step process: (1) to identify potential impairment, and (2) to 
measure the amount of impairment loss.  The argument for SFAS No. 142 is that 
previous practice of goodwill amortization did not reflect the economic change of a 
firm’s value because accounting earnings were burdened with periodic goodwill 
amortization expenses.  However, acquiring entities are willing to pay for goodwill 
presumably due to the assumption that net assets acquired will yield more than the 
purchase price.  The acquiring entities pay a premium for an opportunity to improve 
profitability from an acquired entity, to create value from synergy, and to achieve 
economies of scale.  Therefore, the argument can be made that goodwill should be 
viewed as a valuable economic resource and should not be systematically amortized.  
However, goodwill should remain until it is impaired under the criteria of SFAS No. 142.   
The FASB expects that SFAS No. 142 will improve financial reporting by 
providing users with a better understanding of the underlying economic value of goodwill 
and enhancing their ability to assess firms’ future profitability and cash flows (SFAS No. 
142, Summary).  The implementation of SFAS No. 142 leads to a main research question 
whether or not the standard provides information about a firm’s economic performance.  
This study focuses on the periods subsequent to the initial adoption of SFAS No. 142 and 
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addresses the following questions: (1) Is an impairment firm relatively less efficient than 
a non-impairment firm in the year of impairment recognition? (2) How does the relative 
efficiency of a firm change over time when a firm reports goodwill impairment versus no 
impairment each year? (3) Is relative efficiency a determinant of goodwill impairment? 
(4) What is the predictive ability of relative efficiency with respect to a goodwill 
impairment decision?  This study selects three industries--durable manufacturers, 
computers, and services--for the analysis.  These industries have the largest number of 
firms with goodwill impairment losses and, thus, provide sufficient impairment 
observations.  The research questions are examined in the following two parts. 
The first part, “Goodwill impairment and relative efficiency of firms”, examines 
whether or not goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 improves financial reporting 
and disclosures by better reflecting a firm’s underlying relative efficiency.  A firm’s 
relative efficiency is measured by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  DEA 
allows an aggregation of several financial measures into a meaningful measure of firm 
performance.  Each industry is analyzed individually to mitigate the effect of industry 
differences.  Therefore, the results better capture economic environment and industry 
characteristics.  First, using a cross-sectional analysis, this study compares the relative 
efficiency of impairment firms in the year of goodwill impairment recognition to that of 
non-impairment firms in the same year.  Second, this study investigates the relative 
efficiency of firms over time.  A longitudinal analysis is useful because it explains how 
relative efficiency changes over time when firms recognize goodwill impairment or do 
not have impairment in each year.  The linkage between goodwill impairment and 
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relative efficiency provides an opportunity for the additional analysis in the second part 
of this study. 
The second part, “The determinant and predictive ability of relative efficiency on 
goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142”, examines the importance of a firm’s relative 
efficiency in determining the percentage and the decision of goodwill impairment 
recognition.  After obtaining firms’ relative efficiency scores by each industry, this study 
performs the analyses on combined industries to increase the sample size.  This study 
uses a Tobit regression to analyze the determinants of the percentage of goodwill 
impairment and uses a logistic regression to analyze the likelihood of a goodwill 
impairment decision, after controlling for managerial reporting incentives.  In addition, 
this study examines the predictive ability of relative efficiency with respect to a goodwill 
impairment decision by using a logistic regression and a multivariate discriminant 
analysis (MDA).   
 
1.2 Contribution 
This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways.  First, it contributes 
to the literature regarding asset write-downs (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987; Francis et al. 
1996; Segal 2003; Zang 2003; Riedl 2004).  Prior research does not include relative 
efficiency as a determinant of goodwill impairment.  To my knowledge, this research is 
the first attempt to explore the linkage between goodwill impairment and a firm’s relative 
efficiency and will thus provide evidence regarding potential benefits of SFAS No. 142 in 
conveying information about a firm’s underlying economic value.  Further, the linkage 
between goodwill impairment and a decline in efficiency can explain why goodwill 
 5
impairment conveys information about a firm’s equity valuation and future performance.  
Second, this study extends the relative efficiency literature (e.g. Bowlin 1995, 1999; 
Seiford and Zhu 1999; Zhu 2000; Luo 2003) by applying the DEA technique to measure 
a firm’s overall relative efficiency and to assess the implementation of the accounting 
standard in reflecting the effect of relative efficiency.  Finally, this study contributes to 
the literature on goodwill impairment prediction models (e.g. Hayn and Hughes 2006) by 
examining the predictive ability of relative efficiency in determining goodwill 
impairment.  Although the objective of this study is not to construct a prediction model 
for goodwill impairment, the results from this study provide an avenue for future research 
to incorporate an overall measure of firm performance into the prediction model.  The 
inclusion of a firm’s relative efficiency measure will help financial statement users to 
better assess the likelihood of goodwill impairment decisions. 
The results from this study are of interest to investors, auditors, and standard 
setters.  Investors benefits from the ability to determine a goodwill impairment loss.  If an 
impairment loss signals a decrease in firm efficiency, it will help investors to be aware of 
a decline in the value of their investment in an impairment firm.  Auditors are responsible 
for expressing an opinion on the fairness of financial statements in material respects.  
Therefore, auditors will be able to assess whether goodwill should be kept in financial 
statements or should be written down as goodwill impairment.  Finally, to standard 
setters, results from this study provide empirical evidence on the implication of SFAS 
No. 142 after its initial adoption.  The evidence helps to indicate whether or not the 
standard has improved financial reporting by reflecting the underlying economics of 
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goodwill so that financial statement users are better able to assess the subsequent 
performance of firms.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides the 
background of SFAS No. 142.  Chapter 3 discusses a performance measurement.  
Chapter 4 presents the first part, “Goodwill impairment and relative efficiency of firms”.  
Chapter 5 provides the second part, “The determinant and predictive ability of relative 
efficiency on goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142”.  The final chapter offers a 
summary. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
BACKGROUND OF SFAS NO. 142 
 
 
Prior to SFAS No. 142, goodwill was viewed as a depreciating asset.  It was 
systematically amortized over its expected economic useful life, which was not more than 
40 years, according to Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 17, Intangible 
Assets (AICPA 1970).  However, APB No. 17 did not provide any guidance for when and 
how to measure the existence of goodwill impairment.  SFAS No. 121, Accounting for 
the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of 
(FASB 1995), was used as a rough guide for goodwill impairment testing although its 
objective was for other long-lived asset impairment testing.2  This standard offered 
management discretion in deciding the timing of the impairment test. 
 In June 2001, the FASB issued SFAS No. 141, Business Combinations, and SFAS 
No. 142, Goodwill and Other intangible Assets (FASB 2001a, 2001b).  SFAS No. 141 
eliminates the pooling-of-interest method and requires all business combinations after 
June 2001 to comply with the purchase accounting method.  SFAS No. 142 changes 
accounting for goodwill from an amortization method to an impairment testing approach.  
Goodwill is no longer viewed as a depreciating asset but represents the expectation of  
                                                 
2
 SFAS No. 121 was superseded by SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-
Lived Assets (FASB 2001c), in August 2001. 
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benefits arising from synergies due to an integration of the acquired and acquiring 
entities.  The standard is more specific on three main issues: (1) what level of reporting 
unit to test for goodwill impairment, (2) when to test for impairment, and (3) how to 
measure the amount of goodwill impairment. 
First, SFAS No. 142 requires that a goodwill impairment test be performed at a 
level of “reporting unit”.3  The amount of goodwill assigned to a reporting unit is based 
on the expected benefits arising from synergies of the business combinations although 
other assets or liabilities of the acquired entity may not be allocated to that reporting unit 
(SFAS No. 142, par 34).  The reason is that estimated cash flows are generated at this 
level for planning purposes and can be used to determine the fair value of a reporting 
unit.  Further, the lower the level of a reporting unit is, the lower is the likelihood that a 
firm can offset goodwill impairment from one reporting unit with unrecognized internally 
developed goodwill from another reporting unit.  Second, SFAS No. 142 requires 
goodwill to be tested for impairment at least annually and at the same time each year to 
eliminate the effect of timing manipulation.  In addition, the goodwill impairment test can 
be performed between annual tests if events or certain circumstances indicate that the fair 
value of a reporting unit is likely to be lower than its carrying amount.4  Finally, the 
                                                 
3
 The reporting unit is an operating segment (as currently reported under SFAS No. 131, Disclosures about 
Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information), or one level below an operating segment (referred to 
as a component).  A component of reporting segment is a reporting unit if its discrete financial information 
is available and segment management regularly reviews the operating results.  However, two or more 
components of an operating segment can be aggregated as a single reporting unit if the components have 
similar economic characteristics (SFAS No. 142, par. 30, 31). 
4
 Examples of such events or circumstances include: (1) a significant adverse change in legal factors or in 
the business climate, (2) an adverse action or assessment by a regulator, (3) unanticipated competition, (4) a 
loss of key personnel, (5) a reporting unit or a significant portion of a reporting unit is more likely to be 
sold or disposed of, (6) the testing for recoverability under SFAS No. 121 of a significant asset group 
within a reporting unit, and (7) recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in the financial statements of a 
subsidiary that is a component of a reporting unit (SFAS No. 142, par. 28). 
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FASB provides specific guidelines on how to measure the amount of goodwill 
impairment.   
The goodwill impairment test is performed in a two-step process.  The first step is 
to identify potential goodwill impairment and the second step is to measure the amount of 
impairment loss.   
Step 1:  The fair value of a reporting unit is compared with its carrying amount, including 
goodwill.  If the fair value of a reporting unit is less than its carrying amount, this 
indicates potential goodwill impairment, thereby necessitating the next step 
(SFAS No. 142, par. 19). 
Step 2:  The “implied fair value” of the reporting unit goodwill is compared with the 
carrying amount of goodwill.5   If the implied fair value of goodwill is less than 
its carrying amount of the reporting unit goodwill, the difference between these 
amounts is charged as an impairment loss to the income statement (SFAS No. 
142, par. 20). 
 
  The fair value of a reporting unit is the amount at which a unit as a whole could 
be bought or sold in a current transaction between willing parties.  In determining the fair 
value of a reporting unit, FASB states that quoted market prices are the best evidence of 
the fair value, if available, but need not be representative of the fair value of a reporting 
unit as a whole.  This is because a substantial value may arise from synergies and other 
benefits from a controlled entity (SFAS No. 142, par 23).  An acquiring entity is willing 
                                                 
5
 To calculate implied fair value of goodwill, an entity must allocate the fair value of a reporting unit to all 
of the assets and liabilities of that unit (including any unrecognized intangible assets) as if the reporting unit 
had been acquired in a business combination.  The implied fair value of goodwill is the excess of the fair 
value of a reporting unit over the amount allocated to its assets and liabilities (SFAS No. 142, par. 21). 
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to pay a higher price for the controlling interest in an acquired entity than the amount that 
an investor would pay for securities without the controlling interest (SFAS No. 142, par 
B154).  The controlling interest allows an acquiring entity to access all resources and 
make strategic decisions on policies and directions of an acquired entity.  Moreover, an 
acquiring entity can obtain benefits from an increase in supply chain and coordination 
from an acquired entity.  The economy of scale synergies are typical parts of the 
controlling interest benefits.  Therefore, the fair value of a reporting unit may exceed its 
market capitalization.  SFAS No. 142 notes that if a quoted market price is not available, 
a present value of future cash flows might be the best available technique.  To estimate 
future cash flows, an entity needs to incorporate assumptions that available for market 
participants to estimate fair value or uses its own assumptions if that information is 
unavailable (SFAS No. 142, par 24).6  SFAS No. 142 also allows using other valuation 
techniques (e.g. multiples of earnings or revenues) or similar performance measures 
when the fair value of an entity with the comparable operations and economic 
characteristics is obtainable (SFAS No. 142, par 25).   
Another issue to be considered is that goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 
and long-lived asset impairment under SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or 
Disposal of Long-Lived Assets (FASB 2001c), may be tested for impairment at the same 
time.  In this situation, SFAS No. 142 notes that the other asset (or asset group) will be 
tested for impairment before goodwill.  If the asset (or asset group) is impaired, the 
                                                 
6
 Assumptions are required to determine the present value of future cash flows, for example, the several 
scenarios of business conditions, the probability of occurrence, the discount rate, and the risk adjustment 
factors.  Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present 
Value in Accounting Measurements, provides guidance for using cash flows to determine the fair value of 
assets (FASB 2000). 
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impairment loss will be recognized prior to goodwill being tested for impairment (SFAS 
No. 142, par. 29).  Therefore, the values of assets on the balance sheet at the date of 
goodwill impairment test are the lower amount of fair values or carrying values of these 
assets.  After adjusting for the long-lived asset impairment, the carrying values of these 
assets will be included in estimating the fair value of a reporting unit for the purpose of 
goodwill impairment test. 
According to SFAS No. 144, a long-lived asset impairment loss will be 
recognized only if (1) the carrying amount of a long-lived asset is not recoverable, and 
(2) exceeds its fair value (SFAS No. 144, par 7).  SFAS No. 144 requires a long-lived 
asset to be tested for recoverability whenever events or circumstances indicate that the 
carrying amount of an asset may not be recoverable.7  The carrying amount of a long-
lived asset is not recoverable if it exceeds the sum of undiscounted cash flows from the 
use and disposition of the asset.  Although the fair value of a long-lived asset is less than 
its carrying amount, firms may not recognize the long-lived asset impairment loss if the 
sum of undiscounted cash flows still exceeds its carrying amount.  Therefore, firms are 
able to avoid achieving the threshold for the long-lived asset impairment test.   
On the contrary, when performing a goodwill impairment test, a firm that has a 
decrease in the fair value of long-lived assets is more likely to exhibit deterioration in the 
                                                 
7
 The examples of such events or changes in circumstances are: (1) a significant decrease in the market 
price of a long-lived asset (asset group); (2) a significant adverse change in the extent or manner in which a 
long-lived asset (asset group) is being used or in its physical condition; (3) a significant adverse change in 
legal factors or in the business climate, including an adverse action or assessment by a regulator; (4) an 
accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the amount originally expected for the acquisition or 
construction of a long-lived asset (asset group); (5) a current-period operating or cash flow loss, a history of 
operating or cash flow losses or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses associated with the use of a 
long-lived assets (asset group); and (6) a current expectation that, more likely than not, a long-lived asset 
(asset group) will be sold or otherwise disposed of significantly before the end of its estimated useful life 
(SFAS No. 144, par 8). 
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fair value of a reporting unit.  This is because the reporting unit’s cash flows, which are 
generated from long-lived assets, also reduce as a result of poor operations.  Unlike SFAS 
No. 144, SFAS No. 142 does not require a recoverability test to assess the sum of 
undiscounted cash flows in determining goodwill impairment.  Instead, SFAS No. 142 
applies present value techniques to measure the fair value of a reporting unit and requires 
annual assessment for goodwill impairment.  Therefore, a firm is less likely to avoid 
achieving the threshold for a goodwill impairment test.  As a result, the goodwill 
impairment loss should be able to reflect a decrease in firm performance.  In addition, the 
goodwill impairment loss can also reflect a decline in the fair values of other long-lived 
assets in the reporting unit that may not be noticeable if there are no disclosures of fixed 
asset impairment losses.  An example of goodwill impairment test under SFAS No. 142 
and its relation with SFAS No. 144 are further discussed in Appendix A. 
 The FASB expects that changes in SFAS No. 142 will improve financial reporting 
as follows: 
The new standard will improve financial reporting because the financial 
statements of entities that acquire goodwill and other intangible assets will better 
reflect the “underlying economics” of those assets.  As a result, financial 
statement users will be better able to understand the investments made in those 
assets and the subsequent performance of those investments.  The enhanced 
disclosures about goodwill and intangible assets subsequent to their acquisition 
also will provide users with a better understanding of the expectations about and 
changes in those assets over time, thereby improving their ability to assess future 
profitability and cash flows (SFAS 142, Summary).  
 
 
 The adoption of SFAS No. 142 is effective for fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 2001.  Early adoption is permitted for entities with fiscal years beginning 
after March 15, 2001.  However, subsequent recovery of a goodwill impairment loss is 
not allowed.  The amount of the transitional goodwill impairment loss is recorded as “the 
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effect of a change in accounting principle” and presented in the income statement 
between the captions extraordinary items and net income.8  After the transitional period, 
the goodwill impairment loss is presented as a separate line item of the continuing 
operations in the income statement (SFAS No. 142, par. 43, and 56). 
                                                 
8
 An entity has six months from the date of initial adoption of SFAS No. 142 to complete the first step of 
transitional goodwill impairment test.  However, amounts used in the transitional goodwill impairment test 
are measured at the beginning of the year of initial application (SFAS No. 142, par. 55). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
 
3.1 Linkage between Goodwill Impairment and Firm Performance 
An acquiring entity is willing to pay for goodwill because it believes that the net 
assets acquired are worth more than the purchase price.  The value of goodwill is 
originated from the value of combining entities.  For instance, an entity obtains potential 
acquisition gains from an improvement of management efficiency by well-managed 
bidders (Lang et. al 1989), synergistic gains from economies of scale (Bradley et al. 
1988), and financial synergy benefits from internal financing versus external financing 
advantages (Nielsen and Melicher 1973).  Synergy goodwill is the value created by a 
business combination that may result from more efficient management, economies of 
scale, integration of resources, the improvement in production techniques, and the 
redeployment of assets to more profitable uses.  This concept is consistent with the 
evidence of synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions (Bradley et al. 1988).  In other 
words, corporate acquisitions create synergistic gains resulting in better uses of resources.  
Firms that use resources more efficiently are seen as efficient firms. 
SFAS No. 142 requires managers to test goodwill for impairment at the reporting 
unit level.  However, management estimates and assumptions are subjective and 
information regarding each reporting unit is usually unobtainable.  Although SFAS No.  
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142 allows a reporting unit to be the same as a business segment under SFAS No. 131, in 
practice, many companies have a number of reporting units greater than a number of 
reportable segments.  In addition, Watt (2003) argues that synergies imply joint costs and 
benefits so the allocation of joint costs and benefits for valuation purposes is arbitrary.  
“If there are significant synergies at all among the units, then there is no meaningful way 
to allocate future cash flows, value, and goodwill among units” (p. 218).  Therefore, 
assessing performance at the firm level is more relevant than at the reporting unit level 
when goodwill is assigned to multiple reporting units. 
Goodwill is viewed as an asset by the market and the decline in the value of 
goodwill is used by investors to value the firm as a whole (Hayn and Hughes 2006).  
Therefore, goodwill represents the value and performance of an entire entity.  However, 
goodwill does not have a set of cash flows uniquely associated with it.  “Instead, the cash 
flows associated with acquired goodwill usually are intermingled with those associated 
with internally generated goodwill and other assets because entities generally enter into 
business combinations to reduce costs and achieve synergies, which entails integrating 
the acquired entity with the acquiring entity” (SFAS No. 142, Appendix B, par B84).  To 
assess goodwill for impairment, a firm is allowed to use present value techniques in 
measuring the fair value of a reporting unit.  Because a firm needs to make assumptions 
based on past and current performance when estimating future cash flows, firm 
performance is an important indicator in determining a goodwill impairment loss. 
  Efficiency is a measure of firm performance and is defined as the ratio of the 
output(s) that a firm produces to the input(s) that it uses (Coelli et al. 1998, p.1-3).  
Larger values of this ratio are related with a better performance.  This study defines 
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efficiency as a measure of financial performance, which is generated from business 
operations, and uses accounting data to estimate the performance measure.  Cash flows 
generated from business operations indicate how well firms use several resources as 
inputs (e.g. cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current 
assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) to generate outputs (e.g. sales; income before 
extraordinary items; and operating cash flows).  Thus, a measure of efficiency can be 
used to evaluate the performance of combined entities.  A decline in the value of 
goodwill reported as goodwill impairment should reflect the deterioration of firm 
performance.  Because a measure of performance is a relative concept, or so-called 
relative efficiency, it is measured relative to the performance of another firm or relative 
to its performance at different points in time. 
 
3.2 Measuring Relative Efficiency by Data Envelopment Analysis  
This study assesses firm performance and estimates the relative efficiency of 
impairment and non-impairment firms by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).    
DEA is a frontier estimation technique that uses linear approximation to map the 
envelope of the input-output data.  Each firm within a given industry is considered as a 
decision making unit (DMU).  The efficient frontier line indicates the performance of the 
best DMUs and measures the efficiency of other DMUs by deviations from it (Cooper et 
al. 2000). 
Figure 1 is a simple example to illustrate the relative efficiency concept.  
Following Farrell (1957), the two-input and single-output production process is 
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demonstrated under conditions of constant returns to scale for simplification.9  The 
production function is usually represented as y = f(x1, x2); where y is an output; and x1, x2 
are two inputs.  An isoquant QQ shows all combinations of two inputs that efficient firms 
can use to produce a unit of output.  The efficiency of each firm is measured relative to 
the isoquant.  Technical efficiency is defined as the maximum output attainable from each 
level of inputs or the minimum inputs used for a given level of output.  Firms A, B, C are 
technically efficient because they are located on the isoquant.  Firm D is off the isoquant 
so it is not technically efficient.  The technical efficiency of firm D is the ratio of optimal 
input use (OD’) to actual input use (OD). 
 In Farrell (1957), all firms in the sample are assumed to have the same technology 
and have the same frontier.  However, impairment and non-impairment firms may have 
different objective functions and employ different best practice frontiers.  To allow this 
possibility, this study partitions the pooled sample into the subsamples of impairment and 
non-impairment firms.  Following Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992), Figure 2 illustrates 
how to obtain the technical efficiency index relative to the pooled frontier and the 
subsample frontier.  QQ represents the frontier isoquant from the pooled sample, whereas 
Q*Q* represents the frontier for the impairment subsample.  Considering firm D, the 
technical efficiency relative to the pooled frontier is called an overall efficiency index 
(EI), which is equal to OD’/OD.  The efficiency of each firm calculated relative to its 
separate group’s frontier is called a within-group index (EIw).  For instance, the technical 
                                                 
9
 Returns to scale (RTS) is a long-run concept which reflects the degree of proportional increase in all 
inputs that increases outputs.  In constant RTS, a proportional increase in all inputs results in the same 
proportional increase in outputs.  Variable RTS can be increasing and decreasing RTS.  Increasing 
(Decreasing) RTS occurs when a proportional increase in all inputs results in a greater (smaller) 
proportional increase in outputs (Coelli et al. 1998, p. 18). 
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efficiency index of firm D relative to its own group is equal to OD”/OD.  A between-
group index (EIb), which captures the difference in the frontiers of the two subsamples is 
calculated as the ratio of the overall efficiency index to the within-group efficiency index 
such that EIb = EI/ EIw.  
To examine differences between two subsamples, this study starts by testing 
whether each subsample shares a common production frontier.  Following Fizel and 
Nunnikhoven (1992), EI and EIw are compared for each subsample.  If there are no 
significant differences between the pooled and within-group indices, a Wilcoxon rank 
sum test will be conducted on the overall efficiency indices (EI vs. EI).  A Wilcoxon rank 
sum test is suggested because the theoretical distribution of efficiency scores in DEA is 
usually unknown (Cooper et al. 2000, p.200-202).  This method is used to examine the 
differences between the two groups, assuming that the subsamples share the common 
production frontier.   However, if EI and EIw are significantly different, suggesting that 
the subsample has a frontier different from the pooled frontier, a Wilcoxon rank sum test 
will be conducted on the between-group indices (EIb vs. EIb).  The differences in relative 
efficiency between these two subsamples will indicate which subsample is more efficient 
than the other.10  
 This study relaxes the restriction of constant returns to scale and allows for 
variable returns to scale by using the Banker-Charnes-Cooper (BCC) model (Banker et 
al. 1984).  Impairment and non-impairment firms may possess different returns to scale 
properties.  For example, impairment firms may exhibit decreasing returns to scale 
                                                 
10
 This method has also been used in the study of Burnett and Hansen (2005) to test for the differences in 
relative efficiency between Phase-One and Non-Phase-One plants in cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analyses.  
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because management cannot utilize assets efficiently to generate revenues, profits, and 
cash flows.  Although the results of different DEA models are relatively robust (Ahn et 
al. 1988), the BCC model is more flexible and can accommodate the translation in 
variance.11  The input-oriented BCC model for n DMUs, m outputs, and s inputs is 
shown as follows: 
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where: 
 ε  = DEA scores; 
 Oij = Output j for DMU i; 
 Iir  = Input r for DMU i; 
 Okj  = Output j for DMU k (target DMU); 
 Ikr  = Input r for DMU k (target DMU); 
 wi  = Weight assigned by DEA; 
 
 The BCC model selects a set of weights to minimize ε.  The hypothetical 
composite DMU is constructed based on outputs and inputs for all DMUs.  The 
constraints require the composite DMU to use fewer inputs to produce the greater or the 
same outputs as the target DMU.  In this case, the composite DMU is more efficient than 
                                                 
11
 Translation invariance means that translating the original input or output variables results in a new 
problem that has the same optimal solution. 
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the target DMU and the target DMU is defined as relative inefficiency (ε < 1).  The value 
of ε in the objective function falls in between 0 and 1.  If ε = 1, the composite DMU is 
not more efficient than the target DMU, indicating that the target DMU is on the efficient 
frontier. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT AND RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF FIRMS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the underlying economics of goodwill impairment.  SFAS 
No. 142 was issued in 2001, which eliminates the goodwill amortization method and 
requires goodwill to be tested for impairment annually or whenever events or 
circumstances indicate the potential for impairment.  The standard provides more specific 
guidance in determining the timing and measuring the amount of goodwill impairment 
loss.  The objective of SFAS No. 142 is to improve financial reporting transparency such 
that financial statements will better reflect the underlying economics of assets acquired, 
including goodwill.  As a result, the users of financial statements will better understand 
the changes in those assets over time, thereby improving their ability to assess future 
profitability and cash flows (SFAS No. 142, Summary).   
Relevance and reliability are the two primary qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information (Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information (FASB 1980).  Accounting information is 
relevant when it has predictive value, feedback value, and timeliness.  Because historical 
accounting increases a gap between market values and book values, accounting 
information under the historical-oriented model becomes less relevant.  SFAS No. 142 is 
one of the several accounting standards that have been recently moved toward the fair  
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value accounting model.12  Accounting information is reliable when it achieves 
characteristics of verifiability, neutrality, and representational faithfulness.  The FASB 
concludes that the nonamortization of goodwill together with the impairment testing is 
consistent with the concept of representational faithfulness, as stated in FASB Concepts 
Statement No. 2.13 
Recently, studies of goodwill have revealed the impact of changes in the goodwill 
accounting rules on the stock market during the initial adoption period.  Prior research 
finds that stock return effects of goodwill impairment announcements are negative. The 
results indicate that these announcements are useful because they convey information of a 
decline in the future performance of firms to market participants (Segal 2003; Li et al. 
2005; Long 2005; Shough 2005).  Prior literature examining determinants of goodwill 
impairment documents that the impairment is the result of two main factors--the 
deterioration of economic conditions and reporting incentives for write-off decisions. 
Segal (2003) and Li et al. (2005) find that goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 
results from the deterioration of economic conditions subsequent to the acquisition, while 
several other studies suggest that managerial reporting incentives are important factors in 
determining goodwill impairment (Beatty and Weber 2006; Guler 2006).  Previous 
research uses a firm’s historical performance, industry trends, and stock market 
performance to proxy for economic factors. 
                                                 
12
 Examples of such accounting standards are SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and 
Hedging Activity and  SFAS No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities, 
which will become effective after November 15, 2007. 
13
 Representational faithfulness is correspondence or agreement between a measure or description and the 
phenomenon it purports to represent.  In accounting, the phenomena to be represented are economic 
resources and obligations and the transactions and events that change those resources and obligations (CON 
No. 2, par 63). 
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Prior research focuses on the initial adoption because SFAS No. 142 offers 
management incentives to manage earnings by allowing the transitional impairment 
losses to be reported as “the effect of a change in accounting principle” and presented 
between captions of extraordinary items and net income (SFAS No. 142, par 56).  This 
“below-the-line” item motivates firms to recognize the goodwill impairment losses in the 
adoption year rather than deferring the impairment and reporting them in later years as 
expenses in continuing operations.  In addition, the goodwill impairment losses 
subsequent to the initial adoption period have been under-investigated because of limited 
data availability.  However, the data have become available recently since SFAS No. 142 
was implemented in 2002.  There are several concerns about the implementation of SFAS 
No. 142 because subjectivity is inherent in the goodwill impairment test, such as 
identifying a reporting unit, allocating assets, liabilities, and goodwill to a reporting unit, 
and calculating the fair value of a reporting unit.  As shown in the 2002 annual report of 
AOL Time Warner Inc, the company notes that “the determination of impairment of 
goodwill and other intangible assets requires significant judgment and estimates”.14  Due 
to subjectivity and complexity of the implementation of SFAS No. 142, it is interesting to 
examine whether or not the standard has achieved its merit in reflecting the underlying 
economic reasons for goodwill impairment recognition, the primary objective of this 
standard. 
Drawing upon prior literature examining the relation between goodwill 
impairment and determinants of impairment during the initial adoption of SFAS No. 142, 
                                                 
14
 In 2002, AOL Time Warner Inc reports $54.2 billion charge for goodwill impairment as a cumulative 
effect of an accounting change and records an additional charge of $45.5 billion as a part of operating 
income. 
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this study extends prior research by focusing on goodwill impairment after the initial 
adoption period.  The purpose of this study is to examine the usefulness of SFAS No. 142 
whether the implementation of this standard achieves the FASB’s objective such that 
goodwill impairment reflects the underlying economics of goodwill.  Goodwill is a 
valuable economic resource and the valuation of goodwill is important information for 
evaluating the level and uncertainty of a firm’s future cash flows (Hayn and Hughes 
2006).  Goodwill represents benefits from a business combination due to a value created 
by combining synergies, saving from economies of scale, an ability to obtain controlling 
interest, a possibility to achieve profitability, and an increase in market shares (Nielsen 
and Melicher 1973; Bradley et al. 1988; Lang et. al 1989).  Goodwill does not generate 
cash flows on its own but is associated with other assets in business operations.  
Therefore, a decrease in the value of goodwill reported as goodwill impairment should 
reflect a decline in firm performance and efficiency.  Unlike prior studies that use several 
accounting data and stock returns to proxy for firm performance, this study takes 
advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in capturing a firm’s overall relative 
efficiency.  DEA aggregates multiple financial measures into a single measure of firm 
performance and efficiency.   
This study applies DEA technique to measure a firm’s relative efficiency by 
comparing efficiency of a firm with other firms in the same period and with similar firms 
over different periods.  Data are obtained from three selected industries--durable 
manufacturers, computers, and services.  For a cross-sectional analysis, the empirical 
results show that impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms 
in the year of goodwill impairment recognition, consistent with the prediction that 
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impairment firms are likely to use economic resources less efficiently than non-
impairment firms.  For a longitudinal analysis, this study examines changes in the relative 
efficiency of impairment versus non-impairment firms over time.  The results indicate a 
significant increase in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that report goodwill 
impairment in year t, but do not have goodwill impairment in year t+1.  This study finds 
partial evidence supporting a decrease in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms 
that do not have goodwill impairment in year t, but report impairment in year t+1.  
However, the results show no significant changes in the relative efficiency of firms that 
report goodwill impairment in two consecutive years.  A plausible explanation is that 
impairment firms may have a gradual decline in relative efficiency additional to the 
decline in efficiency from the prior year of impairment recognition.  Therefore, the 
changes in relative efficiency from the prior year are not significant enough to indicate 
any differences between these two periods.  Overall, these findings show that goodwill 
impairment under SFAS No. 142 reflects a decrease in relative efficiency, the underlying 
economic reason for goodwill impairment. 
This study contributes to the prior literature in the following ways.  First, this 
study is the first to examine the usefulness of goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 
by assessing the relative efficiency of firms instead of applying the market-based 
approach.  The results of this study extend the literature by providing further insight into 
the underlying economic reasons for the association between goodwill impairment and 
stock prices (e.g. Segal 2003; Zang 2003; Li et al. 2005; Long 2005).  The association 
between goodwill impairment and the relative efficiency of firms helps to explain why 
goodwill impairment conveys information about firms’ equity valuations and provides 
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users of financial statements with a better understanding of the underlying economic 
value of goodwill.  Second, this study contributes to the relative efficiency literature (e.g. 
Bowlin 1995, 1999; Seiford and Zhu 1999; Zhu 2000) by applying the DEA technique to 
test the implementation of an accounting standard in reflecting the underlying economics 
of goodwill impairment.  Finally, the evidence supporting this study helps investors and 
other users of financial statements to determine potential goodwill impairment by 
including a measure of firm performance.  This study also provides the FASB with 
empirical evidence on the implication of SFAS No. 142 whether or not goodwill 
impairment recognition is consistent with the concept of representational faithfulness.   
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 reviews the 
related literature.  Section 4.3 discusses hypothesis development.  Section 4.4 describes 
research design.  Section 4.5 contains empirical results and Section 4.6 presents the 
sensitivity analysis.  The final section offers the conclusion. 
 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Nature of Goodwill 
At the date of acquisition, SFAS No. 142 requires a combined entity to record the 
target firm’s identifiable and non-identifiable net assets at their fair values.  The excess of 
acquisition price over the fair values of the acquired entity’s net assets is recorded as 
goodwill.  The FASB defines goodwill as the excess of the cost of an entity over the net 
of the amounts assigned to assets acquired and liabilities assumed (SFAS No. 141, par. 
43).  Previous studies (Henning et al. 2000; Long 2005) decompose goodwill into three 
components--going-concern, synergy, and residual components--using the framework 
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provided by Johnson and Petrone (1998).15   Henning et al. (2000) find that, for the 
sample period of 1990-1994, going-concern, synergy, and residual components of 
goodwill represent about 20, 50, and 30 percents of recognized goodwill, respectively.  
According to the FASB, going-concern and synergy components of goodwill are 
described as “core goodwill” that meets the FASB’s definition of assets in FASB 
Concepts Statement No. 6.16, 17  Going-concern goodwill represents the preexisting 
goodwill that was either internally generated by the acquired entity or acquired by it in 
past business combinations.  Synergy goodwill reflects the excess value created by 
combining the entities (SFAS No. 141, Appendix B, par B105).  Residual goodwill is not 
conceptually part of goodwill but it represents a measurement error or a gain/loss to the 
acquiring entity.  It may also occur after acquisitions when the combined entity cannot 
achieve the expected benefits due to a decline in firm performance and efficiency. 
Henning et al. (2000) and Long (2005) conclude that market values have a 
significant positive association with the going-concern and synergy components, but a 
                                                 
15
 Henning et al. (2000) measure components of goodwill as follows:  Going-concern component is 
calculated as the difference between the target’s pre-acquisition market value measured six days prior to the 
acquisition and the target’s fair market value of assets.  Synergy component is calculated as the combined 
cumulative abnormal returns to the target and the acquirer for the 11 days of the acquisition announcement.  
Residual component is calculated as the purchase price less the sum of the fair value of the target’s net 
assets, the going-concern component, and the synergy component. 
16
 The FASB describes three components as follows: (1) Going-concern goodwill relates to the acquired 
entity and represents the ability of a business to earn a higher rate of return on an assembled collection of 
net assets than would be expected if those net assets were acquired separately.  That value arises from the 
synergies of net assets of the business and from other benefits (e.g. the ability to earn monopoly profits and 
barriers to market entry);  (2) Synergy goodwill reflects the fair value of the expected synergies from 
combining the acquiring entity’s and acquired entity’s net assets and businesses;  (3) Residual goodwill 
represents the overvaluation of the amount paid due to errors in valuing acquired entity and the 
overpayment (if the price is driven up in the course of bidding) or underpayment (in a case of distress sale 
or fire sale) by the acquiring entity (SFAS No. 141, Appendix B, par. B102).   
17
 FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements (FASB 1985) defines assets as 
probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past 
transactions or events.  
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significant negative association with the residual component of goodwill.  In addition, the 
coefficient of the synergy component has the highest magnitude compared to the other 
two components of goodwill and is greater than one, suggesting that investors value this 
synergy goodwill more than other components.  During the initial adoption of SFAS No. 
142, Long (2005) finds a positive association between the transitional goodwill 
impairment loss and the residual goodwill, suggesting that the transitional impairment 
loss has already captured the overpayment in past acquisitions.  The transitional 
impairment loss is also positively associated with the synergy goodwill, indicating that 
the synergy component becomes impaired after the acquisition period.  This may be 
caused by a decline in firm performance.  The synergy goodwill is the largest component 
of goodwill, which represents about half of the total amount of goodwill (Long 2005). 
 
4.2.2 Literature on Goodwill Impairment 
 Goodwill is recorded as an asset because it is expected to generate future 
economic benefits.  Prior studies find a strong positive association between equity values 
and goodwill, suggesting that investors value the amount of goodwill as a valuable 
economic resource (Jennings et al. 1996; Henning et al. 2000).  Accounting for goodwill 
after the initial recognition has been debated among researchers and regulators for a long 
time.  An important question is whether goodwill should be amortized over its expected 
useful life or whether it should be tested for impairment.  Under the previous accounting 
standard, firms were forced to record goodwill amortization even though they were able 
to enhance the value of goodwill as could be seen by an increase in an ability to generate 
future operating profits.  On the other hand, firms that experience a significant decline in 
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the value of goodwill were able to hide the decrease by estimating the number of years 
over which goodwill is amortized.  Hall (1993) finds that managers consider economic 
consequences in deciding the length of goodwill amortization period.  The FASB 
acknowledges that not all goodwill declines in value or if the value of goodwill 
decreases, the reduction rarely follows a straight-line basis (SFAS No. 142, Appendix B, 
par B79).  Thus, the amortization method achieves the acceptable level of reliability but 
does not reflect the economic changes in the value of goodwill, thereby reducing the level 
of relevance.  Prior studies focus on how accounting for goodwill amortization affects the 
usefulness of financial statements.  The findings suggest that goodwill amortization 
disclosure is not useful to investors (Jennings et al. 1996; Jennings et al. 2001; Moehrle et 
al. 2001).  Therefore, eliminating goodwill amortization from income statements may 
reduce a source of noise in earnings measurement and not reduce the usefulness of 
earnings. 
 In general, prior studies on asset write-offs, including goodwill before the 
issuance of SFAS No. 142, conclude that the asset write-offs are value relevant and have 
negative valuation effects (Elliott and Shaw 1988; Bartov et al. 1998; Hirschey and 
Richardson 2002, 2003).  Hirschey and Richardson (2002, 2003) find that information 
effects tied to goodwill write-off announcements are materially negative, on the order of  
-2 to -3 percent of the stock price.  They also find negative information effects of -40 
percent in the one-year pre-announcement period and -11 percent by the end of the one-
year post-announcement period.  These results suggest that investors partially anticipate 
goodwill write-offs and underreact to the write-off announcements.  Moreover, Elliott 
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and Shaw (1988) document that analysts reduce their forecasts of year-ahead earnings 
after asset write-off announcements.  
Previous studies examine the announcements of goodwill impairment losses 
under SFAS No. 142 and find that these disclosures convey useful information to users of 
financial statements (e.g. investors and analysts).  The stock market responds negatively 
to the transitional impairment loss under SFAS No. 142 (Segal 2003; Zang 2003; Li et al. 
2005; Long 2005; Shough 2005).  Li et al. (2005) examine the goodwill impairment 
sample from January 2002 to March 2003 and find significantly negative three-day stock 
returns (day -1 to +1) surrounding the impairment announcements.  However, comparing 
goodwill impairment under pre- and post-SFAS No. 142, Segal (2003) finds no evidence 
that the market reaction to goodwill impairment is more negative under SFAS No. 142.  
In addition, prior studies find that financial analysts revise their earnings forecast 
downward upon the announcement of goodwill impairment loss (Zang 2003; Li et al. 
2005).  The evidence indicates that the transitional goodwill impairment loss provides 
meaningful information about the future performance of a firm.  However, market-based 
studies provide only indirect evidence about the relation between goodwill and a firm’s 
future operating performance.  This study extends the value relevance literature by 
providing further insight on the underlying economic reasons for the association between 
goodwill impairment and stock prices. 
Goodwill impairment may arise from the overpayment at the time of acquisition 
or from the subsequent poor performance.  Prior research documents that the transitional 
goodwill impairment is positively associated with the indicator of overpayment (Li et al. 
2005; Long 2005), but negatively associated with the past stock returns and financial 
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performance of a firm (Segal 2003; Li et al. 2005; Long 2005).  Long (2005) measures 
the overpayment as the residual component of goodwill and finds that the goodwill 
impairment loss in the adoption year captures over two thirds of the overpayment 
cumulated across past acquisitions.  These results indicate that although firms should 
write off the overpayment from the amount of goodwill after the acquisition periods, they 
tend to delay the negative effect of the impairment loss until they are required to do so by 
SFAS No. 142.  Because the transitional impairment loss has already captured the 
overpayment accumulated over the past years and a catch-up adjustment to reflect a 
decline in the economic value of goodwill, this offers a research opportunity to examine 
the extent to which post-SFAS No. 142 goodwill impairment reflects a deterioration of a 
firm’s underlying economic value. 
 
4.2.3 Literature on Relative Efficiency 
 Measuring efficiency has been increasingly important since the 1980s as 
corporations are focusing more on improving their performance by increasing their 
efficiency.  Further, there have been changes in legislative and management policies in 
many industries over the past decades and the changes have affected the financial 
condition and performance of firms.  Prior studies assess the performance of firms in 
specific industries.  For example, Bowlin (1995) examines the financial condition of the 
defense industrial base relative to the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500.   
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a nonparametric analysis, is a widely 
accepted method used to assess the relative efficiency of firms.  DEA has been applied in 
non-profit organizations such as hospital and health care (Grosskopf and Valdmanis 
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1987; Nyman and Bricker 1989; Fizel and Nunnikhoven 1992), the banking industry 
(Miller and Noulas 1996; Leong et al. 2003), and the computer industry (Thore 1996; 
Thore et al. 1996).  Moreover, DEA has been used to compare the productivity growth, 
technical progress, and efficiency change in industrialized countries (Fare et al. 1994).  
DEA has also been used to assess the financial performance of the defense industry 
(Bowlin 1995, 1999), large banks (Seiford and Zhu 1999; Luo 2003), and the Fortune 
500 companies (Zhu 2000). 
 DEA has several characteristics that make it attractive to measure relative 
efficiency.  First, DEA allows evaluating efficiency when multiple outputs and inputs 
need to be considered.  In this setting, firms use several resources (inputs) to produce 
multiple financial terms (outputs) that can capture the operating efficiency and ability to 
generate future cash flows, which are a major concern in making a goodwill impairment 
decision.  Thus, DEA combines several financial measures into a meaningful measure of 
overall performance (Bowlin 1999).  Second, the DEA model is pareto optimal so any 
input variable reductions or output variable changes can be affected without worsening 
other model variables (Bowlin 1999).  Third, DEA does not require a weight to be 
attached to each input and output, and does not require a priori specification of functional 
forms as needed in a regression analysis (Cooper et al. 2000, p.4).  Finally, firms on the 
DEA frontier are the best performing firms and can be used as the benchmark for 
measuring the efficiency of other firms.  Therefore, DEA allows this study to achieve the 
objective of comparing the relative efficiency between impairment and non-impairment 
firms in the pooled sample as well as partitioning the pooled sample into subsamples 
when they have different production frontiers. 
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4.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.3.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Business combinations after the adoption of SFAS No. 141 and 142 are expected 
to report the initial goodwill recognition more accurately than prior acquisitions.  This is 
because SFAS No. 141 requires an acquiring entity to make every effort to: (1) measure 
the purchase consideration accurately; (2) record net assets acquired at fair values rather 
than their carrying amount; and (3) recognize all acquired intangible assets, to avoid 
subsuming the write-up of net assets acquired and the residual component into the 
amount initially recognized as goodwill (SFAS No. 141, Appendix B, par. B106).  Thus, 
the residual component of goodwill is likely to represent a smaller portion of recognized 
goodwill.  In addition, Long (2005) finds that the transitional goodwill impairment loss, 
which captures over two thirds of the overpayment cumulated across past acquisitions 
and a catch-up adjustment for a decline in the economic value of goodwill, has already 
adjusted the amount of goodwill to reflect its current economic value.  The evidence 
suggests an opportunity to examine whether goodwill impairment after the initial 
adoption can signal a decline in a firm’s relative efficiency, which is an alternative 
approach to assess the usefulness of goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142. 
This study directly examines whether or not the recognition of goodwill 
impairment loss after the initial adoption of SFAS No. 142 can convey a decline in a 
firm’s underlying economic performance.  Investors view the amount of purchased 
goodwill as a valuable economic resource, which can be seen by a strong positive 
association between equity values and goodwill (Jennings et al. 1996; Henning et al. 
2000).  Prior studies show that the largest component of goodwill is the synergy goodwill 
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(Henning et al. 2000; Long 2005), which represents the value created by business 
combinations resulting from more efficient uses of resources (Bradley et al. 1988).  
Goodwill represents the present value of a stream of expected future cash flows (Jennings 
et al. 1996).  However, goodwill does not have a unique set of cash flows associated with 
it.  Instead, cash flows associated with goodwill are mixed with those associated with 
other assets.  Thus, goodwill impairment provides a signal of important changes in the 
value of goodwill and a firm’s future earnings potential (Hirschey and Richardson 2003).  
Impairment firms are more likely to use their economic resources less efficiently than 
non-impairment firms.  Moreover, these firms are likely to have poor performance, 
decline in efficiency, low profitability, and negative net cash flows.  Therefore, the first 
hypothesis stated in the alternative form is: 
 
H1: Impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms in the 
year of goodwill impairment recognition after the initial adoption of SFAS 142. 
 
 
4.3.2 Longitudinal Analysis 
 This study examines changes in the relative efficiency of impairment and non-
impairment firms over time.  Goodwill impairment is presumably related to a decline in 
the relative efficiency of firms.  Firms are more likely to have lower relative efficiency in 
the year of goodwill impairment reporting than in the year of no impairment reporting.  
Moreover, firms that report goodwill impairment in two consecutive years are more 
likely to have an additional decline in relative efficiency in the second year of goodwill 
impairment.  The disclosure of goodwill impairment will be useful if it can reflect the 
deterioration of a firm’s underlying economic value so that financial statement users will 
be able to understand the subsequent performance of a firm and make better decisions.  
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Therefore, a longitudinal analysis provides further evidence on the merit of SFAS No. 
142 to standard setters and other users of financial statements.   
A longitudinal analysis is conducted on each two consecutive years based on four 
possible scenarios.  The first scenario is that impairment firms may report goodwill 
impairment losses in two consecutive years.  If SFAS No. 142 provides information 
about firm performance, the impairment losses recognized in the second year of 
impairment should reflect an additional decline in relative efficiency.  Thus, the relative 
efficiency of firms in the second year of goodwill impairment is likely to be lower than 
that in the first year of goodwill impairment (EFFt > EFFt+1).   
Regarding the second and third scenarios, firms reporting goodwill impairment in 
this year (year t) may not have goodwill impairment in the next year (year t+1), or vice 
versa.  If SFAS No. 142 is properly applied and achieves its objective, the disclosures of 
goodwill impairment losses should convey the underlying economics of goodwill on a 
timely manner.  Therefore, the relative efficiency of firms in the year of impairment 
reporting is likely to be lower than that in the year of no impairment reporting.  For the 
second scenario, if firms report impairment losses in this year, but do not have 
impairment losses in the next year, the relative efficiency of firms in the next year is 
likely to be as least equal to or higher than that in this year (EFFt ≤ EFFt+1).  For the third 
scenario, if firms report no impairment losses in this year, but have impairment losses in 
the next year, the relative efficiency of firms in the next year is likely to be lower than 
that in this year (EFFt > EFFt+1).   
For the final scenario, this study compares the relative efficiency of firms that do 
not report goodwill impairment in both years.  In this case, this study predicts to find no 
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significant differences in relative efficiency between this year and the next year (EFFt = 
EFFt+1). 
 
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 The sample is restricted to firms on Compustat that are publicly traded in the U.S. 
for the fiscal years 2002-2005.  The adoption of SFAS No. 142 is effective for fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 2001.  Thus, the first effective fiscal year is 2002.18  
The diagram of effective date for the SFAS No. 142 implementation is shown in Figure 
3.  This study restricts the sample to firms with fiscal years ended December 31 to 
eliminate the effect of an early adoption that is permitted to firms with fiscal years 
beginning after March 15, 2001.  The impairment sample of 2002-2005 reports goodwill 
impairment losses as required by SFAS No. 142. 
Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of impairment observations by industry.19  The 
initial sample starts with 13,957 firm-year observations having goodwill balances at the 
beginning or at the ending of each fiscal year during the periods of 2002-2005.  Firms 
with no goodwill impairment and missing data are eliminated.  This study also restricts 
the sample to firms with fiscal years ended December 31.  The sample selection method 
                                                 
18
 For the first effective fiscal year of 2002, this study excludes firms that record only transitional goodwill 
impairment losses as cumulative effects of a change in accounting principle because the transitional 
impairment losses may represent the overpayment during the acquisition periods or the poor efficiency of 
firms in the past years before SFAS No. 142 was adopted but firms delayed goodwill impairment 
recognition.   
19
 Industry membership is determined by using the industry classification as shown in the study of Barth et 
al. (1998), which classified firms into 14 industries.  The classification of Barth et al. (1998) provides this 
study with enough observations to perform an analysis for each selected industry rather than using the 
classification of two-digit SIC code. 
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results in an impairment sample of 914 firm-year observations from 2002-2005 across 14 
industries.  The durable manufacturing industry has the largest number of impairment 
observations (210 firm-year observations), following by the computer industry (180 firm-
year observations), and the service industry (124 firm-year observations).  Therefore, the 
final sample firms are selected from these three industries because each of them provides 
sufficient observations with goodwill impairment.  In addition, due to the nature of rapid 
growth and high technology business, these industries have been considered to be very 
active in mergers and acquisitions and have a large number of firms recognizing goodwill 
impairment losses after the adoption of SFAS No. 142.  Finally, the durable 
manufacturers, computers, and services provide 514 firm-year observations with 
goodwill impairment losses, representing about 56 percent of the total impairment 
observations from all industries. 
The amount of goodwill impairment reported by Compustat is verified by 
comparing with firms’ 10K reports.20  Forty-two observations that have no 10K filings or 
have incorrect amount of goodwill impairment reported by Compustat are eliminated.  
Data for the control sample of firms that report goodwill on the balance sheet but no 
goodwill impairment losses over the entire period of study are collected.  Control firms 
defined as non-impairment observations are matched by SIZE and the same two-digit SIC 
code as the sample firms in the same period.  SIZE is the beginning total assets.  The 
relative efficiency of firms can be influenced by firm size because large firms are likely 
to have higher relative efficiency than small firms due to economies of scale.  On the 
other hand, large firms can experience more mergers and acquisitions than small firms so 
                                                 
20
 Compustat sometimes includes the amount of other intangible asset impairment or the amount of long-
lived asset impairment in the amount of goodwill impairment. 
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they may exhibit greater likelihood of goodwill impairment.  Moreover, firms in different 
industries are subject to different economic conditions.  Thus, matching by firm size and 
industry will reduce size effects and industry-specific factors and allow making a more 
precise analysis about the effect of the relative efficiency.21  Finally, 27 observations 
from the initial sample are excluded because they have no firms matched on size and 
industry.  As shown in Table 4.2, the sample selection results in the final sample of 445 
firm-year impairment observations, which include 173, 161, and 111 observations from 
durable manufacturers, computers, and services, respectively.    
Table 4.3 presents the sample and matched control observations classified by 
industry and year. The impairment sample consists of firms with goodwill impairment 
losses in at least one year during 2002-2005, while the control sample has no goodwill 
impairment losses over the entire period.  Durable manufacturers and computers have the 
largest number of impairment firms presented in 2002 as opposed to 2003-2005.  
However, impairment firms are almost evenly distributed across four years for the service 
industry.   
 
4.4.2 Variables for DEA Model 
 This study uses financial performance measures as proxies for the relative 
efficiency of firms.  Bowlin (1995) suggests two factors to be considered in selecting the 
input and output variables: (1) the production function nature of the DEA model 
                                                 
21
 I obtain additional disclosures of possible reasons for goodwill impairment by reviewing firms’ 10K and 
10Q filings.  If the goodwill impairment loss is caused by an overpayment, the impairment observation and 
the matched control sample will be eliminated from the overall sample.  However, after reviewing the 10K 
and 10Q filing, I do not find any disclosures indicating the overpayment as a rationale for goodwill 
impairment.  Examples of goodwill impairment disclosures are shown in Appendix B. 
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indicating what firms produce in financial terms; and (2) the financial analysis nature of 
the research, which suggests using financial ratios to measure the financial performance 
of firms.22  In this study, the financial performance measure is acceptable because what 
firms are attempting to produce in financial terms reflect the operating efficiency and 
ability to generate future cash flows, which are major concerns when making an 
impairment decision.  Moreover, DEA allows assessing multiple measures of the 
financial performance simultaneously and constructing a single performance measure.  
Thus, it eliminates intercorrelations among variables and contradictions that may result 
from including multiple performance variables in the model. 
To calculate DEA scores, five input variables (i.e. cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets, 
including goodwill) and three output variables (i.e. net sales; income before extraordinary 
items; and operating cash flows) are primarily selected.  Although the selection of input 
and output variables can be subjective, the variables in this study, in part, are widely used 
for evaluating firm performance as described in previous research (Bowlin 1995; Bowlin 
1999; Seiford and Zhu 1999; Zhu 2000; Luo 2003).23  These variables are selected 
because they can represent what firms are attempting to produce in terms of financial 
measures as well as capture important financial ratios, such as profitability, return on 
assets, asset turnover, and cash-return on assets.  In addition, DEA can provide 
information additional to that offered by the traditional ratio analysis (Feroz et al. 2003).   
                                                 
22
 Financial terms that a firm attempts to produce are, for instance, market shares, profitability, liquidity, 
and market values.  These factors are considered as outputs produced by using input variables (e.g. plant 
and equipment, capital, and personnel). 
23
Summary of input/output variables from prior studies is shown in Appendix C.  Market value and stock 
prices are not included as output variables in this study because they incorporate many events or 
circumstances that can be affected by the wide economy and market, which are uncontrollable by firms.  
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Variable descriptions are presented in Table 4.4.  Input variables are resources 
used to generate outputs.  Cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (SG&A) measure the amount of resources consumed to produce 
outputs.  Current assets (CA), fixed assets (FA), and intangible assets (INTAN) represent 
economic resources available to generate sales, net income, and operating cash flows.  
Output variables measure outcomes of business operations, which can be used to assess 
the financial performance in terms of revenues, profitability, and cash generating ability.  
Net sales (S) captures market share and represents the original output of firms.  Income 
before extraordinary items (IB) measures profitability and how efficiently firms use their 
resources to generate profits.  Operating cash flows (OCF) is used to assess the financial 
performance in terms of cash generating ability.  This model represents how efficiently a 
firm can utilize its resources to generate outputs in financial terms. 
A concern of this study is that any changes in a set of input/output variables may 
affect the robustness of results.  For instance, adding various sets of input/output 
variables in the DEA model may result in different relative efficiency scores leading to 
inconsistent inferential statistics.  Thus, several combinations of input/output variables 
are implemented to ensure that the conclusion is robust.  Cost of goods sold and selling, 
general, and administrative expenses are combined as a single input variable called 
operating Expenses (OE).  Moreover, total assets (TA) is used as a single input variable to 
represent current assets, fixed assets, and intangible assets.  This study starts with a 
simple model--two inputs (operating expenses and total assets) and a single output 
(sales).  Then, this study introduces several combinations of input/output variables in the 
model.  Table 4.5 shows eight combinations of input/output variables in the DEA model.  
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Models 2 and 3 have the same inputs as model 1 but have more output variables.  
Operating cash flows is added to model 2 and income before extraordinary items is 
further included in model 3.  Models 4, 5, and 6 have four input variables (operating 
expenses, current assets, fixed assets, and intangible assets) and have three different 
combinations of output variables similar to models 1, 2, and 3.  Operating expenses is 
then disaggregated into cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative 
expenses for models 7 and 8.  The robustness check of including various input/output 
variables in the DEA model is further discussed in the empirical result section.    
  DEA requires all variables to be greater than zero (Charnes et al. 1978).  
However, income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows may have negative 
values.  These negative values are handled by adding a constant to the specific output of 
each DMU.  The constant is obtained by finding the minimum values of the particular 
variable and adding its absolute values to all DMUs so that all firms have positive values 
for that particular variable (Bowlin 1999).24  Although the issue of negative values can 
be resolved, the DEA model with sales as the single output variable is more attractive in 
the sense that it does not have any negative values so there is no need for an adjustment. 
 
4.4.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 A cross-sectional analysis is used to address the differences between the relative 
efficiency of impairment and non-impairment firms.  This analysis is conducted within 
each industry from 2002-2005.  First, the samples of impairment and non-impairment 
                                                 
24
 This method is suitable because the BCC model allows for translation invariance, meaning that 
translating the original input or output variables results in a new problem that has the same optimal 
solution. 
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firms are pooled together each year and the overall efficiency indices (EI) are calculated 
for all firms.  Second, this study partitions the pooled sample into the subsamples of 
impairment versus non-impairment firms and calculates the within-group indices (EIw) 
and the between-group indices (EIb).  Then, the test for differences in relative efficiency 
between the overall efficiency indices and the within-group indices (EI vs. EIw) is used to 
determine whether the subsample frontiers are different from the pooled frontier.  Finally, 
to assess differences in relative efficiency between impairment and non-impairment 
firms, a Wilcoxon rank sum test will be conducted on the overall efficiency indices of 
each subsample (EI vs. EI) if both subsamples share the common frontiers of the pooled 
sample.  On the other hand, if subsample frontiers are different from the pooled frontier, a 
Wilcoxon rank sum test will be analyzed on the between-group indices (EIb vs. EIb) to 
determine which subsample is more efficient than the other.  Overall, results finding that 
impairment firms have lower relative efficiency than non-impairment firms and the 
differences are statistically significant will support hypothesis 1. 
 
4.4.4 Longitudinal Analysis 
 To assess the relative efficiency of firms over time, this study traces each sample 
firm to a subsequent year by using the method of Fizel and Nunnikhoven (1992).  Within 
each industry, DMUs in year t and t+1 are pooled together and classified into four 
groups--(1) firms with impairment in year t and t+1; (2) firms with impairment in year t, 
but without impairment in year t+1; (3) firms without impairment in year t, but with 
impairment in year t+1; and (4) firms without impairment in both years.  Then, the 
overall efficiency indices (EI) are calculated for all DMUs in each group, which is 
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considered as the pooled sample.  Second, the pooled sample in each group is partitioned 
into subsamples of year t versus year t+1.  Then, the within-group indices (EIw) and the 
between-group indices (EIb) are calculated for each subsample.  Finally, the Wilcoxon 
rank sum test is used to examine whether there are significant differences in relative 
efficiency between these two periods.   
The analysis starts by assessing whether each subperiod frontier is different from 
the pooled frontier.  The test for differences in relative efficiency between the overall 
efficiency indices and the within-group indices (EI vs. EIw) for each subperiod is 
conducted for this purpose.  Then, to determine which subsample period is more efficient 
than the other, the Wilcoxon rank sum test conducted on the overall efficiency indices (EI 
vs. EI) will be applied if the subsample frontiers are not different from the pooled 
frontier, otherwise the between-group index test (EIb vs. EIb) will be used.  The test for 
significant differences in relative efficiency between the subsamples of period t and t+1 
is similar to the approach discussed in the cross-sectional analysis.   
 
4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.6 provides descriptive statistics for the impairment and non-impairment 
samples by industry.  Panels A, B, and C of Table 4.6 report descriptive statistics for 
durable manufacturers, computers, and services, respectively.  Descriptive statistics of 
input and output variables indicate that non-impairment firms use slightly higher inputs 
and produce greater outputs than impairment firms.  However, mean differences are not 
statistically significant, except for the difference in income before extraordinary items.  
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The means of income before extraordinary items are $-21.11, $-110.67, and $-101.22 
million for impairment firms as opposed to $66.81, $14.94, and $75.81 million for non-
impairment firms in the durable manufacturers, computers, and services, respectively.  
The differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-statistics of 3.98, 3.11, 
and 4.98, respectively), indicating that impairment firms are less profitable than non-
impairment firms for all three industries.  The median differences of income before 
extraordinary items are also statistically significant at the 1 percent level (z-statistics of 
9.34, 9.01, and 8.44, respectively), consistent with the results of mean differences.  In 
addition, non-impairment firms have lower amount of selling, general, and administrative 
expenses than impairment firms in the service industry and the mean difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistic of 2.09).  Moreover, the median 
differences indicate that non-impairment firms have significantly higher cash flow from 
operations than impairment firms for all three industries (z-statistics of 3.54, 8.37, and 
1.74).  Overall, the descriptive statistics of an individual input/output variable, in part, 
reveal the differences in financial performance between impairment and non-impairment 
firms. 
 Regarding descriptive statistics for the size of goodwill, the service industry has 
the largest amount of goodwill for impairment firms ($450.73 million in mean, $53.14 
million in median), following by the durable manufacturing industry ($208.78 million in 
mean, $15.28 million in median) and the computer industry ($118.36 million in mean, 
$11.65 million in median).  For the impairment sample, the amount of goodwill, on 
average, represents 28, 17, and 24 percents of total assets in the services, durable 
manufacturers, and computers, respectively.  In Panel A of Table 4.6, results of the 
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durable manufacturing industry show that the goodwill balance of impairment firms is 
$208.78 million, which is not significantly different from that of non-impairment firms 
($290.66 million).  The mean (median) of goodwill to total assets is 17 percent (13 
percent), which is the same for both impairment and non-impairment samples.  
Therefore, there are no significant differences in size of goodwill for this industry.   
Panel B of Table 4.6 indicates that there are significant differences in size of 
goodwill between impairment and non-impairment firms for the computer industry.  The 
goodwill balance of impairment firms, on average, is $118.36 million, which is 
statistically greater than that of non-impairment firms ($46.56 million) (t-statistic of 
1.81).  Moreover, impairment firms have a larger percentage of goodwill to total assets 
(24 percent) than non-impairment firms (14 percent) (t-statistic of 4.94).  The median 
differences also indicate that impairment firms have a higher amount of goodwill and a 
larger percentage of goodwill to total assets than non-impairment firms (z-statistics of 
2.78 and 4.29), consistent with the results of mean differences.   
In Panel C of Table 4.6, results of the service industry show that goodwill 
balances of impairment firms ($450.73 million in mean, $53.14 million in median) and 
non-impairment firms ($381.50 million in mean, $32.94 million in median) are not 
statistically different.  However, the percentage of goodwill to total assets of impairment 
firms is 28 percent, which is significantly greater than that of non-impairment firms (21 
percent) (t-statistic of 2.62).  The median differences also support that impairment firms 
have a larger percentage of goodwill to total assets (z-statistic of 3.08).  Overall, the 
durable manufacturing industry is the only one having no significant differences in size 
of goodwill between impairment and non-impairment firms.   
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 In addition to having the largest amount of goodwill, the service industry also has 
the largest amount of impairment loss ($102.63 million), following by the computer 
industry ($65.4 million) and the durable manufacturing industry ($28.77 million).  The 
proportion of impairment loss to goodwill of the service industry is 80 percent, which is 
also the largest percentage relative to the computer industry (69 percent) and the durable 
manufacturing industry (65 percent).  However, the service industry has the lowest 
proportion of goodwill impairment loss to total assets (19 percent), in comparison with 33 
percent of the computer industry and 24 percent of the durable manufacturing industry.  
Because the computer industry has the highest percentage of impairment loss to total 
assets, the amount of goodwill impairment loss appears to be more important to overall 
firms’ values in this industry than in other two industries. 
 
4.5.2 Results of Cross-Sectional Analysis 
4.5.2.1 Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 Table 4.7 presents the results of Wilcoxon rank sum test used to examine whether 
or not the differences in efficiency arise because impairment and non-impairment firms 
have different frontiers.  First, impairment and non-impairment firms are pooled across 
the period of 2002-2005 and the overall indices are calculated.  Then, the within-group 
indices are estimated separately for each subsample of impairment and non-impairment.  
Finally, the Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to compare differences between the overall 
indices and the within-group indices for each subsample.  If the differences are 
statistically significant, this study will use the between-group indices to compare the 
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differences in relative efficiency between impairment and non-impairment firms, 
otherwise the overall indices will be used. 
 This study tests the validity of the DEA model by incorporating eight 
combinations of input/output variables into the model.  The results are robust across 
different DEA models.  Panels A and B of Table 4.7 show the results of the durable 
manufacturers and computers.  In general, the frontiers of the impairment and non-
impairment subsamples are statistically different from the pooled frontier, suggesting that 
these two subsamples do not share a common production function.   However, only 
model 4 for both industries and model 6 for the computer industry have the frontier of 
impairment subsample shifted away from the pooled frontier, but there is no shift in the 
frontier of non-impairment subsample.  The results suggest that impairment firms are 
more likely to be relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms.   
 Panel C of Table 4.7 presents the results of the service industry.  For all models, 
the frontier of the impairment subsample is statistically different from the pooled frontier, 
which immediately suggests that impairment firms are less efficient than the non-
impairment firms.  However, model 7 also has the frontier of the non-impairment 
subsample shifted out from the pooled frontier.  Therefore, a further analysis is needed to 
examine which subsample is more efficient than the other.   
 Panels A, B, and C of Table 4.8 provide the results of the pooled cross-sectional 
analysis examining the differences between impairment and non-impairment firms for the 
durable manufacturing, computer, and service industries, respectively.  Because at least 
one frontier of the two subsamples is statistically different from the pooled frontier as 
previously discussed, this study uses the between-group indices to assess the differences 
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between impairment and non-impairment firms.  Overall, the results indicate that 
impairment firms are less efficient than non-impairment firms and the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all three industries.  These findings 
strongly support the first hypothesis that impairment firms are relatively less efficient 
than non-impairment firms in the year of goodwill impairment recognition.  Most 
importantly, the results are consistent across all models, indicating that including 
different sets of input/output variables in the DEA model does not affect the inferential 
statistics in this study.   
 
4.5.2.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis by Year 
 Tables 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, report the results of the cross-sectional analysis 
examining the differences between impairment and non-impairment firms by year and 
industry.  Because the empirical results are robust across various input/output variables in 
the DEA model, this study reports only the results from model 7, which have five inputs 
(i.e. cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed 
assets; and intangible assets) and a single output (sales).  This model is selected because 
it does not have to adjust for negative values that incur when the model includes income 
before extraordinary items and operating cash flows.  Moreover, the inclusion of multiple 
input variables in the model helps to estimate the relative efficiency of firms more 
accurately. 
 Table 4.9 presents the results of the cross-sectional analysis by year for the 
durable manufacturing industry.  Panel A of Table 4.9 reports the frequencies and 
summary statistics of the efficiency scores for impairment and non-impairment firms on a 
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yearly basis.  Although approximately 50 percent of firms appear on the efficiency 
frontier (the efficiency scores equal to 1), non-impairment firms dominate the high 
efficiency score deciles more than impairment firms.  These results are similar for the 
overall indices, within-group indices, and between-group indices.  Further, the mean 
efficiency scores indicate that impairment firms are slightly less efficient than non-
impairment firms in every year.  Panel B of Table 4.9 compares the overall indices with 
the within-group indices for each subsample to assess whether the subsample frontiers of 
impairment and non-impairment firms are different from the pooled frontier.  The results 
reveal that, except for 2004, at least one frontier of the impairment and non-impairment 
subsamples is shifted out from the pooled frontier.  Therefore, to assess differences in 
relative efficiency between these two subsamples, this study uses the between-group 
index test in 2002, 2003, and 2005 as opposed to the overall index test in 2004.  The 
findings from Panel C of Table 4.9 support the prediction that impairment firms are 
relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms and the differences are statistically 
significant in 2002, 2004, and 2005. 
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 provide the results of the cross-sectional analysis by 
year for the computer and service industries.  The frequencies and summary statistics of 
the efficiency scores for impairment and non-impairment firms are reported on a yearly 
basis in Panel A of both Tables.  Similar to the manufacturing industry, non-impairment 
firms in the computer and service industries dominate the high efficiency score deciles, 
whereas several impairment firms scatter over the low efficiency score deciles.  In 
addition, impairment firms have lower mean efficiency scores than non-impairment 
firms.  In Panel B of Tables 4.10 and 4.11, this study examines whether impairment and 
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non-impairment subsamples share a common production function.  The results mostly 
indicate a shift in the frontier of the impairment subsample from the pooled frontier, 
suggesting the use of a between-group index test to assess differences in relative 
efficiency between these two subsamples.  However, no frontiers of the two subsamples 
are statistically different from the pooled frontier for the computer industry in 2004 and 
for the service industry in 2005.  These findings indicate the use of an overall index test 
for the cross-sectional analysis in these particular years as shown in Panel C.  In Panel C 
of Table 4.10, results of the computer industry indicate that the relative efficiency of 
impairment firms is statistically lower than that of non-impairment firms in 2002 and 
2003 at the 1 percent significant level.  In Panel C of Table 4.11, results of the service 
industry show that impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment 
firms in 2002, 2003, and 2004.  The differences are also statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  These findings are mostly consistent with the main results of the pooled 
cross-sectional analysis as presented in Table 4.8.    
Overall, the results of the cross-section analysis show statistically significant 
differences in relative efficiency between impairment and non-impairment firms.  The 
results indicate that impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment 
firms in the period of goodwill impairment recognition, supporting hypothesis 1. 
 
4.5.3 Results of Longitudinal Analysis 
4.5.3.1 Pooled Longitudinal Analysis 
 This section examines changes in the relative efficiency of impairment and 
control samples across time.  The impairment samples in year t and t+1 are pooled 
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together within each industry and classified into four groups--(1) firms having goodwill 
impairment in two consecutive years, (2) firms having impairment in year t, but no 
impairment in year t+1, (3) firms having no impairment in year t, but impairment in year 
t+1, and (4) firms having no impairment in both years.  The control samples in year t and 
t+1 are also pooled together.  The impairment and control samples are required to have 
goodwill balances and other data available in every two-year analysis.   
Table 4.12 presents the sample distribution by industry and year.  For all 
industries, about 50 percent of the impairment sample reports goodwill impairment either 
in year t or year t+1 (the second and third groups).  However, the impairment sample 
recognizing goodwill impairment in two consecutive years (the first group) is relatively 
small, approximately 10 percent of the total impairment sample.  For all three industries, 
the total impairment and control samples are almost evenly distributed over each two-
year period (2002 vs. 2003, 2003 vs. 2004, and 2004 vs. 2005). 
 Table 4.13 presents the results of the pooled longitudinal analysis for three 
industries.  The impairment samples in each two-year period are pooled together across 
time within each group to perform the pooled longitudinal analysis.  A similar approach 
is applied to the control sample.  Table 4.13, Panel A examines whether each period 
frontier is statistically different from the pooled frontier.  For all industries, the 
subsample frontiers of the first group, which have goodwill impairment in both years, are 
not different from the pooled frontier, suggesting the use of an overall index test to 
examine the differences between year t and t+1.  For the second group, the frontier in 
year t of having goodwill impairment recognition is shifted out from the pooled frontier, 
while the frontier in year t+1 of having no impairment is not statistically different from 
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the pooled frontier.  These results indicate that the relative efficiency in year t of goodwill 
impairment is likely to be lower than that in year t+1 of no impairment.  However, the 
results of the third and the forth groups as well as the results of the control sample are 
mixed across industries.  In conclusion, if this study finds statistically significant 
differences between the overall indices and within-group indices, the between-group 
index test is used for the analysis in Panel B, otherwise the overall group index test is 
applied. 
 Table 4.13, Panel B presents the results of the rank sum test used to examine 
differences in relative efficiency between year t and t+1 by each subgroup.  First, the 
results show no significant differences in relative efficiency between year t and t+1 for 
firms reporting goodwill impairment in both years (the first group), indicating that a 
second year of impairment loss does not reflect an additional decline in relative 
efficiency.  A possible explanation is that firms are likely to have a major decline in 
relative efficiency in the first year of impairment recognition.  Thus, any changes in 
relative efficiency from the prior year are not significant enough to indicate the 
differences between these two periods.  Interestingly, this study finds that firms reporting 
goodwill impairment in year t, but no impairment in year t+1 (the second group) have an 
increase in relative efficiency over time for all three industries.  The significant changes 
in relative efficiency strongly support the prediction that firms are relatively more 
efficient in the period of no impairment recognition (year t+1) than in the period of 
goodwill impairment reporting (year t). 
On the other hand, the results of the pooled longitudinal analysis for the third and 
fourth groups are mixed across industries.  For the impairment sample that does not have 
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goodwill impairment in year t, but reports impairment in year t+1 (the third group), the 
results of the durable manufacturing industry indicate an increase in relative efficiency 
from year t to t+1.  These findings contradict the prediction.  In addition, the results of 
the computer industry show no significant differences in relative efficiency between year 
t and t+1.  Therefore, the individual two-year longitudinal analysis is needed for further 
explanations.  However, for the service industry, the results are consistent with the 
prediction that firms are relatively less efficient in the period of impairment recognition 
(year t+1) than in the period of no goodwill impairment (year t), and these findings are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
This study predicts that there will be no significant differences in relative 
efficiency between two periods of no goodwill impairment recognition (the fourth group).  
However, for durable manufacturers, the impairment sample in group 4 exhibits a decline 
in relative efficiency in the second year of no impairment recognition.  Because firms 
classified into this group do not have goodwill impairment losses in the two particular 
years but are allowed to have impairment recognition in any other years, a decline in 
relative efficiency can be a signal of potential goodwill impairment.  These findings 
suggest that a measure of relative efficiency can be used to determine the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment in the near future.  Finally, the results of the control sample show 
no significant differences in relative efficiency between year t and t+1 for non-
impairment firms in every industry. 
In summary, the results of the pooled longitudinal analysis strongly support an 
increase in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that report goodwill 
impairment losses in year t, but no impairment losses in year t+1.  These findings are 
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consistent across all three industries.  However, the evidence only supports a decline in 
relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that have no impairment in year t, but 
recognize goodwill impairment in year t+1 in the service industry.   
 
4.5.3.2 Longitudinal Analysis by Two Years 
This section discusses the results of the longitudinal analysis by two years to 
further analyze changes in the relative efficiency of impairment and non-impairment 
firms over time.  Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 present the results of the rank sum tests for 
durable manufacturers, computers, and services, respectively.  First, the impairment 
samples in 2002 vs. 2003 are pooled together to calculate the overall indices.  Then, the 
pooled samples are partitioned into two subsamples of 2002 and 2003 to estimate the 
within-group indices and the between-group indices.  The control samples in 2002 vs. 
2003 are also pooled together for this analysis.  A similar approach is performed on the 
analysis in 2003 vs. 2004 and in 2004 vs. 2005.  Panel A of Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 
presents the results of Wilcoxon rank sum test, which is used to examine whether each 
subperiod frontiers and the pooled frontiers differ.  The between-group index test is used 
to assess differences between two periods if the subperiod frontiers are shifted out from 
the pooled frontier.  However, the overall index test is applied if the subperiod frontiers 
are not statistically different from the pooled frontier.   
Panel B of Tables 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 reports the results of the rank sum test used to 
examine the changes in relative efficiency between two periods when impairment firms 
exhibit four different scenarios of having goodwill impairment in every two-year 
analysis.  Table 4.14, Panel B presents the results of Wilcoxon rank sum test for the 
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durable manufacturing industry.  Consistent with the pooled longitudinal analysis, the 
results show no significant changes in relative efficiency between each two-year analysis 
for firms that report goodwill impairment in both years (the first group).  Moreover, the 
results consistently indicate a significant increase in relative efficiency from year t  to t+1 
for firms that report goodwill impairment in year t, but do not have impairment in year 
t+1 (the second group), except for the results in the 2004 vs. 2005 analysis.   
For each two-year analysis, this study reports no significant differences in relative 
efficiency scores between firms that do not have goodwill impairment in year t, but have 
impairment in year t+1 (the third group).  However, these findings are different from the 
results of the pooled longitudinal analysis that indicate an increase in relative efficiency 
from year t to t+1, contrary to the prediction.  The two-year longitudinal analysis 
provides more detailed pictures in every period.  Therefore, it suggests a better 
explanation regarding the changes in relative efficiency of the third group in comparison 
with the results of the pooled longitudinal analysis.  Nonetheless, this study is unable to 
find evidence supporting the prediction that the relative efficiency in year t+1 of 
impairment is lower than that in year t of no impairment.  A plausible explanation is that 
the relative efficiency in year t+1 may be lower than in year t for the analyses of 2003 vs. 
2004 and 2004 vs. 2005.  However, a decline in relative efficiency can be eliminated by 
an increase in efficiency resulting from an industry effect.  Results of the control sample 
in the same periods also show an increase in relative efficiency from year t to t+1, 
supporting the argument that the industry improvement has an impact on the changes in 
relative efficiency over time.   
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Finally, the results of the fourth group show a decline in relative efficiency in the 
second year of no goodwill impairment recognition for the periods of 2002 vs. 2003. 
These results suggest that firms in this group are likely to have goodwill impairment in 
the near future, consistent with evidence from the pooled longitudinal analysis.  In 
contrast, the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the differences in relative efficiency between 
2003 vs. 2004 indicates an increase in relative efficiency in the second year of no 
goodwill impairment reporting.  These opposite results can be explained by the industry 
effect, which can also be seen from an increase in the relative efficiency of the control 
sample in the analysis of 2003 vs. 2004. 
Table 4.15, Panel B reports the results of Wilcoxon rank sum test for the 
computer industry.  The analysis of the first and second groups provides similar results to 
the findings in the durable manufacturing industry.  For the first group, the results show 
no significant differences in relative efficiency between each two-year analysis for firms 
that have goodwill impairment in both years.  For the second group, the results indicate a 
significant increase in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that report goodwill 
impairment in year t, but do not have impairment in year t+1 for every two-year analysis.  
These results are consistent with the prediction.  For the third group, the results show an 
increase in relative efficiency from 2002 to 2003 for firms that do not have goodwill 
impairment in 2002, but have impairment in 2003, which contradicts the prediction.  The 
increase in relative efficiency is possibly explained by an industry improvement.  The 
results of the control sample having no impairment in 2002 and 2003 also indicate an 
increase in relative efficiency, which supports the industry improvement effect.  Finally, 
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for the fourth group, the results show no significant changes in the relative efficiency of 
firms that have no impairment in every two-year analysis. 
 Table 4.16, Panel B reports the results of Wilcoxon rank sum test for the service 
industry.  Results of the first two groups in this industry are similar to those in the durable 
manufacturers and computers.  For the first group, the results of the rank sum test 
indicate no significant differences in relative efficiency between each two-year analysis.  
For the second group, except for the results in 2002 and 2003, this study consistently 
finds an increase in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that have goodwill 
impairment in year t, but do not have impairment in year t+1.  For the third group, the 
rank sum tests show a slight decline in relative efficiency from year t to year t+1 when 
non-impairment firms in year t exhibit goodwill impairment recognition in year t+1.  
However, the differences are not statistically significant.  Finally, the results of the fourth 
group and the control sample indicate no significant differences in relative efficiency 
over time for every two-year analysis. 
 In summary, this study finds no significant changes in relative efficiency from 
year t to t+1 for firms that have impairment in two consecutive years.  The results 
suggest that the second year of impairment recognition does not provide information 
regarding an additional decline in relative efficiency.  Interestingly, the results of the two-
year longitudinal analysis indicate a significant increase in relative efficiency from year t 
to t+1 for firms that have goodwill impairment in year t, but do not have impairment in 
year t+1, consistent with the prediction.  These findings are similar to the results of the 
pooled longitudinal analysis and are consistent across all three industries.  On the other 
hand, the two-year longitudinal analysis is not able to provide evidence to support a 
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decline in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that do not have goodwill 
impairment in year t, but report impairment in year t+1.  A possible explanation is that a 
decrease in relative efficiency is offset by an increase in relative efficiency resulting from 
an industry improvement.  Finally, results show no significant differences in the relative 
efficiency of the sample firms that report no goodwill impairment in both consecutive 
years.   
 Overall, the results of the cross-sectional analysis strongly support the prediction 
that impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms in the year 
of goodwill impairment recognition.  However, the longitudinal analysis provides 
evidence partially supporting the prediction that firms are relatively less efficient in the 
year of goodwill impairment recognition than in the year of no impairment.  An 
alternative explanation is that management is responsible for preparing financial 
reporting and disclosures so managers are able to manage firm performance across time.  
Therefore, when this study examines changes in relative efficiency over time, results can 
be affected by management’s manipulation of firm performance.  On the other hand, the 
cross-sectional analysis compares the relative efficiency of impairment firms to that of 
non-impairment firms in the same industry.  Because management is unable to manage 
the performance of other firms, the cross-sectional analysis provides evidence that is 
more clear and consistent with the prediction. 
 
4.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Because goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 and fixed asset impairment 
under SFAS No. 144 can be recognized during the same period, a concern has been 
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raised as to whether or not a decline in the relative efficiency of firms is attributed to 
fixed asset impairment rather than goodwill impairment.  This study checks the 
robustness of research results by excluding the impairment firms and the matched control 
firms, which have fixed asset impairment, from the pooled cross-sectional analysis.  
Therefore, the sensitivity analysis is only conducted on the sample with goodwill 
impairment.  The reduced sample consists of 210, 214, and 134 observations from 
durable manufacturers, computers, and services, respectively.  
 Table 4.17 presents the results of the pooled cross-sectional analysis.  Panel A 
reports frequencies and summary statistics of the efficiency scores for impairment and 
non-impairment firms in each industry.  For all three industries, non-impairment firms 
appear on the efficiency frontier and dominate the high efficiency score deciles more than 
impairment firms.  In addition, impairment firms have lower mean efficiency scores than 
non-impairment firms, consistent with the main results. 
Table 4.17, Panel B compares the within-group indices with the overall indices to 
examine differences in the relative efficiency of each subsample frontiers from the pooled 
frontier.  The results indicate that the impairment samples have frontiers shifted out from 
the pooled frontier for all three industries.  Thus, this study uses the between-group index 
test to compare differences in relative efficiency between impairment and non-
impairment firms.  Findings from Table 4.17, Panel C strongly support the main results in 
Table 4.8 that impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms in 
the year of impairment recognition.  These results are consistent across all three 
industries. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 This study examines the usefulness of goodwill impairment after the initial 
adoption of SFAS No. 142 by assessing the relative efficiency of firms rather than using 
the market-based study.  Data Envelopment Analysis is used to measure firm 
performance because it allows an aggregation of several financial measures into a single 
performance measure.  Eight combinations of input/output variables are included in the 
DEA model to ensure that results are robust across different models. 
 The results of the cross-sectional analysis strongly support the hypothesis that 
impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms in the year of 
goodwill impairment reporting.  These findings are consistent across different DEA 
models for all three selected industries--durable manufacturers, computers, and services.  
This study, then, examines changes in the relative efficiency of impairment and non-
impairment firms over time.  The results of the longitudinal analysis indicate an increase 
in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that have impairment in this year, but no 
impairment in the next year.  However, the longitudinal analysis provides evidence 
partially supporting a decline in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that do not 
have impairment in this year, but report goodwill impairment in the next year.  The 
plausible explanation is that managers are able to manage the financial reporting and 
performance of their firms over time, while they are unable to manipulate the financial 
performance of other firms in the same industry.  Therefore, measuring the performance 
of a firm relative to other firms (the cross-sectional analysis) provides better evidence to 
support the prediction as opposed to measuring the performance of a firm relative to its 
performance at different points in time (the longitudinal analysis).  Overall, the results 
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indicate that goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 can reflect the decline in the 
relative efficiency of firms; therefore, the implementation of this standard achieves the 
FASB’s objective.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE DETERMINANT AND PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF RELATIVE EFFICIENCY 
ON GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT UNDER SFAS NO. 142 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Goodwill has become an important component of a firm’s value.  It represents 
approximately 20 percent of the total assets of business combinations that occurred 
between 1990 and 1994 (Henning et al. 2004) and the proportion of goodwill to purchase 
price for the acquisitions that occurred from 1997 to 2002 is approximately 68 percent 
(Long 2005).  The FASB responded to the demand for more useful information about 
goodwill from financial statement users by issuing SFAS No. 142, Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets, in June 2001.  SFAS No. 142 provides more specific guidance to 
determine the timing and to measure the amount of goodwill impairment.  The primary 
objective of this standard is to improve financial reporting so that financial statements 
will better reflect the underlying economic value of goodwill and other intangible assets 
(SFAS No. 142, Summary).   
However, the implementation of SFAS No. 142 involves subjective assumptions 
and estimates in determining reporting units, allocating goodwill and other net assets to 
reporting units, and measuring the fair value of reporting units.25  These difficulties call 
                                                 
25
The FASB allows several methods to calculate the fair value of a reporting unit such as market 
capitalization, discounted cash flow, multiple of earnings, and residual income valuation. 
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for management’s potential opportunistic behavior in making a goodwill impairment 
decision.  Because future cash flows are unlikely to be verifiable and the valuation based 
on them may be manipulated, the FASB’s adoption of SFAS No. 142 may lead to an 
increase in fraudulent financial reporting that emerges from the FASB moves toward the 
firm valuation as reflected in SFAS No. 142 (Watts 2003).  In a recent study, Beatty and 
Weber (2006) examine factors affecting managers’ decisions to recognize goodwill 
impairment during the adoption period by focusing on the trade-off between recording 
goodwill impairment charges “below the line” and recording uncertain future impairment 
charges “above the line.”   Beatty and Weber (2006) provide evidence that managerial 
incentives affect managers’ accounting choices that relate to the trade-off between the 
timing and the presentation of goodwill impairment recognition when SFAS No. 142 was 
adopted.  Moreover, Guler (2006) examines goodwill impairment decisions in the years 
after the adoption of SFAS No. 142.  The results reveal that the managers’ choice to 
recognize goodwill impairment losses is attributable to managers’ in-the-money stock 
option holdings and the corporate governance. 
Motivated by this debate, the first objective of this chapter is to examine whether 
or not goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 reflects the underlying economics of 
goodwill, thereby achieving the FASB’s objective.  Specifically, this study focuses on the 
role of a firm’s underlying relative efficiency as a determinant of goodwill impairment.  
Unlike Beatty and Weber’s (2006) study, this study examines factors affecting a goodwill 
impairment decision after the adoption of SFAS No. 142.  Because goodwill impairment 
losses during the transitional period are presented as a cumulative effect of a change in 
accounting principle, SFAS No. 142 offers management incentives for making 
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impairment decisions.  However, the determinants of goodwill impairment may change 
after the adoption period due to the absence of such incentives from the initial 
implementation.  Additionally, unlike the study of Guler (2006) that examines the roles 
of managers’ in-the-money stock option holdings and corporate governance, this study 
analyzes the role of firm efficiency in determining goodwill impairment in the years 
subsequent to the initial adoption of SFAS No. 142. 
This study uses a Tobit regression to examine factors affecting the percentage of 
goodwill impairment and a logistic regression to analyze factors affecting the likelihood 
of a goodwill impairment decision.  In general, firms recognize asset write-offs during a 
period of economic difficulty, and write-off firms are likely to have lower performances 
than other firms in the same industries (Elliott and Shaw 1988).  Therefore, a firm’s 
relative efficiency is expected to have a negative association with the percentage of 
goodwill impairment and the likelihood of a goodwill impairment decision, after 
controlling for reporting incentive factors.  This study is unique because the performance 
of impairment firms is calculated relative to non-impairment firms within the same 
industry by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  The advantage of DEA is that it 
aggregates several financial measures into a single measure of firm performance and 
efficiency.  This eliminates concerns regarding intercorrelations and contradictions 
among variables resulting from the inclusion of multiple performance variables in the 
model.   
Overall, the results strongly support the hypothesis that firms are more likely to 
report goodwill impairment losses and recognize higher percentages of goodwill 
impairment losses when their lagged relative efficiency is low, after controlling for the 
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effects of managerial reporting incentives.  Moreover, the weighted exogenous sample 
maximum likelihood (WESML) used to account for the choice-based sample bias 
provides evidence similar to the results of Tobit and logistic regressions.  The inferences 
are not sensitive to the choices of various input/output variables in the DEA model.  In 
addition, the findings are consistent with the main results after this study applies a 
conditional logistic regression to account for the matched sample design and includes a 
variable to control for a reportable segment.   
 The second objective of this chapter is to assess the ability to determine goodwill 
impairment independently from the management decision by using measures of a decline 
in relative efficiency.  In particular, this study examines whether or not a decrease in 
relative efficiency of firms in prior years can signal potential goodwill impairment under 
SFAS No. 142.  In a related study, Hayn and Hughes (2006) develop a goodwill write-off 
prediction model that incorporates acquisition characteristics and measures of the 
acquired entity’s postacquisition performance.  However, this study differs from the 
study of Hayn and Hughes (2006) in the following ways.  First, the objective of this study 
is to examine the predictive ability of a decline in relative efficiency with respect to the 
likelihood of a goodwill impairment decision, whereas the study of Hayn and Hughes 
(2006) aims at developing a goodwill write-off prediction model.  Second, the sample in 
their primary analysis has goodwill write-offs before the adoption of SFAS No. 142, and 
only 56 write-offs occur subsequent to the adoption of this standard.  In contrast, the 
sample in this study consists of firms having goodwill impairment in the post-SFAS No. 
142 period, which provides more relevant evidence on the implication of this standard 
after the initial adoption.  Third, this study measures the performance at the firm level 
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relative to other firms in the same industry, while Hayn and Hughes (2006) use available 
segment data to capture the performance of segments to which goodwill is assigned.  
Finally, this study applies DEA technique to estimate the overall relative efficiency of 
firms instead of including several performance measures as shown in the study of Hayn 
and Hughes (2006).   
This study uses a logistic regression and a multivariate discriminant analysis 
(MDA) to assess the predictive ability of a decline in relative efficiency in determining 
potential goodwill impairment.  First, this study applies a logistic regression to assess the 
likelihood of a goodwill impairment decision.  The results indicate that the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment in year t is positively associated with an indicator variable of a 
decline in relative efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 and a history of goodwill impairment 
reporting from year t-3 to t-1.  However, the likelihood of goodwill impairment in year t 
is negatively associated with a percent change in relative efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 
and from year t-3 to t-1.  Empirical evidence suggests that these variables can be used to 
determine potential goodwill impairment. 
Second, this study applies similar variables in the logistic regression to the MDA 
and uses this method to classify firms as impairment or non-impairment.  Resubstitution 
and cross-validation methods are used to assess classification accuracy.  The results show 
that the model including a percent change in relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 
correctly predicts more than 50 percent of the actual impairment and provides the total 
classification error of 35.32 percent, which is the lowest error rate.  These findings 
suggest that a decline in relative efficiency is an important factor in determining potential 
goodwill impairment.  Moreover, adding information regarding a change in relative 
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efficiency from the past years produces better results than including only information 
from year t-2 to t-1.   
 This study contributes to the related literature in the following ways.  First, this 
study extends the literature regarding asset write-offs (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987; 
Francis et al. 1996; Riedl 2004) and determinants of goodwill impairment under SFAS 
No. 142 (e.g. Segal 2003; Beatty and Weber 2006; Guler 2006).  To my knowledge, this 
study is the first attempt to analyze the relation between goodwill impairment and a 
firm’s relative efficiency, the underlying economics for goodwill impairment.  Second, 
this study contributes to the relative efficiency literature (e.g. Bowlin 1995, 1999; Seiford 
and Zhu 1999) by using the DEA technique to measure the performance of firms and 
assessing the implication of SFAS No. 142.  Finally, this study extends the literature 
regarding the bankruptcy (e.g. Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980) and goodwill impairment 
prediction models (e.g. Hayn and Hughes 2006).  The evidence supporting this study 
helps investors and other users of financial statements to determine potential goodwill 
impairment by considering the overall measure of firm performance. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 5.2 reviews the 
related literature.  Section 5.3 develops hypotheses.  Section 5.4 discusses research 
design.  Section 5.5 contains empirical results.  Section 5.6 provides sensitivity analysis 
and the final section concludes.  
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5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1 Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
Prior literature examining the determinants of asset impairment concludes that the 
impairment loss resulted from two main factors--reporting incentives and the 
deterioration of economic conditions.  Prior to the specific guidance on accounting for 
asset write-offs, Francis et al. (1996) point out that managers have incentives to manage 
earnings by recognizing impairment only when it provides advantages to them.  Francis 
et al. (1996) conclude that incentives play a substantial role in explaining more 
discretionary asset write-off items, such as goodwill write-offs and restructuring charges 
over the 1989-1992 periods.  Strong and Meyer (1987) find that the most important 
indicator of the asset-write-down decision is a change in senior management.  Moreover, 
Riedl (2004) reveals that asset write-offs under SFAS No. 121 have a weaker association 
with economic factors but a higher association with “big bath” reporting behavior.   
On the other hand, other studies suggest that managers recognize the impairment 
loss to reflect a decrease in the values of assets due to the poor performance of firms, the 
changes in the economic environment, or the changes in management strategies.  Elliott 
and Shaw (1988) find that asset write-off firms tend to underperform other firms in the 
same industry during the three years leading up to and including the year of write-offs in 
terms of the market performance, return on assets, and return on equity.  They also 
conclude that the write-off firms have dividend decreases and bond rating downgrades 
compared to other industrial firms, indicating that asset write-offs occur during the period 
of economic difficulty.  Finally, Rees et al. (1996) find that managers recognize asset 
impairment in years when earnings are low, relative to the industry. 
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After the initial adoption of SFAS No. 142, several recent papers document that 
management’s discretion still has an impact on the initial goodwill impairment decision. 
This is because the standard allows the initial impairment loss to be recorded as the effect 
of a change in accounting principle, not affecting income numbers.  Zang (2003) finds 
that the initial goodwill impairment loss is larger when there has been recent management 
turnover because new managers tend to take a “big bath.”  However, the initial goodwill 
impairment loss is smaller for firms that are highly levered so they can avoid violating 
debt covenants.  Segal (2003) examines the determinants of goodwill impairment before 
and after SFAS No. 142 and finds evidence of a lower association with incentive 
variables but no evidence of a higher association with economic variables under SFAS 
No. 142.26   Moreover, Jordan and Clark (2003) find evidence of “big bath” earnings 
management among the Fortune 100 companies during the initial adoption period of 
SFAS No. 142.  Beatty and Weber (2006) examine the adoption decision of SFAS No. 
142 by focusing on the trade-off between recording goodwill impairment losses below 
the line and recording future impairment losses above the line.  They conclude that firms 
accelerate the initial goodwill impairment charges when their income from continuing 
operations has a higher stock market multiple or they have recent management turnover.  
However, firms’ debt contracting, compensation incentives, and exchange delisting 
requirements affect management decisions to delay impairment recognition during the 
transitional period.  Finally, Guler (2006) reveals that the likelihood of recognizing the 
impairment losses subsequent to the adoption period significantly decreases when 
                                                 
26
 Incentive variables are proxies for factors associated with management incentives to record goodwill 
impairment (e.g. management turnover, debt covenant violations, unexpectedly low (high) performance).  
Economic variables are proxies for a poor historical firm performance and a decline in industry trend (e.g. 
changes in sales and in industry ROA). 
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managers have in-the-money stock option holdings, but it significantly increases when 
firms have stronger corporate governance.27 
In summary, most of these recent studies were conducted using data from the 
initial adoption period because post-SFAS No. 142 data were not available at that time.  
In addition, the adoption period was investigated in great detail because the standard 
allows the transitional goodwill impairment loss to be recorded as the effect of a change 
in accounting principle.  This offers incentives for the management to exercise discretion 
in reporting the transitional impairment.  However, this study aims at examining the 
implication of SFAS No. 142 after the transitional period because data have recently 
become available.  Moreover, the management has no incentives to report goodwill 
impairment above-the-line or below-the-line item in income statements as allowed during 
the initial adoption period.  Drawing upon the results from chapter 4, which show that 
impairment firms are relatively less efficient than non-impairment firms during the year 
of goodwill impairment recognition, this chapter further examines whether or not the 
relative efficiency is a determinant of goodwill impairment losses, after controlling for 
other confounding factors.  
 
5.2.2 Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 This study applies the literature on bankruptcy prediction models as guidance in 
discussing the prediction of goodwill impairment.  Prior research on the bankruptcy 
prediction model uses several financial ratios to predict bankruptcy.  Altman (1968) 
employs a multiple discriminant analysis and a set of financial ratios in constructing the 
                                                 
27
 Guler (2006) measures corporate governance by the percentage of outside directors, percentage of 
outside directors’ ownership, number of busy directors, and separation of CEO and Chair titles. 
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Altman’s Z score.  These financial ratios include working capital to total assets, retained 
earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, market value 
equity to book value of total debt, and sales to total assets.  Results indicate a decline in 
financial ratios as bankruptcy approached, and the prediction model accurately predicts 
the failure up to two years prior to bankruptcy.  Ohlson (1980) includes nine variables 
used to capture firm leverage, liquidity, and performance in the prediction model, and 
uses a logistic analysis to predict corporate failure.  Finally, Zmijewski (1984) uses three 
variables--net income to total assets (return on assets), total debt to total assets (leverage), 
and current assets to current liabilities (liquidity)--to estimate financial distress prediction 
models. 
 In a recent study regarding the prediction of goodwill impairment, Hayn and 
Hughes (2006) develop a write-off prediction model that incorporates acquisition 
characteristics and measures of the acquired entity’s subsequent performance of 
acquisitions made over the years from 1988 to 1998.28  Four performance indicators, 
which are used to measure the performance of segments to which the goodwill is 
assigned, are operating income to identifiable assets, a change in ROA from the previous 
year, operating losses, and the percentage change in sales.  Results indicate that the 
predictive power of their write-off prediction model is modest and much weaker than that 
of the bankruptcy prediction model, which measures the performance at the firm level.  In 
addition, the modest predictive power is not mainly due to the subsequent performance of 
the acquired entity, but rather due to the acquisition characteristics.  These results are 
                                                 
28
 Measures of acquisition indicators are payment of significant premium, number of bidders, the 
percentage of the acquisition cost assigned to goodwill, and use of acquiring firm’s stock as the primary 
model of consideration.  
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surprising and contradict bankruptcy prediction model literature, which indicates that 
performance indicators are powerful predictors of financial distress.  According to Hayn 
and Hughes (2006), plausible explanations for the contradiction are the limited number of 
performance indicators that can be computed from segment data and the low quality of 
the available segment disclosures. 
 The purpose of this study is not to develop a predictive model of goodwill 
impairment, but to employ financial performance measures in prior years to identify 
potential goodwill impairment.  Unlike prior research, which uses several performance 
indicators, this study develops an overall measure of firm performance by using DEA 
technique to combine several input/output variables.  DEA has been widely used to assess 
performance in many industries, such as non-profit organizations, the banking industry, 
and the defense industrial business (e.g. Grosskopf and Valdmanis 1987; Fizel and 
Nunnikhoven 1992; Miller and Noulas 1996; Bowlin 1999; Leong et al. 2003).  DEA is a 
robust and flexible methodology for financial performance evaluation because it is able to 
assess multiple variables simultaneously and capture possible interactions between 
variables (Bowlin 1995).  Moreover, DEA offers information additional to that provided 
by a traditional ratio analysis (Feroz et al. 2003). 
 
5.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.3.1 Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
Prior research concludes that the recognition of asset write-offs is determined by 
economic factors and managerial reporting incentives.  Asset write-offs can signal a 
decrease in a firm’s ability to generate future earnings, and management appropriately 
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reports the information (e.g. Elliott and Shaw 1988; Rees et al. 1996).  On the other hand, 
the write-offs can be results of management acting opportunistically to improve future 
earnings (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987; Beatty and Weber 2006).29  Therefore, the FASB 
issued SFAS No. 142 to improve financial reporting quality and reduce management’s 
opportunistic behavior on goodwill impairment decisions.  The FASB expects that the 
standard will help financial statements to better reflect the underlying economics of 
goodwill.  However, Guler (2006) still finds evidence of the roles of managers’ stock 
option holdings and board of directors’ characteristics in managers’ choice to report 
goodwill impairment.  Thus, the usefulness of SFAS No. 142 after the initial adoption 
period remains debatable.   
Motivated by the above debate, this study takes an alternative view to examine the 
extent to which goodwill impairment losses under SFAS No. 142 can be identified by the 
underlying economics of goodwill.  To assess goodwill for impairment, the FASB 
requires using the fair value approach to identify the value of a reporting unit.  Market 
capitalization can represent the fair value of a reporting unit if it is available and a firm 
has only one reporting unit.  However, the fair value of a reporting unit may be greater 
than the market capitalization due to synergies and other benefits from a controlled entity.  
When market value is not available, SFAS No. 142 allows using other valuation 
techniques (e.g. the present value of future cash flows and the multiples of earnings or 
revenues), which require assumptions and estimates based on past and current 
                                                 
29
 Management acts opportunistically to improve future earnings by recording goodwill impairment when 
a firm has recent management turnover.  However, management tends to delay goodwill impairment 
recognition due to debt contracting constraint, compensation incentives, and exchange delisting 
requirements. 
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performance.  Therefore, the recognition of goodwill impairment losses is inevitably 
determined by a firm performance. 
Prior studies find that the goodwill impairment loss has some evidence of delayed 
recognition and is associated with firm past performance (Li et al. 2005; Long 2005; 
Hayn and Hughes 2006).  Firms experiencing relatively low efficiency, compared to 
other firms in the same industry, are likely to have a decrease in goodwill values, which 
will be reported as goodwill impairment losses.  Thus, relative efficiency can be used as a 
measure of firm performance, an underlying economic reason for a decline in goodwill 
value.  Moreover, the economic linkage between goodwill impairment and firm 
performance suggests that, after controlling for other incentive variables, goodwill 
impairment loss is likely to have a negative association with lagged relative efficiency.  
In other words, inefficient firms are more likely to report goodwill impairment losses in 
the near future.  The hypothesis stated in an alternative form is as follows: 
 
H2:  Goodwill impairment loss under SFAS No. 142 is negatively associated with 
lagged relative efficiency. 
 
5.3.2 Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 The second objective of this chapter is to assess the predictive ability of a firm’s 
past performance on the likelihood of a goodwill impairment decision.  Because a firm 
reporting asset write-offs is likely to experience lower performance than other firms in 
the same industries (Elliott and Shaw 1988), it is interesting to examine whether or not an 
indicator of a decline in a firm’s past performance can be a factor that attributes to the 
recognition of goodwill impairment in the near future.  Therefore, a decline in firm 
performance over the past years is expected to indicate the likelihood of a goodwill 
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impairment decision.  Nonetheless, this study does not intend to develop a prediction 
model for goodwill impairment, as in the study of Hayn and Hughes (2006). 
 
5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 Sample firms obtained from Compustat are publicly traded companies in the U.S. 
during the fiscal years 2002-2005.  The initial sample starts with the selected impairment 
sample from chapter 4 that consists of 173 firms from durable manufacturers, 161 firms 
from computers, and 111 firms from services.  As previously discussed, the impairment 
sample is matched with control firms that have no goodwill impairment for the entire 
period of study based on size, the same two-digit SIC code, and the same year.  Then, the 
additional restrictions are imposed.  Observations are required to have stock returns and 
sufficient information to calculate lagged relative efficiency for the analysis of 
determinants of goodwill impairment.30  Therefore, the final sample is reduced to 384 
firm-year observations--172 firms from the durable manufacturers, 118 firms from the 
computers, and 94 firms from the services.  The sample period becomes 2003-2005 
because the 2002 data are needed to estimate lagged relative efficiency for 2003.   
For the analysis of a predictive ability of relative efficiency with respect to a 
goodwill impairment decision, observations are required to have adequate information to 
compute lagged relative efficiency up to the three-year lag.  The decline in efficiency 
from the past three years is considered because goodwill impairment losses lag behind 
                                                 
30
 To calculate lagged relative efficiency, information about assets (e.g. current assets, fixed assets, 
intangible assets, total assets) at the beginning and ending periods of the previous year are needed to 
calculate the average balances of these variables.  Thus, these observations need to take place within the 
past two years. 
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the economic impairment of goodwill by an average of three to four years (Hayn and 
Hughes 2006).  Therefore, the sample period becomes 2004-2005.  The final sample is 
reduced to 252 firm-year observations, consisting of 124 firms from the durable 
manufacturers, 66 firms from the computers, and 62 firms from the services.   
 For all observations, firms’ 10K filings to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) are reviewed to obtain additional goodwill impairment disclosures 
and to ensure that the amount of goodwill impairment provided by Compustat is 
correct.31   In addition, information about changes in chief executive officers over the 
past two years is hand-collected from firms’ proxy statements. 
 
5.4.2 Relative Efficiency Measure 
Because financial ratios and performance indicators are important factors in 
indicating the financial distress and bankruptcy (e.g. Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; 
Zmijewski 1984), this study uses financial performance measures as proxies for the 
relative efficiency of firms, an indicator of goodwill impairment.  However, this study is 
unique in a way that it applies DEA technique to include several input/output variables 
and construct a single performance measure.32  Therefore, it mitigates intercorrelations 
and contradictions among variables that may incur from including multiple performance 
measures in the model. 
                                                 
31
 Compustat sometimes combines the impairment amount of other intangible assets or the long-lived 
assets into the amount of goodwill impairment.  In this case, this study includes only the amount of 
goodwill impairment for the analysis. 
32
 This study uses the Banker-Charnes-Cooper (BCC) model for the DEA analysis to allow for variable 
returns to scale. 
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 Regarding the robustness check among various DEA models in chapter 4, the 
inferences are not sensitive to the choices of different input/output variables in the DEA 
model.  This study reports primary results from the DEA model, which has five input 
variables (i.e. cost of goods sold, selling, general, and administrative expenses, current 
assets, fixed assets, and intangible assets) and a single output variable (sales).  A reason 
for selecting this combination of input/output variables is that all variables in this model 
do not have negative values.  Therefore, this study does not have to make an adjustment 
for the relative efficiency measurement.  
 Market values the amount of goodwill as an asset, a valuable economic resource 
(Henning et al. 2000), so the decline in value of goodwill should reflect a deterioration of 
a firm value.  This study measures the relative efficiency at the firm level because 
evaluating goodwill for impairment by each reporting unit is unlikely to perform due to 
unavailable information.  Although SFAS No. 142 mentions that a reporting unit can be 
an operating segment, in practices, several reporting units are combined to represent a 
component of an operating segment.  The combination of reporting units leads to lower 
quality of disclosures than those provided at the firm level (Hayn and Hughes 2006).  
Moreover, the problem of disclosure quality still exists even a reporting unit is the same 
as an operating segment.33  Hayn and Hughes (2006) also note that “when goodwill is 
allocated across reporting units, the unique subsequent performance of the acquired entity 
is no longer clearly defined and can no longer be traced”.  Moreover, Watt (2003) argues 
that synergies imply joint costs and benefits so it is arbitrary to allocate future cash flows 
                                                 
33
 Givoly et al. (1999) find that segment data reported under SFAS No. 14, Financial Reporting for 
Segments of a Business Enterprise, have lower quality data than firm-level data due to the need to assign 
joint costs to the firm’s segments. 
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and goodwill among units.  Therefore, this study uses available information to measure 
performance at the firm level as opposed to at the reporting unit level. 
 
5.4.3 Empirical Models 
5.4.3.1 Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
Prior research concludes that economic factors and reporting incentives are two 
major determinants of goodwill impairment reporting (e.g. Segal 2003; Zang 2003; Li et 
al. 2005; Long 2005).  This study applies Tobit and logistic regressions for the 
analysis.34  First, this study uses a Tobit model to examine the association between the 
percentage of goodwill impairment and the determinants of goodwill impairment.  The 
Tobit model is a censored regression where observations on the dependent variable (y) 
are censored at a certain point, but the explanatory variables are observed for all 
observations (Maddala 1991).35  Second, this study uses a logistic regression to examine 
firms’ decisions to recognize goodwill impairment.  The logistic regression is appropriate 
because the decision to report goodwill impairment is a dichotomous choice.  The Tobit 
and logistic models are specified as follows: 
Tobit regression 
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34
 Tobit and logistic regressions are used because this study examines both the percentage of goodwill 
impairment that is reported and the decision to recognize goodwill impairment. 
35
 In this study, the dependent variable is the percentage of goodwill impairment, which can also be seen 
as the percentage change in the value of goodwill.  Since U.S. GAAP does not allow for the recognition of 
an increase in goodwill values, but only allow for the recognition of a decrease in goodwill values (i.e. 
goodwill impairment), the dependent variable is censored at zero where the values of goodwill increase.  
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Logistic regression 
 
ittitiit
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 (3) 
where: 
IMP%it  Firm i’s reported pre-tax goodwill impairment (measured as a 
positive sign) for year t, divided by goodwill at the end of year  
t-1 for impairment firms, and 0 for non-impairment firms; 
IMPAIRit  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i reports goodwill 
impairment for the fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Proxies for Economic Factors 
EFFi,t-1  (-) Firm i’s relative efficiency scores for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1 (-) Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
 
Proxies for Reporting Incentives 
CEOit  (+) A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO 
in the year of impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
BATHit (-) A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in 
net income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled 
by total assets at the end of year t-1, when the decrease is below 
the median of negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit (+) A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase 
in net income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, 
scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1, when the increase is 
above the median of  positive values of this variable, and 0 
otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit (-) A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the difference in net 
income before goodwill impairment between year t and t-1, 
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scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1, falls in 
the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 0 otherwise.36 
 
Control Variables 
SIZEi,t-1 (?) Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 (?) Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
 
Proxies for Economic Factors 
Goodwill impairment is negatively associated with a firm’s historical financial 
performance and past stock performance (Segal 2003; Li et al. 2005; Long 2005).  The 
relative efficiency variable is a proxy for firm overall performance, which eliminates 
intercorrelations and contradictions among variables resulting from the inclusion of 
several performance variables in the model.  This variable is calculated by using the 
Banker-Charnes-Cooper (BCC) model to measure the performance of a firm relative to 
other firms within the same industry and year.  According to prior research, goodwill 
impairment before the adoption of SFAS No. 142 shows some evidence of delayed 
recognition and is associated with firm past performance.  Therefore, lagged relative 
efficiency (EFFi,t-1) is included to examine the extent to which the relative efficiency in a 
year prior to goodwill impairment reporting is a determinant of goodwill impairment.  
EFFi,t-1 is predicted to be negatively associated with goodwill impairment, after 
controlling for other confounding variables.  Results finding a significant negative 
association between EFFi,t-1 and goodwill impairment will, thus, support hypothesis 2.  
Moreover, prior research finds that firms with poor stock performance in prior periods are 
                                                 
36
 Market value of equity is a firm’s price per share (Compustat item 199) multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding (Compustat item 25) measured at the end of year t-1. 
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likely to have asset write-offs (Elliott and Shaw 1988; Francis et al. 1996; Long 2005).  
Therefore, this study includes lagged stock returns (RETi,t-1) as a proxy for the stock 
performance over a year prior to the impairment announcement.  The goodwill 
impairment loss is also predicted to be negatively associated with lagged stock returns. 
 
Proxies for Reporting Incentives 
 Incentive factors are used to measure management incentives in making the 
goodwill impairment decision.  Prior studies find that new management has incentives to 
clear the deck to improve firm future performance and blame the previous management 
(Strong and Meyer 1987; Segal 2003; Zang 2003; Riedl 2004).  Therefore, CEOit is 
included to capture a change in chief executive officer (CEO) in the year of goodwill 
impairment reporting.  A positive association between goodwill impairment and the CEO 
turnover is expected.   
Current year’s earnings performance such as when earnings are unexpectedly low 
or unexpectedly high may also affect the goodwill impairment decision.  Management is 
likely to record goodwill impairment when earnings are unexpectedly low under the “big 
bath” hypothesis (Walsh et al. 1991; Zucca and Campbell 1992).  On the other hand, 
management tends to reduce earnings volatility, particularly in the period of unusual 
increases in earnings or when earnings are unexpectedly high, under the “income 
smoothing” hypothesis (Moses 1987; Trueman and Titman 1988).  The reduction of 
earnings volatility when earnings are unexpectedly high may lead to an increase in 
goodwill impairment losses.  Prior research distinguishes between these two effects on 
asset write-offs by including separate variables to measure unexpectedly low versus 
unexpectedly high earnings performance (Francis et al. 1996; Segal 2003; Riedl 2004).   
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Segal (2003) finds evidence supporting the big bath and smoothing hypotheses in the 
period before the adoption of SFAS No. 142, but only finds evidence supporting the big 
bath hypothesis after the adoption of this standard.  Following Riedl (2004), earnings 
performance is considered to be poor when a decrease in net income before goodwill 
impairment from year t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, is below the 
median of negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise.  Earnings performance is 
considered to be good when an increase in net income before goodwill impairment from 
year t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, is above the median of positive 
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise.  Thus, this study includes BATHit (SMOOTHit) to 
proxy for the unexpectedly low (unexpectedly high) earnings performance.  Goodwill 
impairment is predicted to be negatively associated with BATHit, but positively associated 
with SMOOTHit. 
Studies on earnings management find that managers attempt to avoid reporting 
earnings decreases, small losses, and negative earnings surprises at the earnings 
announcement (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Matsumoto 2002).  Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) find that the distribution of earnings shows unusually low frequencies of 
small decreases in earnings and small losses but unusually high frequencies of small 
increases in earnings and small positive profits.  These findings indicate that firms 
manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses.  Following Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), this study includes a measure of small earnings increases (SM_INCREASEit) as 
defined to be in the range [0.00, 0.02) to capture the small increase in earnings from the 
prior year deviated from the benchmark of zero.  Goodwill impairment is predicted to be 
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negatively associated with SM_INCREASEit because firms that report small earnings 
increases try to reduce the amount of goodwill impairment. 
 
Control Variables   
In addition to economic factors and reporting incentives, this study includes 
control variables to measure the size and risk of firms.   SIZEi,t-1 is a control variable to 
assess the extent to which large firms may experience more mergers and acquisitions than 
small firms and may have the different likelihood of a goodwill impairment loss.  Elliott 
and Shaw (1988) find that write-off firms are larger in terms of revenues and assets.  On 
the other hand, large firms may gain benefits from economies of scale and more efficient 
uses of resources, resulting in the lower amount of goodwill impairment.  Finally, 
leverage (LEVi,t-1) is a control variable to measure the risk of firms.  High risk firms are 
likely to report the large amount of goodwill impairment.  On the other hand, highly 
leveraged firms may try to avoid violations of debt covenants by reducing the effect from 
goodwill impairment losses (Zang 2003; Beatty and Weber 2006).  Therefore, this study 
does not predict any signs for the size and leverage variables.   
 
 Using Tobit and logistic regressions, however, raises a concern of choice-based 
sample bias.  The choice-based sample bias results when the sample of impairment firms 
is identified first, and then the control sample is selected from non-impairment firms, 
resulting in a nonrandom sample.  The probability of a firm entering the sample is larger 
than the population probability, which causes the constant and all of the coefficients to be 
asymptotically biased and inconsistent.  This problem occurs for most specifications of 
the selection probability type model such as logistic and probit models (Zmijewski 1984).  
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Zmijewski (1984) addresses the problem of the choice-based sample bias and suggests 
using a weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood (WESML) to account for this 
problem.  The WESML procedure provides asymptotically consistent parameter 
estimates and is the least complex method in comparison with other techniques, such as a 
conditional maximum likelihood and full information concentrated maximum likelihood 
(Zmijewski 1984). 
 The concept of WESML is to weight the log-likelihood function by the ratio of 
the population frequency rate to the sample frequency rate to adjust for the choice-based 
sample bias.37  This study applies the WESML estimation procedure as discussed by 
Zmijewski (1984).  Impairment and non-impairment observations collected in equal 
proportions are adjusted by the probability of goodwill impairment in the population.  
According to data available in Compustat, the proportion of firms reporting goodwill 
impairment losses is approximately 10 percent over the periods of 2003-2005 for these 
three selected industries.38  Therefore, the weight of firms reporting goodwill impairment 
in the population is set to be 10 percent for the WESML estimation. 
 
5.4.3.2 Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
Logistic Regression 
Following the bankruptcy prediction model literature (Ohlson 1980; Zmijewski 
1984), this study applies a logistic regression for which the dependent variable is a 
                                                 
37
 The WESML estimator requires that the true population proportions be known.  Then, the estimator is 
obtained by maximizing the weighted log-likelihood (Greene 2003, p. 673). 
38
 There are 226, 179, and 116 firms that report goodwill impairment from the total population of 2,367, 
1,744, and 1,206 firms during the periods of 2003-2005 for the durable manufacturing, computer, and 
service industries, respectively. 
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dichotomous variable indicating whether firms report either goodwill impairment or no 
impairment.  The logistic regression model uses an indicator of a decline in relative 
efficiency and other explanatory variables in the past years to determine the likelihood of 
a goodwill impairment decision.  The logistic model is specified as follows: 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETDecEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,21,10  (4.1) 
 
where:  
IMPAIRit A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a firm reports a goodwill 
impairment in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
DecEFFi,t-1  (+) A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when there is a decline in firm i’s 
relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1, and 0 otherwise;  
RETi,t-1 (-) Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOi,t-1 (+) A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in a 
year prior to impairment reporting (year t-1), and 0 otherwise; 
MKBKi,t-1 (-) Market to book ratio at the end of year t-1; 
LEVi,t-1 (?) Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
 
 Instead of using DecEFFi,t-1 variable as shown in model (4.1), this study further 
includes several measurements of a decline in the relative efficiency of firms up to the 
past three years (i.e. DecEFF_Histi,t-3, %ChgEFFi,t-1, %ChgEFFi,t-2, and %ChgEFFi,t-3). 
These variables are included because goodwill impairment losses lag behind the 
economic impairment of goodwill by an average of three to four years (Hayn and Hughes 
2006).  Therefore, the logistic models are shown as follows: 
 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETHistDecEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,23,10 _  (4.2) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,21,10 %  (4.3) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,22,10 %  (4.4) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,23,10 %  (4.5) 
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where variables are as defined above, and; 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3  (+) Number of years in which firm i has a decline in relative 
efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 prior to goodwill impairment 
recognition; 
%ChgEFFi,t-1 (-) A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1; 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 (-) A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-2; 
%ChgEFFi,t-3 (-) A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-1; 
 
The explanatory variables are proxies for two main factors--economic reasons and 
reporting incentives.  Write-off firms appear to underperform other firms in the same 
industry during the years prior to the write-offs announcement (Elliott and Shaw 1988; 
Francis et al. 1996; Long 2005).  The relative efficiency and stock return variables are 
used to measure the past operating and stock market performance of firms.  Firms with a 
history of low efficiency and low stock returns are more likely to report goodwill 
impairment losses.  Therefore, a goodwill impairment decision is predicted to have a 
positive association with proxies for an indicator of a decline in efficiency (DecEFFi,t-1 
and DecEFF_Histi,t-3), but a negative association with a percentage change in relative 
efficiency from the prior years (%ChgEFFi,t-1, %ChgEFFi,t-2, and %ChgEFFi,t-3).  In 
addition, a goodwill impairment decision is predicted to be negatively associated with 
lagged stock returns (RETi,t-1). 
Regarding the reporting incentive variables, CEO turnover in a year prior to 
goodwill impairment announcement is more likely to increase the likelihood of an 
impairment decision because new management has incentives to clear the deck and blame 
the previous CEO (Strong and Meyer 1987; Segal 2003; Zang 2003; Riedl 2004).  
Therefore, a goodwill impairment decision is expected to have a positive association with 
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CEOi,t-1.  Market to book ratio (MKBKi,t-1) is used to measure firm growth.  Growth firms 
that have high market to book ratio are less likely to have goodwill impairment charges 
because the potential valuation effects of reporting losses or earnings declines are 
relatively high for these firms.  Thus, a goodwill impairment decision is expected to be 
negatively associated with MKBKi,t-1.  Finally, highly leveraged firms are unwilling to 
report goodwill impairment charges so that they can avoid potential violations of debt 
covenants (Zang 2003; Beatty and Weber 2006).  The recognition of impairment losses 
will reduce the book value of goodwill and increase the debt-to-equity ratio that may 
exceed the thresholds stipulated by debt covenants.  In contrast, the variable LEVi,t-1 is 
also a proxy for the economic difficulty and financial problem.  Firms that have high 
leverage ratio are seen as high risk firms, which face an obstacle in obtaining external 
sources of financing.  This problem can lead to the lack of sufficient funding.   These 
firms are more likely to become less efficient, resulting in a decision to take goodwill 
impairment charges.  Therefore, this study does not predict a sign for LEVi,t-1.   
 
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) 
 Prior studies use MDA to develop bankruptcy prediction models (Altman 1968; 
Altman et al. 1977).  MDA is a classification analysis that can be used to discriminate 
between at least two categories.  However, MDA has some disadvantages in that it 
requires the variance-covariance matrices of the predictors to be identical and normally 
distributed for both groups (Ohlson 1980).  Nonetheless, Ohlson (1980) notes that a 
violation of these assumptions is unimportant if the only objective of the model is to 
develop a discriminating device.  Moreover, Kuruppu et al. (2003) note that MDA 
provides better accuracy in predicting company liquidation than a logit model developed 
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from the same data.  Therefore, this study uses MDA to distinguish between impairment 
and non-impairment firms and applies similar variables in the logistic regression models 
(4.1) to (4.5) to MDA. 
 This study estimates the probability of correct classification by using 
resubstitution and cross-validation methods.  The first method applies a discriminant rule 
to the data used to develop the rule so the probabilities of correct classification are 
overestimated.  The second method also known as Lachenbruch or jackknifing procedure 
removes one observation from the data set, develops discriminant rule based on the 
remaining data, and applies it to the observation not used in developing the model.  This 
procedure is repeated for each observation to evaluate the model accuracy.  The cross-
validation method provides unbiased estimates for the true probabilities of classification 
(Johnson 1998, p. 220-221). 
 
5.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the goodwill impairment sample.  These 
data are hand-collected from firms’10K filings to provide further insight into the 
properties of impairment firms.  Panel A of Table 5.1 shows a description of 
circumstances leading to goodwill impairment.  A decline in the operating performance 
of firms, changes in strategies, and reorganization are primary reasons for recognizing 
goodwill impairment.  These circumstances represent 46.9 percent of the total 
impairment samples.  Other possible circumstances are an economy downturn (4.7 
percent), a decline in stock prices (2.6 percent), an adverse change in legal action (1.0 
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percent), an unanticipated competition (0.5 percent), and a loss of key personnel (4.7 
percent).  Approximately 16 percent of the impairment firms disclose a combination of 
reasons leading to goodwill impairment recognition.  However, 23.4 percent of the 
impairment firms do not provide any rationale for goodwill impairment charges. 
 Panel B of Table 5.1 provides methods of determining the fair value of a reporting 
unit.  Approximately 59 percent of the impairment firms use a present value of future 
cash flows when determining the fair value of reporting units, suggesting that impairment 
firms need to make assumptions and estimations based on past and current performance.  
Other fair value techniques include market capitalization (3.6 percent), multiples of 
earnings (1.6 percent), and a combination of fair value methods (25 percent).  Panel C of 
Table 5.1 reports the quarterly distribution of goodwill impairment.  The majority of 
goodwill impairment losses are reported in the fourth quarter, consistent with prior 
research (e.g. Elliott and Shaw 1988).  The proportion of firms reporting goodwill 
impairment in the fourth quarter represents approximately 64 percent of the total 
impairment firms.  Finally, Panel D of Table 5.1 shows that the majority of impairment 
firms (72.9 percent) have multiple reportable segments, suggesting that impairment firms 
are likely to have more complex organizational structures.   
 Table 5.2 contains descriptive statistics for the determinants of goodwill 
impairment classified by impairment and non-impairment samples.  Consistent with prior 
research, goodwill impairment firms exhibit poorer financial performance when 
compared to non-impairment firms.  The mean of EFFi,t-1 for impairment firms is 0.93 as 
opposed to 0.97 for non-impairment firms, and the difference is statistically significant (t-
statistic of 3.89).  Impairment firms also have a significantly lower mean of RETi,t-1 than 
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non-impairment firms (t-statistic of 3.08).  The median differences also indicate that 
impairment firms have lower financial and stock market performances than non-
impairment firms (z-statistics of 3.48 and 4.28).   
Regarding variables related to managerial reporting incentives, the mean and 
median differences as reported by t-statistics and z-statistics show that impairment firms 
have significantly higher rates of CEO turnover (t-statistic of 3.83, z-statistic of 3.76), 
more unexpected low earnings (BATHit) (t-statistic of 2.42, z-statistic of 3.15), and lower 
small earnings increases (SM_INCREASEit) (t-statistic of 3.56, z-statistic of 3.51).  These 
results indicate that firms are more likely to report goodwill impairment when they have a 
change in CEO or encounter an unexpected low performance.  On the contrary, firms are 
less likely to report goodwill impairment when they experience small earnings increases.   
Regarding the control variables, impairment and non-impairment firms are not 
significantly different in size because they are matched by size and industry.  However, 
impairment firms have higher leverage (LEVi,t-1) than non-impairment firms.  The mean 
difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistic of 2.01), but there is 
no difference in median.  The amount of goodwill, on average, represents 23 percent of 
total assets, which is significantly greater than the amount of goodwill to total assets for 
non-impairment firms (t-statistic of 1.95).  Finally, for the impairment firms, the amount 
of goodwill impairment loss, on average, represents 66 percent of goodwill and 16 
percent of total assets. 
 Table 5.3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used to distinguish 
between impairment and non-impairment firms for the predictive ability analysis.  The 
results show that impairment firms are likely to have a more decline in relative efficiency 
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from year t-2 to t-1 (DecEFFi,t-1) (t-statistic of 2.63, z-statistic of 2.60), a longer history 
of goodwill impairment from year t-3 to t-1 (DecEFF_Histi,t-3) (t-statistic of 2.81, z-
statistic of 1.94), and a lower percent change in relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 
(%ChgEFFi,t-3) (t-statistic of 2.53, z-statistic of 3.59) than non-impairment firms.  Both 
mean and median differences of these variables are statistically significant at least at the 
10 percent level.  However, descriptive statistics show only differences in the median of 
variables used to measure a percent change in relative efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 
(%ChgEFFi,t-1) and from year t-3 to t-2 (%ChgEFFi,t-2).   
Regarding other explanatory variables, impairment firms have lower stock returns 
(RETi,t-1) (t-statistic of 2.96, z-statistic of 3.91) and higher rate of CEO turnover in the 
year prior to goodwill impairment recognition (CEOi,t-1) (t-statistic of 2.91, z-statistic of 
2.87).  Impairment firms also have higher leverage (LEVi,t-1) than non-impairment firms, 
but only the mean difference is statistically significant (t-statistic of 2.11).  Moreover, 
impairment firms have lower market to book ratio (MKBKi,t-1) than non-impairment 
firms, but only the median difference is statistically significant (z-statistic of 4.28). 
 Table 5.4 presents Pearson correlations for the determinants of goodwill 
impairment.  Table 5.5 reports Pearson correlations for variables used in the predictive 
ability analysis.  The results from both tables indicate that proxies for the relative 
efficiency (EFFi,t-1, DecEFFi,t-1, DecEFF_Histi,t-3, %ChgEFFi,t-1, %ChgEFFi,t-2, and 
%ChgEFFi,t-3) are not highly correlated with other variables.  However, Table 5.5 shows 
that these relative efficiency variables are highly correlated with one another.  The largest 
correlation coefficient is 0.80 (p-value < 0.0001), which measures the correlation 
between DecEFFi,t-1 and DecEFF_Histi,t-3.  Therefore, the relative efficiency variables are 
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separately included in the model to prevent multicollinearity problem.39  Except for a 
high correlation between the relative efficiency variables, the correlation coefficients 
between any other two variables are lower than 0.35 in absolute values, so no other 
variables are highly correlated with each other. 
 
5.5.2 Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
 Table 5.6 presents the main results of a Tobit regression used to examine 
determinants of the percentage of goodwill impairment and a logistic regression used to 
examine the likelihood of a decision to recognize goodwill impairment.  The first analysis 
shown in this table is a Tobit regression.  This study examines if the estimation results 
have a heteroskedasticity problem by estimating the model that allows for 
heteroskedasticity and the model that assumes no heteroskedasticity.  The likelihood ratio 
test for the null hypothesis that the model is homeskedastic is rejected at the 1 percent 
significant level, suggesting a presence of heteroskedasticity.  Therefore, the estimated 
Tobit regression that accounted for heteroskedasticity is used for the analysis. 
Results in Table 5.6 show that EFFi,t-1 is significantly negative, as predicted (t-
statistic of -4.07), indicating that firms having low lagged efficiency relative to other 
firms in the same industry are likely to report a higher amount of goodwill impairment.  
This finding strongly supports hypothesis 2.  The results also show a significantly 
negative association between RETi,t-1 and the percentage of goodwill impairment (t-
statistic of -1.91), suggesting that firms with low past stock performance are likely to 
report a higher percentage of goodwill impairment. 
                                                 
39
 Correlation coefficients that higher than 0.8 in absolute values may indicate multicollinearity problem 
(Kennnedy 1998, p. 187).  
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 For the reporting incentive variables, CEOit is significantly positive (t-statistic of 
2.80) and SM_INCREASEit is significantly negative, as predicted (t-statistic of -1.79).  
These results indicate that firms having a change in CEO are more likely to report a 
higher amount of goodwill impairment, while firms with small earnings increases try to 
reduce the amount of goodwill impairment losses to avoid earnings decreases and losses.  
However, BATHit and SMOOTHit are not significantly associated with the percentage of 
goodwill impairment. 
 Regarding the control variables, results show that SIZEit is not statistically 
significant because impairment and non-impairment firms are matched by size.  
However, results show that LEVi,t-1 is significantly positive (t-statistic of 1.79).  Thus, 
firms having higher leverage are more likely to report larger amount of goodwill 
impairment losses, suggesting that high risk firms face economic difficulty and are more 
prone to a decline in firm performance. 
 In addition, the relative efficiency variable measured in the same period of 
goodwill impairment reporting (EFFt) is further included in the Tobit regression to check 
whether the lagged relative efficiency variable remains significant.  The results 
(untabulated) are qualitatively similar to the results from the original Tobit model.  The 
coefficient of EFFi,t-1 is -2.19 and significantly associated with the percentage of 
goodwill impairment (t-statistic of -2.37).  However, the variable EFFt is not statistically 
significant.  The results suggest that the lagged relative efficiency measure has more 
explanatory power and outperforms the current relative efficiency measure.  Thus, the 
past performance of firms is an important determinant of goodwill impairment.  
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The second analysis, which follows the Tobit regression, is a logistic regression.  
The logistic regression used to examine the likelihood of a goodwill impairment decision 
provides similar results to those discussed in the Tobit analysis.  Table 5.6 reports the 
coefficient estimates, marginal effects, and z-statistics of each variable.  The psudo R 
square is 11 percent and the likelihood ratio chi-square is significant at the 1 percent 
level, indicating that the model is valid.40  Consistent with results of the Tobit regression, 
the variable EFFi,t-1 has a significantly negative association with the likelihood of a 
goodwill impairment decision (z-statistic of -3.48).  The marginal effect on EFFi,t-1 
indicates that having a reduction of the relative efficiency score in year t-1 increases the 
likelihood of recognizing goodwill impairment losses by 1.23 times.  These findings 
strongly support the hypothesis that low lagged relative efficiency is an important 
indicator used in decisions to take goodwill impairment charges.  A difference between 
the results of Tobit and logistic analyses is that the proxy for BATHit becomes 
significantly negative (t-statistic of -1.89) in the logistic analysis. 
 The last column reports results of the WESML coefficients for the logistic 
regression.  The WESML procedure is used to adjust for the choice-based sample bias as 
discussed by Zmijewski (1984).  Although the WESML procedure provides consistent 
estimators, they are less efficient (Maddala 1991).  The results of WESML estimation are 
qualitatively similar to the results of logistic regression.  Most importantly, the variable 
EFFi,t-1 remains significantly negative, as predicted (t-statistic of -2.63), suggesting that 
                                                 
40
 This study examines if the estimation results of the logistic regression have heteroskedasticity problem 
by estimating the model that allows for heteroskedasticity and the model that assumes no 
heteroskedasticity.  The likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the model is homeskedastic is not 
rejected at the 1 percent significant level.  Therefore, the heteroskedaticity is not an issue in the logistic 
analysis. 
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the negative association between EFFi,t-1 and the likelihood of goodwill impairment 
recognition holds after adjusting for the choice-based sample bias.  The only difference 
from the results of logistic regression is that the coefficient of LEVi,t-1 becomes 
insignificant in the WESML estimation. 
 To eliminate the effects of extreme observations, this study also winsorizes the 
top and bottom 1 percentile of continuous variables and reexamines the Tobit and logistic 
regressions.  Results (untabulated) provide similar inferences to the main results without 
winsorization.  The percentage of goodwill impairment loss and the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment recognition remain negatively associated with lagged relative 
efficiency. 
  Finally, other measure of firm performance is included in the Tobit and logistic 
regressions to compare with the relative efficiency measure.  Because prior studies 
(Elliott and Shaw 1988; Francis et al. 1996; Rees et al. 1996) use return on assets (ROA) 
to assess firm performance, this study includes ROA in the models as another 
performance measure.  The ROA variable is calculated in the same year of goodwill 
impairment reporting.41  The results of Tobit regression (untabulated) indicate that both 
coefficients of ROA (-0.48) and lagged relative efficiency (-2.18) are negatively 
significant (t-statistics of -5.93 and -4.19), but the coefficient of lagged relative efficiency 
is larger in magnitude.  Instead of using current year ROA, this study includes lagged 
ROA in the model.  The results show that lagged ROA becomes insignificant, but lagged 
relative efficiency remains negatively significant (t-statistic of -3.78).  The logistic 
regression also provides similar inferences as the Tobit regression.  These findings 
                                                 
41
 Return on assets is an operating income after depreciation (Compustat item 178) divided by total assets 
(Compustat item 6) measured at the end of year t. 
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suggest that lagged relative efficiency is a better measure of firm performance than ROA 
and should be used to determine potential goodwill impairment. 
 Overall, Tobit regression, logistic regression, and WESML estimation provide 
similar results, supporting the hypothesis that firms having low lagged efficiency relative 
to other firms in the same industry are more likely to record goodwill impairment and 
report a higher amount of goodwill impairment.  These results remain consistent after 
controlling for managerial reporting incentives and other confounding variables. 
 
5.5.3 Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 This section uses a logistic regression and a discriminant analysis to assess the 
possibility of including several relative efficiency measures and other controlling 
variables in years prior to goodwill impairment recognition to identify potential goodwill 
impairment.  Table 5.7 reports results of the logistic regression.  An indicator of a decline 
in relative efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 (DecEFFi,t-1) is included in model (4.1) and the 
number of years in which firms report a decline in relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 
(DecEFF_Histi,t-3) is included in model (4.2).  Results show that the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment in year t is positively associated with DecEFFi,t-1 and 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3 (Wald Chi-squares of 4.45 and 4.36, respectively).  This study also 
includes measures of a percent change in relative efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 
(%ChgEFFi,t-1), from year t-3 to t-2, (%ChgEFFi,t-2), and from year t-3 to t-1 
(%ChgEFFi,t-3) in models (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5), respectively.  The results show that 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 and %ChgEFFi,t-3 are negatively significant (Wald Chi-squares of 2.16 and 
4.14).  However, %ChgEFFi,t-1 is not statistically significant.  The coefficient of 
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%ChgEFFi,t-3 has the largest magnitude compared to efficiency measures in other 
models, suggesting that model (4.5) provides the best performance indicator for goodwill 
impairment. 
For all models, the likelihood of goodwill impairment in year t is negatively 
associated with RETi,t-1, but positively associated with CEOi,t-1 and LEVi,t-1.  These 
findings suggest that the likelihood of a goodwill impairment decision increases when 
firms have lower past stock returns, higher CEO turnover in the year prior to goodwill 
impairment reporting, and higher leverage.  In summary, the findings suggest that these 
variables (DecEFFi,t-1, DecEFF_Histi,t-3, %ChgEFFi,t-2, and %ChgEFFi,t-3) can be used to 
determine potential goodwill impairment. 
 Table 5.8 presents the results of the discriminant analysis using the same variables 
that are specified for the logistic regression to assess the predictive ability of the relative 
efficiency measures.  This study uses resubstitution and cross-validation methods to 
assess classification accuracy.  In Panel A of Table 5.8, using the resubstitution method, 
this study finds that non-impairment firms are correctly classified 73.02 percent of the 
time, while impairment firms are correctly classified 53.97 percent of the time.  Using the 
cross-validation method, the classification accuracy of non-impairment firms is 72.22 
percent, whereas the classification accuracy of impairment firms is 53.17 percent, which 
is slightly lower than the results of resubstitution method.  The total classification error is 
37.30 percent.  In general, the cross-validation method provides unbiased estimates 
(Johnson 1998), so it should be used to assess classification accuracy.  In Panel B of 
Table 5.8, instead of using the DecEFFi,t-1 variable, this study includes DecEFF_Histi,t-3, 
which measures the number of years in which a firm has a decline in efficiency from year 
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t-3 to t-1.  The discriminant analysis shows the total classification error of 41.67 percent, 
which is slightly higher than the total error in Panel A. 
In Panels C, D, and E of Table 5.8, this study adds information about a percent 
change in relative efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 (%ChgEFFi,t-1), from year t-3 to t-2 
(%ChgEFFi,t-2), and from year t-3 to t-1 (%ChgEFFi,t-3) in the analysis instead of using 
an indicator variable of a decline in efficiency, or a history of a decline in efficiency.  In 
Panel E, the MDA model that includes the variable %ChgEFFi,t-3 produces better results 
than the models that include the variables %ChgEFFi,t-1 and %ChgEFFi,t-2 in Panels C 
and D.  The model in Panel E correctly predicts 53.17 percent of the actual impairment 
and 76.19 percent of the actual non-impairment.  In addition, the total classification error 
reduces to 35.32 percent, which is the lowest error rate compared to other models from 
Panels A to D.  Finally, in Panel F of Table 5.8, the results of the discriminant analysis 
excluding the measure of relative efficiency show that the model correctly predicts only 
43.65 percent of the actual impairment, which is the lowest classification accuracy.  The 
total classification error is 39.29 percent.   
In conclusion, the model including the variable %ChgEFFi,t-3 provides the best 
result for classification accuracy.  The linear discriminant function of this model is as 
follows: 
1,1,1,1,3, 81.0001.017.118.0%66.121.0 −−−−− +−+−−−= tititititi LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFZ  (5) 
where other variables are as defined above; and Z is an overall index.  If Z is greater than 
zero, a firm will be classified as an impairment firm; otherwise it will be classified as a 
non-impairment firm.   
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Overall, the results of this study suggest that a decline in relative efficiency at the 
firm level can be used to determine future goodwill impairment.  Moreover, adding 
information about a percent change in relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 helps to 
improve classification accuracy. 
 
5.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 This section provides sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of research 
results.  The sensitivity analyses are performed by examining whether the results are 
sensitive to the choices of different input/output variables in the DEA model.  Moreover, 
this study applies a conditional logistic regression to the matched sample, and includes 
one reportable segment in the model as a control variable. 
 
5.6.1 Choices of Input/Output Variables 
A concern has been raised as to whether the results remain consistent if the 
choices of input/output variables in the DEA model are different.  Therefore, this study 
reruns the Tobit regression, logistic regression, and WESML estimation on two 
additional DEA models.  Table 5.9, Panel A reports results of the DEA model having 
four input variables (operating expenses; current assets; fixed assets; intangible assets) 
and a single output variable (sales), while Panel B presents results of the DEA model 
having two input variables (operating expenses; total assets) and three output variables 
(sales; operating cash flows; income before extraordinary items).  These two DEA 
models produce results that are qualitatively similar to the findings presented in Table 
5.6.  Most importantly, the percentage of goodwill impairment losses and the likelihood 
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of a goodwill impairment decision remain negatively associated with the lagged relative 
efficiency, after controlling for other reporting incentive and control variables. 
 
5.6.2 Conditional Logistic Regression 
 The second sensitivity analysis is performed to take into account matching 
variables’ effects because this study selects the control sample by matching on size and 
the same two-digit SIC code.  A conditional logistic regression, which provides 
consistent estimates, is used to analyze the pair-wise differenced data between the sample 
and matched control.  The conditional logistic regression is a no-intercept logit regression 
of pair-wise differences in the dependent variable upon pair-wise differences of the 
independent variables (Cram et al. 2007).42  
Table 5.10 contains results of the conditional logistic regression applying on three 
different DEA models.43  Findings in Table 5.10 are qualitatively similar to the main 
results of the logistic regression presented in Table 5.6.  The likelihood of goodwill 
impairment recognition is negatively associated with lagged relative efficiency, 
indicating that impairment firms have poor past performance and low efficiency.  In 
addition, the likelihood of goodwill impairment recognition is positively associated with 
CEOit and LEVi,t-1, but it is negatively associated with RETi,t-1, BATHit, and 
SM_INCREASEit, consistent with the main results.  Only difference from the results of 
                                                 
42
 Another method to account for the matching variables’ effects is a logit analysis of pooled, non-
differenced data that includes a dummy variable for each pairing without an overall intercept (Cram et al. 
2007).  
43 DEA model 1 has five inputs (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current 
assets; fixed assets; intangible assets) and a single output (sales).  DEA model 2 has four inputs (operating 
expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) and a single output (sales).  DEA model 3 has 
two inputs (operating expenses; total assets) and three outputs (sales; operating cash flows; income before 
extraordinary items). 
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the logistic regression is that the proxy for SIZEit becomes negatively significant in the 
conditional logistic regression.  These findings suggest that small firms are likely to 
recognize higher goodwill impairment losses because they are less likely to achieve 
economies of scale, as opposed to large firms.  The statistically significance in size 
suggests that impairment and non-impairment firms are not perfectly matched by size and 
the differences are revealed when using the conditional logistic analysis.  Overall, the 
results are robust across various DEA models.  
 
5.6.3 Control for Reportable Segment 
 The third sensitivity analysis is undertaken to control for a reportable segment.  
This study measures relative efficiency at the firm level, while the FASB requires that 
goodwill impairment is assessed at the reporting unit level.  Thus, there is a concern that 
managers of firms with multiple reporting units can exercise their discretion on goodwill 
allocation.  Managers can offset poor performance of one reporting unit with good 
performance of another reporting unit, leading to no goodwill impairment recognition.  
On the other hand, managers do not manipulate performance of reporting units, but 
appropriately report goodwill impairment losses when there is a deterioration of firm 
performance.  In general, firms with complex organizational structures and operations are 
likely to have multiple reporting units.  These firms need to put greater effort to achieve 
the optimal resource allocation and coordination among various units.  Therefore, firms 
that have multiple reporting units are more likely to report goodwill impairment losses 
when their operations are inefficient. 
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The number of reporting units is typically not disclosed in financial statements.  
However, Beatty and Weber (2006) argue that single-segment firms tend to have one 
reporting unit.  They include a dichotomous variable to proxy for one reporting unit.  
This variable equals to 1 for single-segment firms and 0 for multiple segment firms.  
Following Beatty and Weber (2006), this study includes the variable OneSEGit to control 
for firms that have one reportable segment and reruns the Tobit regression, logistic 
regression, and WESML estimation.  Descriptive statistics (not tabulated) show that 
impairment firms are more likely to have multiple reportable segments, whereas non-
impairment firms are more likely to have a single reportable segment.  The mean of 
OneSEGit for impairment firms is 0.27 compared to 0.52 for non-impairment firms and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-statistic of 5.17). 
Table 5.11 presents results of the Tobit regression, logistic regression, and 
WESML estimation including a control variable for one segment.  The results in Table 
5.11 are qualitatively similar to those findings shown in Table 5.6, after including a 
control variable for one reportable segment.  The percentage of goodwill impairment and 
the likelihood of goodwill impairment recognition are negatively associated with the 
variable OneSEGit, consistent with the results in Beatty and Weber (2006).  These findings 
indicate that firms having one reportable segment are less likely to recognize goodwill 
impairment losses than firms having multiple segments.  The results run counter to the 
argument that firms with multiple reportable segments try to hide their poor performance 
from one segment with good performance from other segments. 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
 This study examines the role of the relative efficiency of firms in determining the 
percentage of goodwill impairment and the decision to recognize goodwill impairment 
charges in the years subsequent to the adoption of SFAS No. 142.  This study applies 
DEA technique to estimate a firm’s relative efficiency.  Relative efficiency is a measure 
of a firm’s overall performance, the underlying economics for goodwill impairment 
decision.  The results show that firms having low lagged relative efficiency are more 
likely to have goodwill impairment charges and report higher amount of goodwill 
impairment losses, after controlling for managerial reporting incentives and other 
confounding variables.  The results suggest that relative efficiency is an important 
determinant of goodwill impairment.  The inferences are robust to the choice of various 
input/output variables in the DEA model.  Moreover, the findings are consistent after 
applying a conditional logistic regression to account for the matched sample design and 
after controlling for a reportable segment. 
 This study also assesses the ability of including several proxies for a decline in 
relative efficiency in the past years to determine the likelihood of a goodwill impairment 
decision.  Moreover, a discriminant analysis is used to distinguish between impairment 
and non-impairment firms.  Results of logistic regressions show that an indicator variable 
of a decline in relative efficiency and a history of goodwill impairment reporting are 
positively associated with the likelihood of goodwill impairment in year t.  Moreover, the 
variables measured a percent change in relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-2 and from 
year t-3 to t-1 are negatively associated with the likelihood of goodwill impairment in 
year t.  The results suggest that these variables can be used to determine potential 
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goodwill impairment.  Applying similar variables to the discriminant analysis, the model 
correctly predicts more than 50 percent of the actual impairment with the best total error 
rate of 35.32 percent.  These findings provide opportunity for future research to include 
the measure of a firm’s overall performance in the prediction model of goodwill 
impairment. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 This study examines the implementation of SFAS No. 142 after the initial 
adoption period to assess whether the standard achieves its objective to improve the 
quality of financial reporting.  The FASB expects that financial statements of firms that 
acquire goodwill and other intangible assets will better reflect the underlying economics 
of those assets (SFAS No. 142, Summary).  This study takes advantages of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure firm performance and efficiency, the 
underlying economic determinant of goodwill impairment.  The DEA aggregates several 
financial measures into a meaningful measure of overall performance.  This method 
reduces intercorrelations and contradictions among variables that occur from including 
multiple variables in the model. 
 First, this study examines the usefulness of goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 
142 by assessing whether the impairment loss signals a decline in relative efficiency, 
rather than applying the market-based study.  The results of the cross-sectional analysis 
strongly support the hypothesis that impairment firms are relatively less efficient than 
non-impairment firms in the year of goodwill impairment recognition.  These findings are 
robust across different DEA models.  The results of the longitudinal analysis show a 
significantly increase in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 for firms that have goodwill 
impairment in this year, but no impairment in the next year.  However, evidence of the
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longitudinal analysis partially supports a decline in relative efficiency from year t to t+1 
for firms that do not have goodwill impairment in this year, but have impairment in the 
next year.  The plausible explanation is that managers are able to manipulate performance 
of their firms over time, but they are unable to manage performance of other comparable 
firms.  Therefore, the cross-sectional analysis provides stronger evidence to support the 
hypothesis than the longitudinal analysis.  Overall, the results indicate that goodwill 
impairment under SFAS No. 142 can reflect the decline in a firm’s relative efficiency as 
compared to other firms in the same industry. 
 Second, this study examines the role of relative efficiency of firms in determining 
the percentage of goodwill impairment and the decision to recognize goodwill 
impairment.  The results indicate that firms having low lagged relative efficiency are 
more likely to recognize goodwill impairment charges and report higher amount of 
goodwill impairment losses, after controlling for managerial reporting incentives.  These 
findings are consistent among the choices of various input/output variables in the DEA 
model, after applying a conditional logistic regression to account for the matched sample 
design, and after controlling for a reportable segment.  In addition, a decline in relative 
efficiency in the past years can be used to determine potential goodwill impairment and 
discriminate between impairment and non-impairment firms. 
 The results of this study extend the literature on value relevance (e.g. Hirschey 
and Richardson 2002, 2003; Segal 2003; Li et al. 2005) by providing evidence on the 
underlying economics for the association between goodwill impairment and stock prices.  
This study also contributes to the literature on asset write-downs (e.g. Segal 2003; Beatty 
and Weber 2006; Guler 2006) by including a firm’s relative efficiency as one of the 
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determinants for goodwill impairment.  This study provides evidence on the implication 
of SFAS No. 142 after the initial adoption period.  Although prior studies conclude that 
reporting incentives and economic conditions are major factors for goodwill impairment, 
this study provides evidence that goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 can reflect 
the underlying economics of goodwill, thereby achieving the objective of this standard.  
The relation between goodwill impairment and a firm’s relative efficiency helps financial 
statement users to understand the underlying economics for goodwill impairment.  The 
results also provide an avenue for future research to incorporate an overall measure of 
firm performance in the goodwill impairment prediction model. 
 However, the analysis is subject to some limitations.  First, the study assesses the 
relative efficiency of firms based solely on financial performance measures that may lack 
a comprehensive view of the overall measure of firm efficiency.  Non-financial measures 
(e.g. quality of services, new product success rate, and customer satisfaction rate) are also 
important measures of firm efficiency.  Thus, including non-financial performance 
measures as proxies for the relative efficiency of firms will be beneficial to future 
research.  Another limitation is that although the FASB requires the goodwill impairment 
test to be performed at the reporting unit level, all variables in the study are measured at 
the firm level because reporting unit performance data are unavailable.  Consequently, 
the performance of a firm as a whole can be different from the performance of a reporting 
unit that reports goodwill impairment.  Therefore, including the measure of relative 
efficiency at the reporting unit level will be fruitful for future research and provide a 
better perspective on this analysis. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT UNDER SFAS NO. 142 
 
 
This section provides discussions and an example of the accounting for goodwill 
impairment.  For the purpose of testing goodwill for impairment, acquired assets and 
assumed liabilities will be assigned to a reporting unit as of the acquisition date if both of 
the following criteria are met: (1) the asset or liability relate to the operations of a 
reporting unit; and (2) the asset or liability will be considered in determining the fair 
value of a reporting unit (SFAS No. 142, par. 32).  Goodwill acquired in a business 
combination will also be assigned to one or more reporting units as of the acquisition 
date.  The amount of goodwill assigned to reporting units is based on the expected 
benefits obtained from synergies resulting from business combinations although other 
assets or liabilities of the acquired entity may not be allocated to that reporting unit 
(SFAS No. 142, par. 34). 
The accounting for goodwill impairment under SFAS No. 142 is illustrated in the 
following example.  Assume that a company has two reporting units (Unit A and B).  The 
values of the identifiable net assets (acquired assets and assumed liabilities), the amount 
of goodwill, and the fair value of reporting units recorded at the date of impairment test 
are presented as follows: 
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Identifiable net assets: 
    Current assets 
    Long-lived assets 
    Less Liabilities 
 
Goodwill 
Carrying value of  reporting unit 
 
FV of reporting unit 
Reporting  
Unit A 
 
50 
200 
(100) 
150 
200 
350 
 
250 
Reporting  
Unit B 
 
250 
350 
(400) 
200 
400 
600 
 
450 
 
 The goodwill impairment test is performed at the reporting unit level under a two-
step process.  The first step is to identify potential impairment by comparing the fair 
value of a reporting unit with the carrying value of a reporting unit, including goodwill.  
The second step is to measure the amount of impairment loss by comparing the implied 
fair value of reporting unit goodwill with the carrying amount of that goodwill.  The 
implied fair value of goodwill is calculated by allocating the fair value of a reporting unit 
to all assets and liabilities of that unit (including any unrecognized intangible assets), as if 
the reporting unit had been acquired in a business combination.  The excess of the fair 
value of a reporting unit over the amount assigned to its assets and liabilities is the 
implied fair value of goodwill (SFAS No. 142. par. 21).  The example of the two-step 
goodwill impairment process is shown as follows: 
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Two-Step Process 
Step 1:  To identify potential impairment 
  FV of reporting unit 
  Carrying value of reporting unit (BV) 
  FV < Carrying value of reporting unit 
 
Step 2:  To measure the amount of impairment loss 
  FV of reporting unit 
  Assign to: FV of current assets 
                   FV of long-lived assets 
                   FV of liabilities 
  Implied FV of goodwill 
 
 Carrying value of goodwill 
  
 Goodwill impairment loss 
Reporting 
Unit A 
 
 
250 
350 
(100) 
 
 
250 
(50) 
(200) 
120 
120 
 
200 
 
80 
(200-120=80) 
Reporting  
Unit B 
 
 
450 
600 
(150) 
 
 
450 
(250) 
(430) 
400 
170 
 
400 
 
230 
(400-170=230) 
 
 In this example, the fair values of reporting units A and B are below the carrying 
values of reporting units in the first step; therefore, the second step is required.  After 
allocating the fair values of each reporting unit to all of the assets and liabilities in that 
reporting unit, this company has the implied fair value of goodwill less than the carrying 
amount of goodwill.  Therefore, goodwill impairment loss is recognized as the total 
amount of $310.  The amount of impairment loss is the difference between the carrying 
amount of goodwill and the implied fair value of goodwill.   
 
SFAS No. 142 and SFAS No. 144 Comparison 
This section compares SFAS No. 142 with SFAS No. 144 regarding the criteria of 
when to test and how to measure the impairment loss.  SFAS No. 144, superseded SFAS 
No. 121, and addresses the accounting for long-lived assets to be held and used, to be 
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disposed of other than by sale, and to be disposed of by sale.   SFAS No. 144 requires 
long-lived asset (asset group) to be tested for recoverability whenever events or changes 
in circumstances indicate that its carrying amount may not be recoverable.44  The 
following table compares the examples of circumstances that indicate potential goodwill 
impairment under SFAS No. 142 as opposed to circumstances that indicate the potential 
long-lived asset impairment under SFAS No. 144.  
 
SFAS No. 142 
(SFAS No. 142, par 28) 
SFAS No. 144 
(SFAS No. 144, par 8) 
 
1. Significant adverse change in legal 
factors or in the business climate 
2. Adverse action or assessment by a 
regulator 
3. Reporting unit is more likely to be sold 
or disposed of 
4. Unanticipated competition 
5. Loss of key personnel 
6. Testing for recoverability under SFAS 
121 (SFAS 144 now) of a significant 
asset group within a reporting unit 
7. Recognition of goodwill impairment 
loss of a subsidiary that is a component 
of a reporting unit 
 
 
1. Significant adverse change in legal 
factors or in the business climate 
2. Adverse action or assessment by a 
regulator 
3. Long-lived asset is more likely to be 
sold or disposed of 
4. Decrease in market price of a long-
lived asset  
5. Adverse change in the extent in which 
a long-lived asset is being used or in 
physical condition 
6. Accumulation of costs in excess of the 
amount originally expected for the 
acquisition or construction 
7. Current-period operating or cash flow 
loss, a history of operating or cash flow 
losses, or a forecast of continuing 
losses 
 
 
The first three events that trigger goodwill impairment test under SFAS No. 142 
are similar to events indicating that the carrying amount of long-lived assets may not be 
recoverable under SFAS No. 144.  More importantly, the test for recoverability under 
                                                 
44
 If a long-lived asset (or assets) is part of a group that includes other assets and liabilities, the unit of 
accounting for the long-lived asset is its group.  An asset group represents the lowest level for which 
identifiable cash flows are largely independent of the cash flows of other groups of assets and liabilities 
(SFAS 144, par 4). 
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SFAS No. 144 is one of the circumstances that require goodwill to be tested for 
impairment.  Therefore, firms that have long-lived asset impairment may report goodwill 
impairment during the same period.   
Unlike the two-step process of goodwill impairment test in SFAS No. 142, SFAS 
No. 144 requires that an impairment loss will be recognized only if the carrying amount 
of a long-lived asset is not recoverable and exceeds its fair value.  The recoverability test 
is an additional step, which requires assessing the sum of undiscounted cash flows as a 
threshold for the impairment test.  If the carrying amount of a long-lived asset exceeds 
the sum of the undiscounted cash flows from the asset, the carrying amount of a long-
lived asset will not be recoverable.  Then, an impairment loss is measured as the 
difference between the carrying amount of a long-lived asset and its fair value (SFAS No. 
144, par7).  The recoverability test offers a possibility to avoid achieving the threshold 
for long-lived asset impairment test when the carrying amount of a long-lived asset is 
greater than its fair value, but still lower than the sum of the undiscounted cash flows.  
On the other hand, SFAS No. 142 applies present values techniques to measure 
fair value of reporting unit; therefore, firms are less likely to avoid achieving the 
threshold for goodwill impairment test.  Although a firm with a decline in the fair value 
of long-lived assets is able to avoid recording fixed asset impairment, the fair value of a 
reporting unit is more likely to decrease due to a reduction in benefits from these assets, 
resulting in goodwill impairment recognition.  Therefore, goodwill impairment loss 
provides an overall picture of a decrease in the fair value of a reporting unit, which 
reflects a deterioration of the fair value other assets in the reporting unit as well. 
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 When a reporting unit (or a portion of reporting unit that constitutes a business) is 
to be disposed of in its entirely, goodwill of that reporting unit should be included in the 
carrying amount of the reporting unit when determines the gain or loss on disposal.  The 
amount of goodwill in the carrying amount of unit to be disposed of should be based on 
the relative fair values of the business to be disposed of and the portion of the reporting 
unit that will be retained (SFAS No. 142, par. 39). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT DISCLOSURES 
 
 
The objective of this section is to obtain additional disclosures of possible 
circumstances leading to goodwill impairment.  There is a concern that the relationship 
between goodwill impairment losses and firms’ relative efficiency will not hold when the 
major component of goodwill is the residual goodwill, which becomes impaired.  The 
FASB noted that going-concern and synergy components of goodwill are conceptually 
part of goodwill, whereas residual component of goodwill is not conceptually part of 
goodwill.  Residual goodwill represents a measurement error in valuing the acquired 
entity, or an overpayment (e.g. if the price is driven up in the course of bidding) or 
underpayment (e.g. a distress sale or fire sale) by the acquiring entity (SFAS No. 141, 
Appendix B, par. B102, B105).   
To identify reasons for goodwill impairment loss, firms’ 10K and 10Q filings are 
reviewed to obtain additional goodwill impairment disclosures from notes to financial 
statement.  The impairment observation and the matched control sample will be 
eliminated from the final sample if there are disclosures indicate that an overpayment is a 
circumstance leading to goodwill impairment recognition.  This method is appropriate 
since SFAS No. 142 requires impairment firms to disclose a description of the facts and 
circumstances leading to the impairment in the notes to the financial statements (SFAS  
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No. 142, par. 47).  The examples of disclosures regarding goodwill impairment loss are 
shown as follows: 
 
Excerpt from Intermet Corporation – 2003 Annual Report 
 
“…Due to the erosion of the profitability of the Light Metals reporting unit, and the 
revision of our forecast as a result of the changing market conditions, our estimated 
discounted cash flows from the Light Metals reporting unit decreased significantly as 
compared to our impairment tests performed in 2002. Based on the first step analysis, 
we determined that the carrying value of the Light Metals reporting unit was in excess of 
its fair value as of November 30, 2003. Accordingly, we were required to perform the 
second step analysis on the Light Metals reporting unit to determine the amount of the 
impairment. The second step analysis indicated that the pre-tax goodwill impairment 
charge was $51.1 million, which was reported as "Goodwill Impairment Charge" in the 
accompanying statements of operations in 2003.” 
 
Excerpt from Inter Corporation – 2003 Annual report 
  
“… The Wireless Communications and Computing Group (WCCG) business, comprised 
primarily of flash memory products and cellular baseband chipsets, has not performed as 
management had expected. In the fourth quarter of 2003, it became apparent that 
WCCG was now expected to grow more slowly than previously projected. A slower-
than-expected rollout of products and slower-than-expected customer acceptance of 
our products in the baseband chipset business, as well as a delay in the transition to 
next-generation phone networks, have pushed out the forecasts for sales into high-end 
data cell phones. These factors resulted in lower growth expectations for the reporting 
unit and triggered the goodwill impairment. The impairment review requires a two-step 
process. The first step of the review compares the fair value of the reporting units with 
substantial goodwill against their aggregate carrying values, including goodwill. The 
company estimated the fair value of the WCCG and ICG reporting units using the income 
method of valuation, which includes the use of estimated discounted cash flows. Based on 
the comparison, the carrying value of the WCCG reporting unit exceeded the fair value. 
Accordingly, the company performed the second step of the test, comparing the implied 
fair value of the WCCG reporting unit's goodwill with the carrying amount of that 
goodwill. Based on this assessment, the company recorded a non-cash impairment 
charge of $611 million, which is included as a component of operating income in the "all 
other" category for segment reporting purposes.” 
 
Excerpt from Movie Gallery Inc – 2005 Annual report 
 
“Goodwill is tested at a reporting unit level.  Our reporting units for this purpose are 
Movie Gallery and Hollywood Video (our Game Crazy segment has no goodwill).  
Goodwill is impaired if the fair value of a reporting unit is less than the carrying value of 
its assets.  The estimated fair value of each of the reporting units was computed using 
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the present value of estimated future cash flows, which included the impact of trends in 
the business and industry noted in 2005, and considering market prices of our debt and 
equity securities, including the accelerated decline in the in-store rental industry, 
increased competition in the video sell-through markets and the growth of the on-line 
movie rental segment in which we do not have a presence.  Impairments of goodwill 
were recorded for the Movie Gallery and Hollywood reporting units in the amounts of 
$161.7 million and $361.2 million, respectively. 
 
The first step of the goodwill impairment test compares the book value of the reporting 
units to their estimated fair values. The estimated fair values of the reporting units are 
computed using the present value of estimated future cash flows. This analysis utilizes a 
multi-year forecast of estimated cash flows and a terminal value at the end of the cash 
flow period. The forecast period growth assumptions consist of internal projections that 
are based on our budget and long-range strategic plan.  The discount rate used at the 
testing date is our weighted-average cost of capital, modified as necessary to reconcile 
the sum of the enterprise values of our reporting units to the market value of our debt and 
equity securities outstanding. If fair values of the reporting units do not exceed their 
carrying values then the second step must be performed to quantify the amount of the 
impairment. 
 
The second step of the goodwill impairment test compares the implied fair value of 
goodwill to the book value of goodwill for each reporting unit. To determine the implied 
fair value of goodwill, we allocated the estimated fair value of each reporting unit to the 
estimated fair value of the existing tangible assets and liabilities, as well as existing 
identified intangible assets and previously unidentified intangible assets. The estimated 
implied fair value of goodwill was compared to its respective carrying value and any 
excess carrying value was recorded as a goodwill impairment charge to operating 
income. 
 
In the first step of the impairment test the fair value of both the Movie Gallery and 
Hollywood Video reporting units were lower than their carrying values, and therefore the 
goodwill of those reporting units was impaired. 
 
The second step of the impairment test indicated that the implied fair value of goodwill 
for the Movie Gallery reporting unit was completely impaired, and therefore a goodwill 
impairment charge was recorded for $161.7 million.  The implied fair value of goodwill 
for the Hollywood Video reporting unit was $118.4 million, and therefore a goodwill 
impairment charge was recorded for $361.2 million.” 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
SUMMARY OF INPUT/OUTPUT VARIABLES FROM PRIOR STUDIES 
 
 
Studies Input Variables Output Variables 
 
Bowlin (1995) 
 
Total assets 
Stockholders’ equity 
Plant and equipment 
Employees 
 
Net income 
Cash flow from operations 
Net sales 
End-of-year market value of equity 
 
Bowlin (1999) 
 
Operating expenses 
Identifiable assets 
 
Operating profit 
Operating cash flows 
Sales 
 
Seiford and Zhu (1999) 
Zhu (2000) 
 
Stage 1 
Employees  
Assets 
Stockholders’ equity 
 
Stage 2 
Revenues 
Profits 
 
Stage 1 
Revenues 
Profits 
 
 
Stage 2 
Market value 
Total return to investors 
Earnings per share 
 
Luo (2003) 
 
Stage 1 
Employees  
Total assets 
Stockholders’ equity 
 
Stage 2 
Revenues 
Profits 
 
Stage 1 
Revenues 
Profits 
 
 
Stage 2 
Market value 
Stock price 
Earnings per share 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
LIST OF SAMPLE FIRMS 
 
Panel A: Durable Manufacturers 
Id YR Impairment Firms SIC No Impairment Firms SIC 
1 2002 CHANNELL COMMERCIAL CORP 3089 CLARION TECHNOLOGIES INC 3089 
2 2002 CONSOLIDATED CONTAINR CO 3089 APTARGROUP INC 3089 
3 2002 EAGLE BUILDING TECH INC 3270 AMERICAN STONE INDUSTRS INC 3281 
4 2002 U S CONCRETE INC 3270 JARDEN CORP 3221 
5 2002 FIBERCORE INC 3357 NIAGARA CORP 3310 
6 2002 INTERNATIONAL WIRE GROUP 3357 GIBRALTAR INDUSTRIES INC 3310 
7 2002 ACME UNITED CORP 3420 NORTH AMER GALV & COATINGS 3470 
8 2002 MPM TECHNOLOGIES INC 3564 JMAR TECHNOLOGIES INC 3559 
9 2002 QUIPP INC 3559 PARAGON TECHNOLOGIES INC 3530 
10 2002 VEECO INSTRUMENTS INC 3559 IDEX CORP 3561 
11 2002 TIGER TELEMATICS INC 3663 COGNITRONICS CORP 3661 
12 2002 DISTINCTIVE DEVICES INC 3661 ELECTR TELE-COMMUNCTN 3661 
13 2002 TPC LIQUIDATION 3661 HOME DIRECTOR INC 3669 
14 2002 DIGITAL ANGEL CORP 3669 CIRCUIT RESEARCH LABS INC 3663 
15 2002 PUBLICARD INC 3690 EMRISE CORP 3640 
16 2002 PORTA SYSTEMS CORP 3661 SOCKET COMMUNICATIONS INC 3663 
17 2002 NCT GROUP INC 3651 FIBERSTARS INC 3640 
18 2002 DIGITAL VIDEO SYSTEMS IN 3651 NUMEREX CORP  -CL A 3669 
19 2002 COM21 INC 3661 ASTRONICS CORP 3640 
20 2002 MAXWELL TECHNOLOGIES INC 3612 LIFELINE SYSTEMS INC 3663 
21 2002 VYYO INC 3663 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INC 3661 
22 2002 WAVE WIRELESS CORP 3663 UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS INC 3651 
23 2002 SL INDUSTRIES INC 3620 EXCEL TECHNOLOGY INC 3690 
24 2002 CARRIER ACCESS CORP 3661 FRANKLIN ELECTRIC CO INC 3621 
25 2002 NMS COMMUNICATIONS CORP 3661 NATIONAL PRESTO INDS INC 3634 
26 2002 KOMAG INC 3695 BALDOR ELECTRIC CO 3621 
27 2002 STANDARD MOTOR PRODS 3690 GENLYTE GROUP INC 3640 
28 2002 SONICWALL INC 3663 MCDATA CORP  -CL A 3669 
29 2002 ARRIS GROUP INC 3663 REGAL-BELOIT CORP 3621 
30 2002 ZAP 3790 UNIVERSAL AUTOMOTIVE INDS 3714 
31 2002 LMI AEROSPACE INC 3728 MARINE PRODUCTS CORP 3730 
32 2002 NATIONAL R V HOLDINGS IN 3716 R & B INC 3714 
33 2002 MCDERMOTT INTL INC 3730 AMERICAN AXLE & MFG HLDGS 3714 
34 2002 ANTARES PHARMA INC 3841 EP MEDSYSTEMS INC 3845 
35 2002 PARADIGM MEDICAL INDS IN 3845 ORBIT INTERNATIONAL CP 3812 
36 2002 ELECTRIC CITY CORP 3825 CARDIAC SCIENCE CORP 3845 
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37 2002 BICO INC 3845 ENDOLOGIX INC 3841 
38 2002 AETRIUM INC 3825 IRIS INTERNATIONAL INC 3826 
39 2002 ENDOCARE INC 3841 BADGER METER INC 3824 
40 2002 MDI INC 3861 SUNRISE TELECOM INC 3825 
41 2002 CRYOLIFE INC 3842 ARTHROCARE CORP 3845 
42 2002 NANOMETRICS INC 3829 TOLLGRADE COMMUNICATIONS INC 3825 
43 2002 IXIA 3825 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES INC 3823 
44 2002 SEQUENOM INC 3826 OAKLEY INC 3851 
45 2002 INFOCUS CORP 3861 MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO 3842 
46 2002 TERADYNE INC 3825 STRYKER CORP 3842 
47 2002 GABRIEL TECHNOLOGIES COR 3990 ACTION PRODUCTS INTL INC 3944 
48 2002 DECRANE AIRCRAFT HLDGS I 3728 WABASH NATIONAL CORP 3715 
49 2002 MILACRON INC 3559 DENTSPLY INTERNATL INC 3843 
50 2002 WHIRLPOOL CORP 3630 COOPER INDUSTRIES LTD 3640 
51 2002 PROGRESSIVE GAMING INTL 3990 MIDDLETON DOLL CO 3942 
52 2003 LEXINGTON PRECISION CORP 3060 MICROTEK MEDICAL HLDGS INC 3089 
53 2003 CONSTAR INTERNATIONAL IN 3080 BPC HOLDING CORP 3089 
54 2003 BARRY (R G) CORP 3140 ROCKY SHOES & BOOTS INC 3140 
55 2003 LIQUIDMETAL TECHNOLOGIES 3310 NIAGARA CORP 3310 
56 2003 WOLVERINE TUBE INC 3350 GIBRALTAR INDUSTRIES INC 3310 
57 2003 LONE STAR TECHNOLOGIES 3317 COMMSCOPE INC 3357 
58 2003 WHX CORP 3330 HARSCO CORP 3390 
59 2003 OLIN CORP 3350 OM GROUP INC 3341 
60 2003 POWERCOLD CORP 3585 PARAGON TECHNOLOGIES INC 3530 
61 2003 SHUMATE INDUSTRIES INC 3533 REINHOLD INDUSTRIES  -CL A 3555 
62 2003 QUIPP INC 3559 CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP 3564 
63 2003 T-3 ENERGY SERVICES INC 3533 ALAMO GROUP INC 3523 
64 2003 NN INC 3562 WATER PIK TECHNOLOGIES INC 3569 
65 2003 MESTEK INC 3585 KADANT INC 3550 
66 2003 ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC 3531 GARDNER DENVER INC 3560 
67 2003 MILACRON INC 3559 IDEX CORP 3561 
68 2003 TECUMSEH PRODUCTS CO  -C 3585 COOPER CAMERON CORP 3533 
69 2003 TEREX CORP 3531 BRUNSWICK CORP 3510 
70 2003 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 3540 INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD 3560 
71 2003 SAFARI ASSOCIATES INC 3669 ISECURETRAC CORP 3669 
72 2003 AXESSTEL INC 3663 VIEWCAST.COM INC 3663 
73 2003 DIGITAL ANGEL CORP 3669 ASTRONICS CORP 3640 
74 2003 PECO II INC 3612 UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS INC 3651 
75 2003 NMS COMMUNICATIONS CORP 3661 HARMONIC INC 3663 
76 2003 POWERWAVE TECHNOLOGIES I 3663 TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC 3663 
77 2003 ZAP 3790 PORTEC RAIL PRODUCTS INC 3743 
78 2003 CONRAD INDUSTRIES INC 3730 MARINE PRODUCTS CORP 3730 
79 2003 DECRANE AIRCRAFT HLDGS I 3728 MONACO COACH CORP 3711 
80 2003 TRIMAS CORP 3790 FEDERAL SIGNAL CORP 3711 
81 2003 UNION TANK CAR CO 3743 BORGWARNER INC 3714 
82 2003 FEDERAL-MOGUL CORP 3714 EATON CORP 3714 
83 2003 HOMELAND SECURITY NETWRK 3812 TRESTLE HOLDINGS INC 3826 
84 2003 AMERICAN MEDICAL TECHNOL 3845 EP MEDSYSTEMS INC 3845 
85 2003 ZEVEX INTERNATIONAL INC 3845 BIOJECT MEDICAL TECHNOL 3841 
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86 2003 MDI INC 3861 K-TRON INTERNATIONAL INC 3823 
87 2003 TRANSGENOMIC INC 3826 MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC 3841 
88 2003 X-RITE INC 3861 KYPHON INC 3841 
89 2003 IXIA 3825 RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES INC 3823 
90 2003 THERMO ELECTRON CORP 3826 PERKINELMER INC 3826 
91 2003 LEVCOR INTERNATIONAL INC 3960 ACTION PRODUCTS INTL INC 3944 
92 2004 THERMOVIEW INDUSTRIES IN 3089 UFP TECHNOLOGIES INC 3086 
93 2004 ARMSTRONG HOLDINGS INC 3089 COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO 3011 
94 2004 K-SWISS INC  -CL A 3140 DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP 3100 
95 2004 SUPER VISION INTL INC  - 3357 METALICO INC 3341 
96 2004 TITAN INTERNATIONAL INC 3312 BRUSH ENGINEERED MATERIALS 3330 
97 2004 GENERAL CABLE CORP/DE 3350 CENTURY ALUMINUM CO 3350 
98 2004 MUELLER INDUSTRIES 3350 OM GROUP INC 3341 
99 2004 DRESSER INC 3490 SILGAN HOLDINGS INC 3411 
100 2004 TOWER AUTOMOTIVE INC 3460 SNAP-ON INC 3420 
101 2004 QUIPP INC 3559 CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP 3564 
102 2004 KAYDON CORP 3562 GARDNER DENVER INC 3560 
103 2004 LENNOX INTERNATIONAL INC 3585 COOPER CAMERON CORP 3533 
104 2004 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 3540 INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD 3560 
105 2004 TIGER TELEMATICS INC 3663 LEGEND MOBILE INC 3663 
106 2004 SLS INTERNATIONAL INC 3651 SENTRY TECHNOLOGY CORP 3669 
107 2004 NCT GROUP INC 3651 CIRCUIT RESEARCH LABS INC 3663 
108 2004 PECO II INC 3612 LOJACK CORP 3669 
109 2004 ROCKFORD CORP 3651 UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS INC 3651 
110 2004 TELEX COMMUNICATIONS INC 3651 LAMSON & SESSIONS CO 3640 
111 2004 DSP GROUP INC 3663 INTER-TEL INC  -SER A 3661 
112 2004 APPLICA INC 3634 BALDOR ELECTRIC CO 3621 
113 2004 STANDARD MOTOR PRODS 3690 REGAL-BELOIT CORP 3621 
114 2004 CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS INC 3669 GENLYTE GROUP INC 3640 
115 2004 TELEFLEX INC 3620 AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION CP 3620 
116 2004 MAYTAG CORP 3630 COOPER INDUSTRIES LTD 3640 
117 2004 SPX CORP 3612 L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HLDGS INC 3663 
118 2004 IMPCO TECHNOLOGIES INC 3714 SUPREME INDUSTRIES INC 3713 
119 2004 FEDERAL-MOGUL CORP 3714 EATON CORP 3714 
120 2004 UNIVEC INC 3841 TRESTLE HOLDINGS INC 3826 
121 2004 SPECTRX INC 3845 CYTOMEDIX INC 3841 
122 2004 TRANSGENOMIC INC 3826 ATRION CORP 3841 
123 2004 ENDOCARE INC 3841 FARO TECHNOLOGIES INC 3829 
124 2004 NEWPORT CORP 3821 FLIR SYSTEMS INC 3812 
125 2004 TRANS-INDUSTRIES INC 3990 GAMING PARTNERS INTL CORP 3944 
126 2004 ESCALADE INC 3949 CROSS (A.T.) & CO  -CL A 3950 
127 2004 EXX INC  -CL A 3621 WJ COMMUNICATIONS INC 3663 
128 2004 T-3 ENERGY SERVICES INC 3533 3D SYSTEMS CORP 3559 
129 2005 NORTH AMER TECHNOL GROUP 3089 UFP TECHNOLOGIES INC 3086 
130 2005 FOAMEX INTERNATIONAL INC 3086 WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SVSC INC 3060 
131 2005 GRAHAM PACKAGING HLDGS C 3089 COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO 3011 
132 2005 MADDEN STEVEN LTD 3140 DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP 3100 
133 2005 LIBBEY INC 3220 CERADYNE INC 3290 
134 2005 TARPON INDUSTRIES INC 3317 DYNAMIC MATERIALS CORP 3390 
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135 2005 MMI PRODUCTS INC 3310 BRUSH ENGINEERED MATERIALS 3330 
136 2005 BELDEN CDT INC 3357 OM GROUP INC 3341 
137 2005 TECUMSEH PRODUCTS CO  -C 3585 COOPER CAMERON CORP 3533 
138 2005 AMERICAN STANDARD COS IN 3585 CUMMINS INC 3510 
139 2005 ITT INDUSTRIES INC 3561 BAKER HUGHES INC 3533 
140 2005 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 3540 INGERSOLL-RAND CO LTD 3560 
141 2005 PUBLICARD INC 3690 ISECURETRAC CORP 3669 
142 2005 VODAVI TECHNOLOGY INC 3661 VASCO DATA SEC INTL INC 3669 
143 2005 TERABEAM INC 3663 MEDIS TECHNOLOGIES LTD 3690 
144 2005 EXX INC  -CL A 3621 AXSYS TECHNOLOGIES INC 3640 
145 2005 DIGITAL ANGEL CORP 3669 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INC 3661 
146 2005 AROTECH CORP 3690 AIRSPAN NETWORKS INC 3663 
147 2005 ZHONE TECHNOLOGIES INC 3661 KINETEK INC 3621 
148 2005 REMY INTL INC 3690 TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC 3663 
149 2005 MAYTAG CORP 3630 TELLABS INC 3661 
150 2005 SPX CORP 3612 L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HLDGS INC 3663 
151 2005 TRINITY INDUSTRIES 3743 AMERICAN AXLE & MFG HLDGS 3714 
152 2005 ELECTRIC CITY CORP 3825 TRESTLE HOLDINGS INC 3826 
153 2005 MED-DESIGN CORP 3841 PHOTOMEDEX INC 3845 
154 2005 WORLD HEART CORP 3845 UTAH MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC 3845 
155 2005 CIPHERGEN BIOSYSTEMS INC 3826 RAE SYSTEMS INC 3829 
156 2005 SONIC INNOVATIONS INC 3842 YOUNG INNOVATIONS INC 3843 
157 2005 OCCULOGIX INC 3845 AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTMS HLDS 3842 
158 2005 LEVCOR INTERNATIONAL INC 3960 DATREK MILLER INTL INC 3949 
159 2005 K2 INC 3949 HASBRO INC 3944 
160 2005 CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS INC 3669 GENLYTE GROUP INC 3640 
161 2005 T-3 ENERGY SERVICES INC 3533 3D SYSTEMS CORP 3559 
162 2005 FEDERAL-MOGUL CORP 3714 EATON CORP 3714 
163 2005 BOYDS COLLECTION LTD 3942 NAUTILUS INC 3949 
164 2005 CTI INDUSTRIES CORP 3060 CORE MOLDING TECHNOLOGIES 3089 
165 2005 DANA CORP 3714 GOODRICH CORP 3728 
166 2005 DAYTON SUPERIOR CORP 3440 RTI INTL METALS INC 3490 
167 2005 MICROFIELD GROUP INC 3640 SENTRY TECHNOLOGY CORP 3669 
168 2005 PTS INC 3949 ACTION PRODUCTS INTL INC 3944 
169 2005 TEKELEC 3663 BALDOR ELECTRIC CO 3621 
170 2005 TEREX CORP 3531 AGCO CORP 3523 
171 2005 UTSTARCOM INC 3669 COOPER INDUSTRIES LTD 3640 
172 2005 ZAP 3790 COACH INDUSTRIES GROUP INC 3711 
173 2005 PARADIGM MEDICAL INDS IN 3845 QUALMARK CORP 3829 
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1 2002 SOFTNET TECHNOLOGY CORP 3571 CAMBEX CORP 3572 
2 2002 STORAGE COMPUTER CORP 3577 TRANSACT TECHNOLOGIES 3577 
3 2002 IMMERSION CORP 3577 SAFENET INC 3577 
4 2002 SCM MICROSYSTEMS INC 3577 ECHELON CORP 3576 
5 2002 MRV COMMUNICATIONS INC 3576 ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGI 3576 
6 2002 QUICKLOGIC CORP 3674 SIRENZA MICRODEVICES 3674 
7 2002 PCD INC 3678 PLX TECHNOLOGY INC 3674 
8 2002 SILICON IMAGE INC 3674 MONOLITHIC SYS TECHNO 3674 
9 2002 CENTILLIUM COMMUNICATION 3674 DIODES INC 3674 
10 2002 SILICON LABORATORIES INC 3674 ADVANCED POWER TECHNO 3674 
11 2002 SIPEX CORP 3674 NORTECH SYSTEMS INC 3679 
12 2002 BEL FUSE INC 3677 TTM TECHNOLOGIES INC 3672 
13 2002 KEY COMPONENTS LLC 3677 PIXELWORKS INC 3674 
14 2002 MICROTUNE INC 3674 VICOR CORP 3679 
15 2002 ANADIGICS INC 3674 ACTEL CORP 3674 
16 2002 ARTESYN TECHNOLOGIES INC 3679 ZORAN CORP 3674 
17 2002 DDI CORP 3672 AMIS HOLDINGS INC 3674 
18 2002 TRANSWITCH CORP 3674 CTS CORP 3670 
19 2002 TRIQUINT SEMICONDUCTOR I 3674 AMPHENOL CORP 3678 
20 2002 CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CO 3674 LATTICE SEMICONDUCTOR 3674 
21 2002 AMKOR TECHNOLOGY INC 3674 FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCT 3674 
22 2002 BROADCOM CORP  -CL A 3674 VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOG 3670 
23 2002 AXTIVE CORP 7372 LION INC 7370 
24 2002 NEW MEXICO SOFTWARE INC 7372 VITALSTREAM HOLDINGS 7370 
25 2002 NEXT GENERATION TECH HLD 7372 KINTERA INC 7372 
26 2002 GUARDIAN TECHNLGS INTL I 7373 SIBONEY CORP 7372 
27 2002 DIGITAL FUSION INC 7370 MAI SYSTEMS CORP 7373 
28 2002 MEDIAVEST INC 7370 EBIX INC 7372 
29 2002 INNOVATIVE SOFTWARE TECH 7372 KNOVA SOFTWARE INC 7372 
30 2002 VERTEL CORP 7372 MERGE TECHNOLOGIES IN 7373 
31 2002 INSIGHTFUL CORP 7372 D A CONSULTING GROUP 7370 
32 2002 LOYALTYPOINT INC 7370 DOCUMENT SCIENCES COR 7372 
33 2002 NESTOR INC 7373 SEGUE SOFTWARE INC 7372 
34 2002 VIANET TECHNOLOGIES INC 7373 APPLIX INC 7372 
35 2002 EUROWEB INTERNATIONAL CO 7370 ANALEX CORP 7370 
36 2002 WORLDGATE COMMUNICATIONS 7373 OPEN SOLUTIONS INC 7372 
37 2002 FASTNET CORP 7370 ERESEARCHTECHNOLOGY I 7372 
38 2002 INTRUSION INC 7372 PRIVATE BUSINESS INC 7372 
39 2002 SAGENT TECHNOLOGY INC 7372 DATALINK CORP 7373 
40 2002 NEXPRISE INC 7372 LIONBRIDGE TECHNOLOGI 7372 
41 2002 HEALTHAXIS INC 7374 INFOCROSSING INC 7374 
42 2002 VIEWPOINT CORP 7372 SYNPLICITY INC 7372 
43 2002 TUMBLEWEED COMMUNICATION 7372 TRIPOS INC 7372 
44 2002 ITA HOLDINGS INC 7373 PDF SOLUTIONS INC 7373 
45 2002 I-MANY INC 7372 AMICAS INC 7372 
46 2002 EDGEWATER TECHNOLOGY INC 7370 RAINDANCE COMMUNICATI 7370 
47 2002 BSQUARE CORP 7372 ACTUATE CORP 7372 
48 2002 VERTICALNET INC 7372 PEGASYSTEMS INC 7372 
49 2002 IVILLAGE INC 7370 QUADRAMED CORP 7372 
50 2002 CAPTARIS INC 7372 NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS 7372 
51 2002 CLARUS CORP 7372 COGNIZANT TECH SOLUTI 7370 
52 2002 KANA SOFTWARE INC 7372 SYNTEL INC 7370 
53 2002 APPLIED DIGITAL SOLUTION 7373 MIDWAY GAMES INC 7372 
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54 2002 EASYLINK SERVICES CP  -C 7370 RENAISSANCE LEARNING 7372 
55 2002 SONUS NETWORKS INC 7373 DENDRITE INTERNATIONA 7372 
56 2002 METASOLV INC 7372 MANTECH INTL CORP 7373 
57 2002 VIA NET.WORKS INC 7370 CRITICAL PATH INC 7370 
58 2002 ANSWERTHINK INC 7370 ECLIPSYS CORP 7373 
59 2002 QUOVADX INC 7372 COVANSYS CORP 7371 
60 2002 IGATE CORP 7371 SPSS INC 7372 
61 2002 VITRIA TECHNOLOGY INC 7372 ACCELRYS INC 7372 
62 2002 PRICELINE.COM INC 7370 NEOFORMA INC 7374 
63 2002 TRIZETTO GROUP INC 7372 MEDQUIST INC 7374 
64 2002 INTERWOVEN INC 7372 NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 7372 
65 2002 SAPIENT CORP 7372 INTERNET SECURITY SYS 7372 
66 2002 VIGNETTE CORP 7372 KEANE INC 7371 
67 2002 INFOSPACE INC 7370 PEROT SYSTEMS CORP 7373 
68 2002 SYBASE INC 7372 MERCURY INTERACTIVE C 7372 
69 2002 VERISIGN INC 7372 UNISYS CORP 7373 
70 2002 CORNING INC 3679 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 3674 
71 2002 EPRESENCE INC 7370 COSTAR GROUP INC 7370 
72 2003 INTELLI-CHECK INC 3579 GLOBAL EPOINT INC 3571 
73 2003 DIGITAL LIFESTYLES GROUP 3571 TRANSACT TECHNOLOGIES 3577 
74 2003 MRV COMMUNICATIONS INC 3576 ECHELON CORP 3576 
75 2003 RAMTRON INTERNATIONAL CO 3674 SIRENZA MICRODEVICES 3674 
76 2003 REPTRON ELECTRONICS INC 3672 SUNTRON CORP 3672 
77 2003 KEY COMPONENTS LLC 3677 TTM TECHNOLOGIES INC 3672 
78 2003 DDI CORP 3672 PIXELWORKS INC 3674 
79 2003 BROADCOM CORP  -CL A 3674 FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCT 3674 
80 2003 VERIDICOM INTERNATIONAL 7372 SECURED SERVICES INC 7373 
81 2003 SAFE TECHNOLOGIES INTL 7370 LION INC 7370 
82 2003 MAXIMUM DYNAMICS INC 7372 VITALSTREAM HOLDINGS 7370 
83 2003 AXTIVE CORP 7372 CHINA MOBILITY SOLUTI 7370 
84 2003 MEDLINK INTERNATIONAL IN 7370 ADSTAR INC 7370 
85 2003 VANTAGEMED CORP 7372 A D A M INC 7372 
86 2003 INSIGHTFUL CORP 7372 SEGUE SOFTWARE INC 7372 
87 2003 IPIX CORP 7373 TELTRONICS INC 7373 
88 2003 ASA INTERNATIONAL LTD 7373 INNODATA ISOGEN INC 7374 
89 2003 EUROWEB INTERNATIONAL CO 7370 DOCUMENT SCIENCES COR 7372 
90 2003 LOUDEYE CORP 7370 GSE SYSTEMS INC 7372 
91 2003 VERSO TECHNOLOGIES INC 7373 THESTREET.COM 7370 
92 2003 BSQUARE CORP 7372 DATALINK CORP 7373 
93 2003 I-MANY INC 7372 TECHTEAM GLOBAL INC 7370 
94 2003 IVILLAGE INC 7370 CRITICAL PATH INC 7370 
95 2003 APPLIED DIGITAL SOLUTION 7373 AMICAS INC 7372 
96 2003 METASOLV INC 7372 BLACKBAUD INC 7372 
97 2003 RADIANT SYSTEMS INC 7373 NYFIX INC 7373 
98 2003 VIA NET.WORKS INC 7370 RENAISSANCE LEARNING 7372 
99 2003 IGATE CORP 7371 SYNTEL INC 7370 
100 2003 ENTRUST INC 7372 DENDRITE INTERNATIONA 7372 
101 2003 ASIAINFO HOLDINGS INC 7372 VALUECLICK INC 7370 
102 2003 S1 CORP 7373 INFORMATICA CORP 7372 
103 2003 VERISIGN INC 7372 MCAFEE INC 7372 
104 2003 INCENTRA SOLUTIONS INC 7372 UNITED SYSTEMS TECHNO 7372 
105 2003 724 SOLUTIONS INC 7372 LIONBRIDGE TECHNOLOGI 7372 
106 2004 SOFTNET TECHNOLOGY CORP 3571 GLOBAL EPOINT INC 3571 
107 2004 RELIABILITY INC 3674 PHOTONIC PRODUCTS GRO 3679 
108 2004 ACACIA RESEARCH-CONSOLID 3674 PLX TECHNOLOGY INC 3674 
109 2004 THREE-FIVE SYSTEMS INC 3674 SUNTRON CORP 3672 
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110 2004 ESS TECHNOLOGY INC 3674 SILICON STORAGE TECHN 3674 
111 2004 STONERIDGE INC 3679 ZORAN CORP 3674 
112 2004 CORNING INC 3679 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 3674 
113 2004 SPORTSNUTS INC 7370 VITALSTREAM HOLDINGS 7370 
114 2004 WIZZARD SOFTWARE CORP 7372 PRESCIENT APPLIED INT 7373 
115 2004 NEW MEXICO SOFTWARE INC 7372 WIDEPOINT CORP 7370 
116 2004 BRIGHTSTAR INFO TECH GRP 7370 SIBONEY CORP 7372 
117 2004 INCENTRA SOLUTIONS INC 7372 SECURED SERVICES INC 7373 
118 2004 PRACTICEXPERT INC 7373 CIMNET INC 7372 
119 2004 LEVEL 8 SYSTEMS INC 7371 HEALTHGATE DATA CORP 7370 
120 2004 VANTAGEMED CORP 7372 LION INC 7370 
121 2004 AXTIVE CORP 7372 A D A M INC 7372 
122 2004 FIRSTWAVE TECHNOLOGIES I 7372 HEALTH GRADES INC 7370 
123 2004 VIA NET.WORKS INC 7370 SECURE COMPUTING CORP 7372 
124 2004 INTRADO INC 7374 NYFIX INC 7373 
125 2004 LIGHTBRIDGE INC 7374 ANSYS INC 7372 
126 2004 CNET NETWORKS INC 7370 DIGITAL INSIGHT CORP 7370 
127 2004 MASTERCARD INC 7374 SABRE HOLDINGS CORP 7373 
128 2004 INTERMEC INC 3577 ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGI 3576 
129 2005 REPTRON ELECTRONICS INC 3672 ADVANCED POWER TECHNO 3674 
130 2005 ACACIA RESEARCH-CONSOLID 3674 SUNPOWER CORP 3674 
131 2005 ESS TECHNOLOGY INC 3674 VICOR CORP 3679 
132 2005 DDI CORP 3672 ACTEL CORP 3674 
133 2005 TECHNITROL INC 3679 AMIS HOLDINGS INC 3674 
134 2005 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES 3674 FREESCALE SEMICONDUCT 3674 
135 2005 WIZZARD SOFTWARE CORP 7372 CIMETRIX INC 7372 
136 2005 ONELINK CORP 7374 CATUITY INC 7371 
137 2005 FIRSTWAVE TECHNOLOGIES I 7372 SIBONEY CORP 7372 
138 2005 AMERICAN EDUCATION CORP 7372 MAKEMUSIC INC 7372 
139 2005 INCENTRA SOLUTIONS INC 7372 HEALTHSTREAM INC 7370 
140 2005 VIEWPOINT CORP 7372 ONLINE RESOURCES CORP 7374 
141 2005 TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CO 7373 CORILLIAN CORP 7372 
142 2005 ANALYSTS INTERNATIONAL C 7371 ACTUATE CORP 7372 
143 2005 APPLIED DIGITAL SOLUTION 7373 SECURE COMPUTING CORP 7372 
144 2005 SAFLINK CORP 7373 WEBMD HEALTH HOLDINGS 7370 
145 2005 PROXYMED INC 7374 KANBAY INTERNATIONAL 7373 
146 2005 INTERNET CAP GROUP INC 7370 ALTIRIS INC 7372 
147 2005 ASIAINFO HOLDINGS INC 7372 ECLIPSYS CORP 7373 
148 2005 JDA SOFTWARE GROUP INC 7372 DENDRITE INTERNATIONA 7372 
149 2005 BROADVISION INC 7373 SUPPORTSOFT INC 7372 
150 2005 INNOVATIVE SOFTWARE TECH 7372 CIMNET INC 7372 
151 2005 PRACTICEXPERT INC 7373 ADSTAR INC 7370 
152 2005 VERIDICOM INTERNATIONAL 7372 LION INC 7370 
153 2005 AAVID THERMAL TECHNOLOGI 3679 SUNTRON CORP 3672 
154 2005 CYBER DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN 7372 HYPERSPACE COMM INC 7372 
155 2005 IDI GLOBAL INC 7370 A CONSULTING TEAM INC 7370 
156 2005 IMAGEWARE SYSTEMS INC 7373 A D A M INC 7372 
157 2005 IMMEDIATEK INC 7372 BITSTREAM INC  -CL A 7372 
158 2005 JUNIPER GROUP INC 7370 WIDEPOINT CORP 7370 
159 2005 ZANETT INC 7370 APPLIX INC 7372 
160 2005 RAMTRON INTERNATIONAL CO 3674 LOGICVISION INC 3674 
161 2005 SOFTNET TECHNOLOGY CORP 3571 FOCUS ENHANCEMENTS IN 3576 
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1 2002 MARRIOTT INTL INC 7011 HILTON HOTELS CORP 7011 
2 2002 ALDERWOODS GROUP INC 7200 CARRIAGE SERVICES INC 7200 
3 2002 RCM TECHNOLOGIES INC 7363 HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP 7340 
4 2002 UNIVERSAL ACCESS GLOBAL HLD 7389 MEDICAL STAFFNG NTWRK HLDGS 7363 
5 2002 VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS INC 7310 KINETIC CONCEPTS INC 7350 
6 2002 PROTECTION ONE INC 7380 CONVERGYS CORP 7389 
7 2002 SPHERION CORP 7363 INTERPOOL INC 7359 
8 2002 HANOVER COMPRESSOR CO 7359 WESCO FINANCIAL CORP 7359 
9 2002 UNITED RENTALS INC 7350 CROWN CASTLE INTL CORP 7359 
10 2002 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS 7311 OMNICOM GROUP 7311 
11 2002 MIDAS INC 7500 STANDARD PARKING CORP 7500 
12 2002 CINEMARK USA INC  -CL A 7830 REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP 7830 
13 2002 EMERGENT GROUP INC 8090 MIRACOR DIAGNOSTICS INC 8071 
14 2002 NOVAMED INC 8011 ODYSSEY HEALTHCARE INC 8050 
15 2002 CHEMED CORP 8082 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE CORP 8051 
16 2002 SUN HEALTHCARE GROUP INC 8051 APRIA HEALTHCARE GROUP INC 8082 
17 2002 EVCI CAREER COLLEGES INC 8200 CONCORDE CAREER COLLEGES IN 8200 
18 2002 NEW HORIZONS WORLDWIDE INC 8200 GP STRATEGIES CP 8200 
19 2002 THINKPATH INC 8711 INDUSTRIAL SERVICES AMER IN 8742 
20 2002 OPINION RESEARCH CORP 8700 EXPONENT INC 8742 
21 2002 MANAGEMENT NETWORK GROUP IN 8742 ARBITRON INC 8700 
22 2002 META GROUP INC 8700 AMERICAN DENTAL PARTNERS IN 8741 
23 2002 DISCOVERY PARTNERS INTL INC 8731 AMBASSADORS INTERNATIONL IN 8741 
24 2002 KENDLE INTERNATIONAL INC 8731 PER-SE TECHNOLOGIES INC 8741 
25 2002 COMFORCE CORP 8742 DIGITAS INC 8742 
26 2002 DECODE GENETICS INC 8731 MAXYGEN INC 8731 
27 2003 DIALOG GROUP 7310 ACCUFACTS PRE-EMPLOYMENT SC 7389 
28 2003 BUTLER INTERNATIONAL INC 7363 IPAYMENT INC 7389 
29 2003 ON ASSIGNMENT INC 7363 UNIVERSAL HOSPITAL SERVICES 7350 
30 2003 HUDSON HIGHLAND GROUP INC 7361 AARON RENTS INC 7359 
31 2003 HANOVER COMPRESSOR CO 7359 R H DONNELLEY CORP 7310 
32 2003 UNITED RENTALS INC 7350 LAMAR ADVERTISING CO  -CL A 7310 
33 2003 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS 7311 OMNICOM GROUP 7311 
34 2003 MACE SECURITY INTL INC 7500 STANDARD PARKING CORP 7500 
35 2003 MIDAS INC 7500 DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE G 7510 
36 2003 AVENUE ENTERTAINMENT GRP IN 7812 SECURED DIGITAL APPLICATION 7812 
37 2003 BLOCKBUSTER INC 7841 REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP 7830 
38 2003 DOVER MOTORSPORTS INC 7948 MAJESTIC STAR CASINO LLC 7990 
39 2003 PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT INC 7990 PENN NATIONAL GAMING INC 7990 
40 2003 MAGNA ENTERTAINMENT CORP 7948 AMERISTAR CASINOS INC 7990 
41 2003 STATION CASINOS INC 7990 WESTWOOD ONE INC 7900 
42 2003 HARRAHS ENTERTAINMENT INC 7990 SIX FLAGS INC 7996 
43 2003 PACER HEALTH CORP 8093 METROPOLITAN HLTH NTWRKS IN 8011 
44 2003 NEW YORK HEALTH CARE INC 8082 BIO IMAGING TECHNOLOGIES IN 8071 
45 2003 CHEMED CORP 8082 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE CORP 8051 
46 2003 ALLIANCE IMAGING INC 8071 PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP INC 8060 
47 2003 HEALTHSOUTH CORP 8060 TRIAD HOSPITALS INC 8062 
48 2003 TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 8062 HCA INC 8062 
49 2003 THEGLOBE.COM INC 8742 ESSEX CORP 8711 
50 2003 ELOYALTY CORP 8742 MTC TECHNOLOGIES INC 8711 
51 2003 OPINION RESEARCH CORP 8700 EXPONENT INC 8742 
52 2003 MANAGEMENT NETWORK GROUP IN 8742 AMBASSADORS INTERNATIONL IN 8741 
53 2003 COMFORCE CORP 8742 ARBITRON INC 8700 
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Id YR Impairment Firms SIC No Impairment Firms SIC 
54 2003 PRG-SCHULTZ INTL INC 8721 AAIPHARMA INC 8731 
55 2003 MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES IN 8741 PHARMACEUTICAL PROD DEV INC 8731 
56 2003 CHAMPNSHIP AUTO RACING TEAM 7948 WHEELING ISLAND GAMING INC 7990 
57 2004 SRI/SURGICAL EXPRESS INC 7200 TRM CORP 7200 
58 2004 MONARCH STAFFING INC 7361 VILLAGE EDOCS INC 7389 
59 2004 SPAR GROUP INC 7389 KENEXA CORP 7361 
60 2004 PRECIS INC 7389 NATIONAL RESEARCH CORP 7389 
61 2004 MIVA INC 7310 ARBINET-THEXCHANGE INC 7389 
62 2004 DIGITAL GENERATION SYS INC 7310 BARRETT BUSINESS SVCS INC 7363 
63 2004 RCM TECHNOLOGIES INC 7363 PORTFOLIO RECOVRY ASSOC INC 7320 
64 2004 EMAK WORLDWIDE INC 7310 APAC CUSTOMER SERVICES INC 7389 
65 2004 ON ASSIGNMENT INC 7363 ICT GROUP INC 7389 
66 2004 COMPUTER HORIZONS CORP 7363 IPASS INC 7389 
67 2004 SITEL CORP 7389 CDI CORP 7363 
68 2004 TEAM HEALTH INC 7363 HARTE HANKS INC 7331 
69 2004 UNITED RENTALS INC 7350 MANPOWER INC/WI 7363 
70 2004 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS 7311 OMNICOM GROUP 7311 
71 2004 MACE SECURITY INTL INC 7500 STANDARD PARKING CORP 7500 
72 2004 MAGIC LANTERN GROUP INC 7812 POINT.360 7819 
73 2004 BLOCKBUSTER INC 7841 DREAMWORKS ANIMATION INC 7812 
74 2004 DISCOVERY HOLDING CO 7812 REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP 7830 
75 2004 TOWN SPORTS INTL HOLDINGS 7997 CHURCHILL DOWNS INC 7948 
76 2004 BALLY TOTAL FITNESS HLDG CP 7990 WESTWOOD ONE INC 7900 
77 2004 U S PHYSICAL THERAPY INC 8000 MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC INC 8071 
78 2004 RADIOLOGIX INC 8093 AMERICAN HOMEPATIENT INC 8082 
79 2004 HANGER ORTHOPEDIC GRP 8093 PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP INC 8060 
80 2004 TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 8062 HCA INC 8062 
81 2004 PRINCETON REVIEW INC 8200 LINCOLN EDUCATIONAL SERVICE 8200 
82 2004 ALBANY MOLECULAR RESH INC 8731 CBIZ INC 8721 
83 2004 GARTNER INC 8700 COVANCE INC 8731 
84 2004 BEARINGPOINT INC 8742 CORRECTIONS CORP AMER 8744 
85 2004 MANAGEMENT NETWORK GROUP IN 8742 STONEPATH GROUP INC 8742 
86 2005 GREAT WOLF RESORTS INC 7011 MORGANS HOTEL GROUP CO 7011 
87 2005 PRECIS INC 7389 MEDIALINK WORLDWIDE INC 7380 
88 2005 DIGITAL GENERATION SYS INC 7310 INTERSECTIONS INC 7320 
89 2005 EMAK WORLDWIDE INC 7310 COMPUDYNE CORP 7381 
90 2005 REWARDS NETWORKS INC 7389 MEDICAL STAFFNG NTWRK HLDGS 7363 
91 2005 MIVA INC 7310 CDI CORP 7363 
92 2005 SOURCECORP INC 7389 CROSS COUNTRY HEALTHCARE IN 7363 
93 2005 RENT-A-CENTER INC 7359 DUN & BRADSTREET CORP 7320 
94 2005 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS 7311 OMNICOM GROUP 7311 
95 2005 MOVIE GALLERY INC 7841 READING INTL INC  -CL A 7830 
96 2005 CINEMARK USA INC  -CL A 7830 DREAMWORKS ANIMATION INC 7812 
97 2005 BLOCKBUSTER INC 7841 REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP 7830 
98 2005 U S PHYSICAL THERAPY INC 8000 MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC INC 8071 
99 2005 I-TRAX INC 8000 OSTEOTECH INC 8090 
100 2005 RADIOLOGIX INC 8093 OPTION CARE INC 8093 
101 2005 QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC 8071 COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS IN 8062 
102 2005 GREENFIELD ONLINE INC 8700 ESSEX CORP 8711 
103 2005 NANOGEN INC 8731 AMERICAN DENTAL PARTNERS IN 8741 
104 2005 LECG CORP 8742 SYMYX TECHNOLOGIES INC 8731 
105 2005 PDI INC 8742 MAXYGEN INC 8731 
106 2005 SFBC INTERNATIONAL INC 8731 DIGITAS INC 8742 
107 2005 OPINION RESEARCH CORP 8700 NUVELO INC 8731 
108 2005 PRG-SCHULTZ INTL INC 8721 GEVITY HR INC 8741 
109 2005 THINKPATH INC 8711 COMMONWEALTH BIOTECHNOLOGIE 8731 
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Id YR Impairment Firms SIC No Impairment Firms SIC 
110 2005 HOOPER HOLMES INC 8090 AMERICAN HOMEPATIENT INC 8082 
111 2005 MSX INTERNATIONAL INC 7363 ARBINET-THEXCHANGE INC 7389 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Industry Distribution of Impairment Observations (2002-2005) 
    Total Impairment  
Industry Primary SIC Code Firm-year Firm-year % 
    Obs. Obs.   
     
1. Mining and Construction 
 
1000-1999, excluding 1300-
1399 250 20 8.00% 
2. Food 2000-2111 361 15 4.16% 
3. Textiles and Printing & 
Publications 
2200-2780 
 730 44 6.03% 
4. Chemicals 2800-2824, 2840-2899 369 29 7.86% 
5. Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836 531 28 5.27% 
6. Extractive Industries 2900-2999, 1300-1399 336 14 4.17% 
7. Durable Manufacturers 
 
3000-3999, excluding 3570-
3579 and 3670-3679 
3,332 
 
210 
 
6.30% 
 
8. Computers 
 
7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-
3679 
2,418 
 
180 
 
7.44% 
 
9. Transportation 4000-4899 952 82 8.61% 
10. Utilities 4900-4999 205 15 7.32% 
11. Retail 5000-5999 1,550 65 4.19% 
12. Financial Institutions 6000-6411 917 72 7.85% 
13.Insurance and Real Estate 6500-6999 293 16 5.46% 
14. Services 
 
7000-8999, excluding 7370-
7379 
1,713 
 
124 
 
7.24% 
 
Total  13,957 914  
Selected Industries     
Durable Manufacturers 
 
3000-3999, excluding 3570-
3579 and 3670-3679 
3,332 
 
210 
  
Computers 
 
7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-
3679 
2,418 
 
180 
  
Services 
 
7000-8999, excluding 7370-
7379 
1,713 
 
124 
  
       
Total   7,463 514  
     
Percentage of selected industries to all industries 53.47% 56.24%  
          
Note: 
1. Industry membership is determined by using the industry classification as shown in the study of 
Barth et al. (1998), which classified firms into 14 industries.  Observations shown in this table 
have goodwill balances at the beginning or at the ending of the fiscal year greater than zero. 
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TABLE 4.2 
Sample Selection 
 
Selection Procedure 
Firm-year 
Observations 
  
Available observations with goodwill balances from Compustat database  7,463
over 2002-2005 for durable manufacturer, computer, and service industries 
 
Observations deleted due to  
  - No goodwill impairment 6,160
  - Missing data 473
  - Non-December 31 fiscal year-end 316
 514
Less: 
  - No 10K report or not actually goodwill impairment 42
  - No control firms with a match on size and industry 27
The final sample 445
 
Impairment observations classified by industry 
  - Durable Manufacturers 173
  - Computers 161
  - Services 111
Total 445
   
 
Note: 
1. The final impairment sample is matched with firms having no goodwill impairment over 
the entire period of 2002-2005.  The matched control has the same two-digit SIC code, 
similar size (total assets at the beginning of year t), and belongs to the same year.  
  137
TABLE 4.3 
Sample Distribution by Industry (Cross-Sectional Analysis) 
Description 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Total 
Firm-Year 
Obs. 
      
Panel A: Durable Manufacturers      
Impairment firms in year t 51 40 37 45 173 
Non-impairment firms in year t 51 40 37 45 173 
Total 102 80 74 90 346 
      
Panel B: Computers      
Impairment firms in year t 71 34 23 33 161 
Non-impairment firms in year t 71 34 23 33 161 
Total 142 68 46 66 322 
      
Panel C: Services      
Impairment firms in year t 26 30 29 26 111 
Non-impairment firms in year t 26 30 29 26 111 
Total 52 60 58 52 222 
            
 
  138
TABLE 4.4 
Input/Output Variables in the DEA Model 
 
Variable Description (Compustat item) 
 
Inputs 
Cost of goods sold (COGS) 
 
 
Selling, general and 
administrative expenses 
(SG&A) 
 
Current assets (CA) 
 
 
 
Fixed assets (FA) 
 
 
Intangible assets (INTAN) 
 
Outputs  
Sales (S) 
 
Income before 
extraordinary items (IB) 
 
 
 
Operating cash flows 
(OCF) 
 
 
 
All costs directly allocated by the company to the 
production (Item 41)  
 
All expenses of operation incurred in the regular course of 
business pertaining to the securing of operating income 
(Item 189)  
 
Cash or other assets that are expected to be realized in cash 
or used in the production of revenue within the next 12 
months (Item 4) 
 
Cost, less accumulated depreciation, of tangible fixed 
property used in the production of revenue (Item 8) 
 
Value of intangible assets, including goodwill (Item 33) 
 
 
Net sales in income statements (Item 12) 
 
Income of a company (Item 18) after all expenses, including 
special items, income taxes, and minority interest.  This item 
does not include discontinued operations or extraordinary 
items.  
 
Change in cash from all items classified in the operating 
activities section on statement of cash flows (Item 308) 
 
 
Note: 
1. Current assets, fixed assets, and intangible assets are average balances calculated by 
adding the beginning balances to the ending balances of the fiscal year and dividing by 
two. 
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TABLE 4.5 
Combinations of Input/Output Variables in the DEA Model 
 
DEA Model Input Variable Output Variable 
 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 
Model 5 
Model 6 
Model 7 
Model 8 
 
OE, TA 
OE, TA 
OE, TA 
OE, CA, FA, INTAN 
OE, CA, FA, INTAN 
OE, CA, FA, INTAN 
COGS, SG&A, CA, FA, INTAN 
COGS, SG&A, CA, FA, INTAN 
 
 
S 
S, OCF 
S, OCF, IB 
S 
S, OCF 
S, OCF, IB 
S 
S, OCF, IB 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
1. Input variables: COGS is cost of goods sold; SG&A is selling, general, and administrative 
expenses; OE is operating expenses, equaling to cost of goods sold plus selling, general 
and administrative expenses; CA is current assets; FA is fixed assets; INTAN is intangible 
assets; TA is total assets;. 
2. Output variables: S is sales; OCF is operating cash flows; IB is income before 
extraordinary items. 
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TABLE 4.6 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Durable Manufacturers 
  
  Impairment   Non-Impairment   
Mean 
Differences 
Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean Median S.D.    Mean Median S.D.   |t-stat| |z-stat| 
           
(Impairment N=173, Non-Impairment N=173)       
Inputs ($million)           
COGS 792.62 71.84 1689  806.32 106.67 1675     0.08    1.40 
SG&A 166.72 33.74 364  192.34 46.39 376     0.64    1.18 
OE 952.26 104.54 2010  998.62 164.48 1995     0.18    0.97 
CA 456.78 71.79 908  470.59 100.69 886     0.14    1.18 
FA 231.50 20.74 506  219.87 26.25 419     0.23    0.75 
INTAN 229.14 15.26 585  361.49 24.03 953     1.56    0.97 
TA 1062.57 138.53 2231  1134.64 148.79 2285     0.30    0.32 
           
Outputs ($million)           
S 1063.92 110.15 2315  1145.53 182.28 2291     0.33    1.40 
IB -21.11 -11.16 236  66.81 8.13 169     3.98***    9.34*** 
OCF 66.03 -0.12 240  100.92 11.64 210     1.44    3.54*** 
           
Size of Goodwill and Impairment          
Goodwill ($million) 208.78 15.28 509.18  290.66 13.01 775.02     1.16    0.32 
Goodwill/Total assets 0.17 0.13 0.16  0.17 0.13 0.16     0.17    0.11 
Impairment ($million) 28.77 4.53 60.17        
Impairment/Goodwill 0.69 0.40 2.66        
Impairment/Total assets 0.24 0.03 1.13        
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TABLE 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Computers 
 
  Impairment   Non-Impairment   
Mean 
Differences 
Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean Median S.D.    Mean Median S.D.   |t-stat| |z-stat| 
           
(Impairment N=161, Non-Impairment N=161)        
Inputs ($million)           
COGS 126.66 24.92 345  190.61 26.06 644     1.11    0.11 
SG&A 85.84 23.61 237  114.68 27.07 386     0.81    0.11 
OE 212.50 58.49 548  305.29 77.78 1015     1.02    0.78 
CA 174.02 39.52 502  249.62 47.06 910     0.92    0.78 
FA 106.92 4.56 538  110.93 6.17 552     0.07    1.22 
INTAN 101.83 11.12 373  65.65 7.96 173     1.12    1.00 
TA 434.04 86.56 1481  505.17 96.14 1890     0.38    0.11 
           
Outputs ($million)           
S 229.73 43.72 667  372.24 75.14 1352     1.20    1.67* 
IB -110.67 -16.53 487  14.94 0.08 160     3.11***    9.01*** 
OCF 16.89 -1.64 151  59.88 4.05 311     1.58    8.37*** 
           
Size of Goodwill and Impairment          
Goodwill ($million) 118.36 11.65 482.82  46.56 2.86 137.75     1.81*    2.78*** 
Goodwill/Total assets 0.24 0.16 0.21  0.14 0.08 0.15     4.94***    4.29*** 
Impairment ($million) 65.40 5.53 376.35        
Impairment/Goodwill 0.65 0.59 0.52        
Impairment/Total assets 0.33 0.09 1.41        
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TABLE 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Services 
 
 
  Impairment   Non-Impairment   
Mean 
Differences 
Median 
Differences 
Variable Mean Median S.D.    Mean Median S.D.   |t-stat| |z-stat| 
           
(Impairment N =111, Non-Impairment N=111)        
Inputs           
COGS 859.30 178.42 1805  1099.71 234.00 3057     0.71    0.94 
SG&A 207.10 48.65 528  91.33 34.10 248     2.09**    1.47 
OE 1066.41 243.18 2039  1191.03 312.97 3130     0.35    0.94 
CA 525.89 89.04 1412  560.00 101.64 1450     0.18    0.67 
FA 425.52 36.37 969  530.88 32.68 1600     0.59    0.13 
INTAN 433.62 56.00 845  443.38 57.12 1134     0.07    0.13 
TA 1527.68 244.30 2991  1666.78 254.52 3837     0.30    0.13 
           
Outputs           
S 1228.16 286.66 2286  1415.72 340.57 3647     0.46    1.47 
IB -101.22 -21.25 303  75.81 10.46 220     4.98***    8.44*** 
OCF 110.41 14.57 260  166.70 24.40 410     1.22    1.74* 
           
Size of Goodwill and Impairment          
Goodwill ($million) 450.73 53.14 882.60  381.50 32.94 1047     0.53    1.21 
Goodwill/Total assets 0.28 0.27 0.19  0.21 0.14 0.2     2.62***    3.08*** 
Impairment ($million) 102.63 15.78 250.99        
Impairment/Goodwill 0.80 0.28 3.07        
Impairment/Assets 0.19 0.06 0.49        
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TABLE 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  The t-statistics for mean 
differences and z-statistics for median differences are reported in absolute values. 
2. Input variable definitions: COGS is cost of goods sold; SG&A is selling, general, and administrative expenses; OE is operating expenses, 
equaling to cost of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses; CA is current assets; FA is fixed assets; INTAN is 
intangible assets; TA is total assets. CA, FA, INTAN, and TA are average balances calculated by adding the beginning balances to the 
ending balances of the fiscal year and dividing by two. 
3. Output variable definitions: S is sales; OCF is operating cash flows; IB is income before extraordinary items. 
4. Impairment loss is the pre-tax goodwill impairment recognized in the fiscal year. 
5. Goodwill and total assts are measured at the beginning balance of the fiscal year. 
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TABLE 4.7 
Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis (Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index) 
 
    Wilcoxon Mean Score 
  Impairment    Non-Impairment 
  Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon  Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score 
           
Panel A: Durable Manufacturers (N = 346)          
Model 1 Inputs: OE, AT 163.97 183.03 1.77 *  163.51 183.49 1.86 * 
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 2 Inputs: OE, AT 162.53 184.47 2.04 **  162.37 184.63 2.07 ** 
 Outputs: S, OCF          
           
Model 3 Inputs: OE, AT 161.27 185.73 2.28 **  162.96 184.04 1.96 ** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
           
Model 4 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 145.76 201.24 5.17 ***  164.85 182.15 1.61  
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 5 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 164.09 182.91 1.75 *  158.57 188.43 2.79 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF          
           
Model 6 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 163.50 183.50 1.86 *  158.47 188.53 2.82 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
           
Model 7 Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, INTAN 160.17 186.83 2.50 **  158.75 188.25 2.77 *** 
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 8 Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, INTAN 157.80 189.20 2.95 ***  157.32 189.68 3.07 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
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TABLE 4.7 (Continued) 
 
    Wilcoxon Mean Score 
  Impairment    Non-Impairment 
  Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon  Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score 
           
Panel B: Computers (N=322)          
Model 1 Inputs: OE, AT 152.99 170.01 1.64 *  151.33 171.67 1.96 ** 
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 2 Inputs: OE, AT 151.40 171.60 1.95 *  152.38 170.62 1.76 * 
 Outputs: S, OCF          
           
Model 3 Inputs: OE, AT 150.63 172.40 2.09 **  152.86 170.14 1.67 * 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
           
Model 4 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 151.83 171.17 1.87 *  153.33 169.67 1.58  
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 5 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 150.34 172.66 2.15 **  152.81 170.19 1.69 * 
 Outputs: S, OCF          
           
Model 6 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 149.92 173.08 2.24 **  153.11 169.89 1.63  
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
           
Model 7 Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, INTAN 141.85 181.15 3.81 ***  151.61 171.39 1.94 * 
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 8 Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, INTAN 139.34 183.66 4.33 ***  151.52 171.48 1.98 ** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
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TABLE 4.7 (Continued) 
 
    Wilcoxon Mean Score 
  Impairment    Non-Impairment 
  Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon  Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score 
           
Panel C: Services (N=222)          
Model 1 Inputs: OE, AT 97.29 125.71 3.30 ***  106.91 116.09 1.06  
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 2 Inputs: OE, AT 97.92 125.09 3.15 ***  106.60 116.40 1.14  
 Outputs: S, OCF          
           
Model 3 Inputs: OE, AT 94.92 128.08 3.86 ***  108.11 114.89 0.79  
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
           
Model 4 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 84.29 138.71 6.33 ***  107.63 115.37 0.90  
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 5 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 88.39 134.61 5.40 ***  107.89 115.11 0.86  
 Outputs: S, OCF          
           
Model 6 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 87.12 135.89 5.73 ***  108.55 114.45 0.71  
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
           
Model 7 Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, INTAN 89.87 133.13 5.09 ***  104.42 118.58 1.71 * 
 Outputs: S          
           
Model 8 Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, INTAN 89.96 133.04 5.14 ***  106.32 116.68 1.32  
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB          
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TABLE 4.7 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  The null hypothesis assumes that 
the expected rank sums of the overall indices and the within-group indices are the same.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
2. Input variable definitions: COGS is cost of goods sold; SG&A is selling, general, and administrative expenses; OE is operating expenses, 
equaling to cost of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses; CA is current assets; FA is fixed assets; INTAN is 
intangible assets; TA is total assets.  CA, FA, INTAN, and TA are average balances calculated by adding the beginning balances to the 
ending balances of the fiscal year and dividing by two. 
3. Output variable definitions: S is sales; OCF is operating cash flows; IB is income before extraordinary items. 
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TABLE 4.8 
Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis (Impairment vs. Non-Impairment) 
 
    Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution 
Impairment 
(EIb) 
Non-Impairment 
(EIb) Z-Score 
      
Panel A: Durable Manufacturers (N=346)     
      
Model 1 Inputs: OE, AT 147.07 199.93 4.91 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 2 Inputs: OE, AT 143.36 203.64 5.61 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF     
      
Model 3 Inputs: OE, AT 134.54 212.46 7.25 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
      
Model 4 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 138.29 208.71 6.55 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 5 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 157.49 189.51 2.98 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF     
      
Model 6 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 152.77 194.23 3.87 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
      
Model 7 
Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, 
INTAN 146.03 200.97 5.13 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 8 
Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, 
INTAN 143.64 203.36 5.60 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
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TABLE 4.8 (Continued) 
 
    Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution 
Impairment 
(EIb) 
Non-Impairment 
(EIb) Z-Score 
      
Panel B: Computers (N=322)     
      
Model 1 Inputs: OE, AT 128.80 194.20 6.31 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 2 Inputs: OE, AT 120.60 202.40 7.89 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF     
      
Model 3 Inputs: OE, AT 118.98 204.02 8.20 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
      
Model 4 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 128.39 194.61 6.42 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 5 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 123.07 199.93 7.45 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF     
      
Model 6 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 121.58 201.42 7.73 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
      
Model 7 
Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, 
INTAN 124.30 198.70 7.23 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 8 
Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, 
INTAN 123.68 199.32 7.39 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
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TABLE 4.8 (Continued) 
 
    Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution 
Impairment 
(EIb) 
Non-Impairment 
(EIb) Z-Score 
      
Panel C: Services (N=222)     
      
Model 1 Inputs: OE, AT 81.47 141.53 6.97 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 2 Inputs: OE, AT 83.56 139.44 6.49 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF     
      
Model 3 Inputs: OE, AT 75.07 147.93 8.48 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
      
Model 4 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 74.77 148.23 8.54 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 5 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 73.99 149.01 8.81 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF     
      
Model 6 Inputs: OE, CA, FA, INTAN 73.03 149.97 9.06 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
      
Model 7 
Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, 
INTAN 82.36 140.64 6.89 *** 
 Outputs: S     
      
Model 8 
Inputs: COGS, SGA, CA, FA, 
INTAN 83.82 139.18 6.63 *** 
 Outputs: S, OCF, IB     
            
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-
tailed), respectively.  The null hypothesis assumes that the impairment firms are at least 
as efficient as the non-impairment firms.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are one-sided tests. 
2. Input variable definitions: COGS is cost of goods sold; SG&A is selling, general, and 
administrative expenses; OE is operating expenses, equaling to cost of goods sold plus 
selling, general and administrative expenses; CA is current assets; FA is fixed assets; 
INTAN is intangible assets; TA is total assets.  CA, FA,INTAN, and TA are average 
balances calculated by adding the beginning balances to the ending balances of the fiscal 
year and dividing by two. 
3. Output variable definitions: S is sales; OCF is operating cash flows; IB is income before 
extraordinary items. 
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TABLE 4.9 
Durable Manufacturers: Cross-Sectional Analysis by Year 
 
Panel A: Frequencies and Summary Statistics 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index  
(EIw) 
Between-Group Index 
(EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
1) Year 2002        
1.00 43 17 26 25 35 17 30
0.9-0.99 27 8 19 8 13 21 20
0.8-0.89 9 5 4 2 2 11 0
0.7-0.79 6 5 1 4 1 2 0
0.6-0.69 10 9 1 9 0 0 1
0.5-0.59 5 5 0 2 0 0 0
0.4-0.49 2 2 0 1 0 0 0
< 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 102 51 51 51 51 51 51
Mean  0.83 0.96 0.88 0.98 0.94 0.98
S.D.  0.18 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.05
        
2) Year 2003        
1.00 35 17 18 24 25 17 18
0.9-0.99 21 6 15 5 12 21 19
0.8-0.89 13 9 4 3 2 2 1
0.7-0.79 4 3 1 4 0 0 0
0.6-0.69 1 1 0 2 1 0 0
0.5-0.59 4 3 1 1 0 0 2
0.4-0.49 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
< 0.4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
N 80 40 40 40 40 40 40
Mean  0.89 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.96
S.D.  0.15 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.10
        
3) Year 2004        
1.00 42 19 23 23 29 19 24
0.9-0.99 19 8 11 10 7 16 12
0.8-0.89 10 7 3 2 1 2 1
0.7-0.79 2 2 0 2 0 0 0
0.6-0.69 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.5-0.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4-0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
< 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 74 37 37 37 37 37 37
Mean  0.94 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99
S.D.  0.08 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03
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TABLE 4.9 (Continued) 
 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index 
 (EIw) 
Between-Group Index 
(EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
4) Year 2005        
1.00 40 18 22 24 30 18 24
0.9-0.99 23 7 16 12 11 14 17
0.8-0.89 13 10 3 3 3 8 3
0.7-0.79 5 2 3 1 1 4 0
0.6-0.69 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
0.5-0.59 1 1 0 4 0 1 0
0.4-0.49 2 2 0 1 0 0 0
< 0.4 3 2 1 0 0 0 1
N 90 45 45 45 45 45 45
Mean  0.86 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.93 0.96
S.D.  0.19 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.13
                
 
Panel B: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index 
Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score     
 Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score 
     
1) Year 2002 (N=102)     
  Impairment firms 46.32 56.68 1.83 * 
  Non-impairment firms 47.11 55.89 1.69 * 
     
2) Year 2003 (N=80)     
  Impairment firms 37.50 43.50 1.24  
  Non-impairment firms 36.43 44.58 1.70 * 
     
3) Year 2004 (N=74)     
  Impairment firms 34.82 40.18 1.18  
  Non-impairment firms 34.22 40.78 1.62  
     
4) Year 2005 (N=90)     
  Impairment firms 40.58 50.42 1.88 * 
  Non-impairment firms 40.88 50.12 1.86 * 
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TABLE 4.9 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Impairment vs. Non-impairment Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Impairment Non-Impairment Z-Score 
     
1) Year 2002 (N=102)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 40.21 62.79 4.04 *** 
     
2) Year 2003 (N=80)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 39.25 41.75 0.50  
     
3) Year 2004 (N=74)     
Impairment (EI) vs. Non-Impairment (EI) 34.18 40.82 1.46 * 
     
4) Year 2005 (N=90)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 39.71 51.29 2.20 ** 
        
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
2. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall 
indices and the within-group indices are the same.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel C, the null hypothesis assumes that the impairment firms are at least as 
efficient as the non-impairment firms.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) 
and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 4.10 
Computers: Cross-Sectional Analysis by Year 
 
Panel A: Frequencies and Summary Statistics 
 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index 
(EIw) 
Between-Group Index 
(EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
1) Year 2002        
1.00 45 13 32 32 36 14 45 
0.9-0.99 16 6 10 7 12 13 21 
0.8-0.89 21 8 13 10 8 20 3 
0.7-0.79 25 13 12 4 12 13 1 
0.6-0.69 10 9 1 5 0 7 0 
0.5-0.59 10 8 2 4 2 3 1 
0.4-0.49 5 5 0 6 0 1 0 
< 0.4 10 9 1 3 1 0 0 
N 142 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean  0.71 0.89 0.84 0.91 0.84 0.98 
S.D.  0.23 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.07 
        
2) Year 2003        
1.00 34 13 21 24 24 13 22 
0.9-0.99 4 3 1 3 2 7 9 
0.8-0.89 12 6 6 4 3 6 2 
0.7-0.79 9 5 4 1 3 4 1 
0.6-0.69 5 3 2 0 2 3 0 
0.5-0.59 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0.4-0.49 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 
< 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 68 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Mean  0.84 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.98 
S.D.  0.18 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.05 
        
3) Year 2004        
1.00 29 13 16 16 17 14 17 
0.9-0.99 4 3 1 4 5 3 3 
0.8-0.89 6 2 4 2 0 4 2 
0.7-0.79 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 
0.6-0.69 4 2 2 1 1 0 1 
0.5-0.59 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.4-0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
< 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 46 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Mean  0.91 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.96 
S.D.  0.13 0.1 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 
        
 
 155 
TABLE 4.10 (Continued) 
 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index 
(EIw) 
Between-Group Index 
(EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
4) Year 2005        
1.00 32 16 16 20 23 17 17 
0.9-0.99 11 3 8 2 5 12 14 
0.8-0.89 12 6 6 4 4 2 1 
0.7-0.79 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 
0.6-0.69 3 3 0 3 0 2 0 
0.5-0.59 3 2 1 0 0 0 1 
0.4-0.49 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 
< 0.4 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
N 66 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Mean  0.86 0.93 0.9 0.96 0.96 0.97 
S.D.  0.19 0.13 0.17 0.1 0.09 0.08 
                
 
Panel B: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index 
Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score     
 Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score 
     
1) Year 2002 (N=142)     
  Impairment firms 59.40 83.60 3.56 *** 
  Non-impairment firms 68.87 74.13 0.80  
     
2) Year 2003 (N=68)     
  Impairment firms 28.09 40.91 2.91 *** 
  Non-impairment firms 32.87 36.13 0.80  
     
3) Year 2004 (N=46)     
  Impairment firms 21.35 25.65 1.24  
  Non-impairment firms 22.41 24.59 0.68  
     
4) Year 2005 (N=66)     
  Impairment firms 31.55 35.45 0.90  
  Non-impairment firms 29.91 37.09 1.70 * 
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TABLE 4.10 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Impairment vs. Non-impairment Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Impairment Non-Impairment Z-Score 
     
1) Year 2002 (N=142)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 48.77 94.23 6.77 *** 
     
2) Year 2003 (N=68)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 27.76 41.24 3.02 *** 
     
3) Year 2004 (N=46)     
Impairment (EI) vs. Non-Impairment (EI) 21.87 25.13 0.94  
     
4) Year 2005 (N=66)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 32.48 34.52 0.45  
          
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
2. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall 
indices and the within-group indices are the same.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel C, the null hypothesis assumes that the impairment firms are at least as 
efficient as the non-impairment firms.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) 
and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 4.11 
Services: Cross-Sectional Analysis by Year 
 
Panel A: Frequencies and Summary Statistics 
 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index 
(EIw) 
Between-Group Index 
(EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
1) Year 2002        
1.00 31 10 21 19 22 10 22 
0.9-0.99 7 5 2 5 1 8 4 
0.8-0.89 7 6 1 1 2 5 0 
0.7-0.79 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 
0.6-0.69 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
0.5-0.59 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
< 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 52 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Mean  0.9 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.99 
S.D.  0.12 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.1 0.01 
        
2) Year 2003        
1.00 31 13 18 23 22 13 20 
0.9-0.99 14 4 10 4 7 6 9 
0.8-0.89 5 5 0 3 0 9 0 
0.7-0.79 8 7 1 0 0 1 1 
0.6-0.69 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 
0.5-0.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
< 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 60 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Mean  0.91 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.99 
S.D.  0.11 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.04 
        
3) Year 2004        
1.00 27 7 20 22 21 7 21 
0.9-0.99 13 8 5 4 4 9 8 
0.8-0.89 14 10 4 3 4 11 0 
0.7-0.79 3 3 0 0 0 2 0 
0.6-0.69 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5-0.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
< 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 58 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Mean  0.9 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.99 
S.D.  0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 
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TABLE 4.11 (Continued) 
 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index 
(EIw) 
Between-Group 
Index (EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
4) Year 2005        
1.00 32 14 18 18 21 14 18 
0.9-0.99 10 6 4 7 3 11 6 
0.8-0.89 8 6 2 1 1 1 2 
0.7-0.79 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 
0.6-0.69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5-0.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
< 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 52 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Mean  0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
S.D.  0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
                
 
Panel B: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index 
Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score     
 Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score 
     
1) Year 2002 (N=52)     
  Impairment firms 21.04 31.96 2.85 *** 
  Non-impairment firms 26.02 26.98 0.33  
     
2) Year 2003 (N=60)     
  Impairment firms 24.42 36.58 3.04 *** 
  Non-impairment firms 28.57 32.43 1.01  
     
3) Year 2004 (N=58)     
  Impairment firms 20.90 38.10 4.14 *** 
  Non-impairment firms 28.83 30.17 0.37  
     
4) Year 2005 (N=52)     
  Impairment firms 24.04 28.96 1.33  
  Non-impairment firms 24.81 28.19 1.05  
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TABLE 4.11 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Impairment vs. Non-impairment Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Impairment Non-Impairment Z-Score 
     
1) Year 2002 (N=52)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 19.54 33.46 3.77 *** 
     
2) Year 2003 (N=60)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 25.03 35.97 2.65 *** 
     
3) Year 2004 (N=58)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 19.83 39.17 4.59 *** 
     
4) Year 2005 (N=52)     
Impairment (EI) vs. Non-Impairment (EI) 24.85 28.15 0.89  
        
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
2. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall 
indices and the within-group indices are the same.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel C, the null hypothesis assumes that the impairment firms are at least as 
efficient as the non-impairment firms.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) 
and an output variable (sales). 
 TABLE 4.12 
Sample Distribution by Industry for Longitudinal Analysis 
 
  2002 vs. 2003 2003 vs. 2004 2004 vs. 2005 
Total  
Year t vs. t+1 
Description 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 Year t Year t+1 
         
Panel A: Durable Manufacturers         
1. Impairment t, Impairment t+1 9 9 10 10 9 9 28 28 
2. Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 28 28 27 27 19 19 74 74 
3. Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1 36 36 29 29 42 42 107 107 
4. Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 50 50 51 51 40 40 141 141 
Total impairment sample 123 123 117 117 110 110 350 350 
Control sample 124 124 123 123 122 122 369 369 
         
Panel B: Computers         
1. Impairment t, Impairment t+1 15 15 4 4 7 7 26 26 
2. Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 33 33 22 22 8 8 63 63 
3. Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1 18 18 14 14 24 24 56 56 
4. Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 22 22 43 43 40 40 105 105 
Total impairment sample 88 88 83 83 79 79 250 250 
Control sample 107 107 109 109 104 104 320 320 
         
Panel C: Services         
1. Impairment t, Impairment t+1 9 9 8 8 8 8 25 25 
2. Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 16 16 20 20 14 14 50 50 
3. Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1 19 19 16 16 17 17 52 52 
4. Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 25 25 25 25 27 27 77 77 
Total impairment sample 69 69 69 69 66 66 204 204 
Control sample 80 80 83 83 81 81 244 244 
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TABLE 4.13 
Pooled Longitudinal Analysis 
 
Panel A: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index Comparison 
 
  Durable Manufacturers   Computers   Services 
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score    
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score    
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score    
 Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 27.41 29.6 0.55  25.19 27.81 0.72  23.36 27.64 1.47  
Year t+1 27.88 29.13 0.31  25.15 27.85 0.88  25.44 25.56 0.03  
             
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 65.32 83.68 2.7 *** 56.06 70.94 2.30 ** 44.54 56.46 2.17 **
Year t+1 72.16 76.85 0.7  61.32 65.68 0.70  48.63 52.37 0.72  
             
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 100.58 114.42 1.66 * 52.23 60.77 1.47  50.01 54.99 0.94  
Year t+1 103.38 111.62 0.99  54.03 58.97 0.84  47.60 57.40 1.75 * 
             
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 136.76 146.24 0.99  99.49 111.51 1.47  74.82 80.18 0.80  
Year t+1 130.25 152.75 2.37 ** 100.30 110.70 1.27  73.47 81.53 1.22  
             
Control Sample             
Year t 353.57 385.43 2.04 ** 309.28 331.72 1.55  233.67 255.33 1.72 * 
Year t+1 347.29 391.71 2.84 *** 313.64 327.36 0.95  234.50 254.50 1.58  
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TABLE 4.13 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Year t vs. Yeat t+1 Comparison 
 
  Durable Manufacturers   Computers   Services 
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon  
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon  
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon   
Difference in Distribution Year t Year t+1 Z-Score   Year t Year t+1 Z-Score   Year t Year t+1 Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, 
    Impairment t+1 27.96 29.04 0.26  24.74 28.27 1.00  24.12 26.88 0.91  
2) Impairment t, 
    Non-Impairment t+1 57.64 91.36 4.93 *** 44.47 82.53 5.96 *** 44.52 56.48 2.19 ** 
3) Non-Impairment t, 
    Impairment t+1 101.01 113.99 1.55 * 56.20 56.80 0.10  60.83 44.17 -2.97 *** 
4) Non-Impairment t, 
    Non-Impairment t+1 158.77 124.23 -3.62 *** 103.85 107.15 0.40  75.86 79.14 0.48  
             
Control Sample             
Non-Impairment t, Non-
Impairment t+1 359.53 379.47 1.28  317.64 323.36 0.39  243.90 245.10 0.10  
                          
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2. For Panel A, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall indices and the within-group indices are the same.  
Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that firms in year t are at least as efficient as firms in year t+1, or vice versa.  Wilcoxon Z-cores 
are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current assets, 
fixed assets; and intangible assets) and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 4.14 
Durable Manufacturers: Longitudinal Analysis by Two Years 
 
Panel A: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index Comparison 
 
  2002 vs. 2003   2003 vs. 2004   2004 vs. 2005   
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score   
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score   
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score   
 Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 8.89 10.11 0.56  10.05 10.95 0.40  8.61 10.39 0.79  
Year t+1 8.56 10.44 0.97  10.00 11.00 0.40  9.28 9.72 0.18  
             
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 22.52 34.48 3.11 *** 22.02 32.98 2.75 *** 19.32 19.68 0.11  
Year t+1 26.54 30.46 1.24  26.81 28.19 0.39  17.84 21.16 1.21  
             
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 33.60 39.40 1.33  28.79 30.21 0.36  39.83 45.17 1.05  
Year t+1 35.44 37.56 0.49  27.40 31.60 1.15  39.40 45.60 1.23  
             
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 48.69 52.31 0.65  45.01 57.99 2.32 ** 37.33 43.66 1.34  
Year t+1 44.76 56.24 2.09 ** 48.94 54.06 1.00  38.05 42.95 1.07  
             
Control Sample             
Year t 112.84 136.16 2.60 *** 114.38 132.62 2.05 ** 114.10 130.90 1.92 *
Year t+1 114.82 134.18 2.18 ** 115.86 131.14 1.72 * 116.12 128.88 1.45  
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TABLE 4.14 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Year t vs. Year t+1 Comparison 
 
  2002 vs. 2003   2003 vs. 2004   2004 vs. 2005   
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution 2002 2003 Z-Score   2003 2004 Z-Score   2004 2005 Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1 9.33 9.67 0.11  10.80 10.20 -0.22  8.50 10.50 0.89  
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 22.21 34.79 3.16 *** 19.72 35.28 4.07 *** 19.47 19.53 0.00  
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1 36.00 37.00 0.22  28.90 30.10 0.30  42.33 42.67 0.06  
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 56.82 44.18 -2.28 ** 45.19 57.81 2.26 ** 38.38 42.63 0.87  
             
Control Sample             
Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 119.85 129.15 1.03  111.03 135.97 2.80 *** 111.8 133.2 2.42 ***
                          
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2. For Panel A, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall indices and the within-group indices are the same.  
Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that firms in year t are at least as efficient as firms in year t+1, or vice versa.  Wilcoxon Z-cores 
are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current assets; 
fixed assets; and intangible assets) and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 4.15 
Computers: Longitudinal Analysis by Two Years 
 
Panel A: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index Comparison 
 
  2002 vs. 2003   2003 vs. 2004   2004 vs. 2005   
 
Wilcoxon Mean 
Score   
Wilcoxon Mean 
Score   
Wilcoxon Mean 
Score   
 Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 14.57 16.43 0.67  4.50 4.50 0.00  7.50 7.50 0.00  
Year t+1 14.43 16.57 0.92  4.50 4.50 0.00  7.50 7.50 0.00  
             
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 28.89 38.11 2.01 ** 19.11 25.89 2.02 ** 7.50 9.50 1.37  
Year t+1 32.21 34.79 0.60  21.07 23.93 0.83  8.50 8.50 0.00  
             
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 16.06 20.94 1.69 * 13.43 15.57 0.93  22.94 26.06 0.89  
Year t+1 17.94 19.06 0.37  13.93 15.07 0.52  23.92 25.08 0.32  
             
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 21.11 23.89 0.82  40.07 46.93 1.36  38.10 42.90 0.99  
Year t+1 21.05 23.95 1.05  42.43 44.57 0.43  37.69 43.31 1.17  
             
Control Sample             
Year t 101.85 113.15 1.38  99.67 119.33 2.40 ** 99.68 109.32 1.20  
Year t+1 101.21 113.79 1.58  106.45 112.55 0.75  99.50 109.50 1.23  
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TABLE 4.15 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Year t vs. Year t+1 Comparison 
 
  2002 vs. 2003   2003 vs. 2004   2004 vs. 2005   
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution 2002 2003 Z-Score   2003 2004 Z-Score   2004 2005 Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1 14.10 16.90 1.01  4.50 4.50 0.00  7.50 7.50 0.00  
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 24.82 42.18 3.83 *** 20.11 24.89 1.37 * 7.50 9.50 1.37 *
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1 16.00 21.00 1.68 ** 14.07 14.93 0.33  24.92 24.08 -0.22  
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 20.86 24.14 0.99  43.16 43.84 0.13  40.03 40.98 0.19  
             
Control Sample             
Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 101.44 113.56 1.47 * 89.50 129.50 4.85 *** 107.10 101.90 -0.64  
                          
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2. For Panel A, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall indices and the within-group indices are the same.  
Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that firms in year t are at least as efficient as firms in year t+1, or vice versa.  Wilcoxon Z-cores 
are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current assets; 
fixed assets; and intangible assets) and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 4.16 
Services: Longitudinal Analysis by Two Years 
 
Panel A: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index Comparison 
 
  2002 vs. 2003   2003 vs. 2004   2004 vs. 2005   
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score   
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score   
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score   
 Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  Overall 
Within-
Group Wilcoxon  
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   Index Index Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 9.50 9.50 0.00  8.50 8.50 0.00  8.00 9.00 0.88  
Year t+1 9.50 9.50 0.00  8.50 8.50 0.00  8.50 8.80 0.00  
             
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 15.13 17.88 1.02  17.4 23.6 2.19 ** 12.00 17.00 2.37 **
Year t+1 15.91 17.09 0.43  20.3 20.7 0.14  14.46 14.54 0.00  
             
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1           
Year t 18.55 20.45 0.80  15.53 17.47 0.98  17.47 17.52 0.00  
Year t+1 17.42 21.58 1.47  14.47 18.53 1.77 * 16.82 18.18 0.49  
             
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1           
Year t 25.00 26.00 0.32  24.28 26.72 0.70  26.00 29.00 0.81  
Year t+1 24.00 27.00 0.93  24.96 26.04 0.35  26.54 28.46 0.53  
             
Control Sample             
Year t 75.56 85.44 1.42  78.54 88.45 1.38  76.59 86.41 1.38  
Year t+1 76.74 84.26 1.08  80.05 86.95 0.96  76.16 86.84 1.49  
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TABLE 4.16 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Year t vs. Year t+1 Comparison 
 
  2002 vs. 2003   2003 vs. 2004   2004 vs. 2005   
 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Wilcoxon  
Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution 2002 2003 Z-Score   2003 2004 Z-Score   2004 2005 Z-Score   
             
1) Impairment t, Impairment t+1 9.50 9.50 0.00  8.50 8.50 0.00  8.00 9.00 -0.88  
2) Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 16.44 16.56 0.02  18.20 22.8 1.52 * 12.39 16.61 1.86 **
3) Non-Impairment t, Impairment t+1 20.89 18.11 -0.95  17.59 15.41 -0.84  18.88 16.12 -1.13  
4) Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 26.34 24.66 -0.50  24.32 26.68 0.69  26.70 28.30 0.41  
             
Control Sample             
Non-Impairment t, Non-Impairment t+1 79.93 81.08 0.16  85.17 81.83 -0.46  83.43 79.57 -0.53  
                          
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2. For Panel A, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall indices and the within-group indices are the same.  
Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that firms in year t are at least as efficient as firms in year t+1, or vice versa.  Wilcoxon Z-cores 
are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative expenses; current assets; 
fixed assets; and intangible assets) and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 4.17 
Sensitivity Analysis: Firms without Fixed Asset Impairment 
 
Panel A: Pooled Cross-Sectional Frequencies and Summary Statistics 
 
Efficiency Score   
Overall Index  
(EI) 
Within-Group Index 
(EIw) 
Between-Group Index 
(EIb) 
Ranges Total Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp Imp Non-Imp 
        
1)  Durable Manufacturers      
1.00 58 27 31 39 52 28 31 
0.9-0.99 53 17 36 13 28 56 59 
0.8-0.89 38 18 20 18 15 20 9 
0.7-0.79 25 12 13 8 9 0 4 
0.6-0.69 13 10 3 13 1 0 0 
0.5-0.59 9 9 0 4 0 1 1 
0.4-0.49 4 3 1 3 0 0 0 
< 0.4 10 9 1 7 0 0 1 
N 210 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Mean  0.79 0.90 0.82 0.94 0.95 0.95 
S.D.  0.22 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.10 
        
2) Computers      
1.00 63 24 39 39 55 25 46 
0.9-0.99 30 10 20 13 12 48 51 
0.8-0.89 34 13 21 15 18 18 6 
0.7-0.79 38 21 17 13 14 8 2 
0.6-0.69 17 12 5 10 4 7 1 
0.5-0.59 15 12 3 4 3 1 1 
0.4-0.49 4 3 1 1 1 0 0 
< 0.4 13 12 1 12 0 0 0 
N 214 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Mean  0.74 0.88 0.82 0.91 0.91 0.97 
S.D.  0.23 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.11 0.07 
        
3) Services       
1.00 41 15 26 28 36 16 32 
0.9-0.99 22 8 14 15 9 18 30 
0.8-0.89 28 18 10 19 8 29 2 
0.7-0.79 30 20 10 4 9 3 0 
0.6-0.69 9 4 5 0 5 1 1 
0.5-0.59 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.4-0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
< 0.4 3 1 2 1 0 0 2 
N 134 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Mean  0.84 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.95 
S.D.  0.14 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.15 
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TABLE 4.17 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Relative Efficiency Scores Based on Overall Index vs. Within-Group Index 
Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score     
 Overall Within-Group Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Index Index Z-Score 
     
1) Durable Manufacturers (N=210)     
    Impairment firms 92.98 118.02 3.08 *** 
    Non-Impairment firms 99.13 111.87 1.54  
     
2) Computers (N=214)     
    Impairment firms 95.69 119.31 2.82 *** 
    Non-Impairment firms 100.10 114.90 1.83 * 
     
3) Services (N=134)     
    Impairment firms 53.30 81.70 4.3 *** 
    Non-Impairment firms 62.40 72.60 1.6  
     
 
Panel C: Impairment vs. Non-impairment Comparison 
 
  Wilcoxon Mean Score Wilcoxon 
Difference in Distribution Impairment 
Non-
Impairment Z-Score 
     
1) Durable Manufacturers (N=210)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 98.26 112.74 1.75 ** 
     
2) Computers (N=214)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 85.64 129.36 5.25 *** 
     
3) Services (N=134)     
Impairment (EIb) vs. Non-Impairment (EIb) 50.32 84.68 5.19 *** 
        
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
2. For Panel B, the null hypothesis assumes that the expected rank sums of the overall 
indices and the within-group indices are the same.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are two-sided tests. 
3. For Panel C, the null hypothesis assumes that the impairment firms are at least as 
efficient as the non-impairment firms.  Wilcoxon Z-cores are one-sided tests. 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) 
and an output variable (sales). 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
TABLE 5.1 
Distribution of Goodwill Impairment Sample 
 
  Impairment Obs. % 
 (N=192)  
   
Panel A: Circumstances Leading to Goodwill Impairment  
Economy Downturn 9 4.7%
Decline in Stock Prices 5 2.6%
Decline in Firm Operating Performance,  
Change in Strategies, and Reorganization 90 46.9%
Adverse Change in Legal Action 2 1.0%
Unanticipated Competition 1 0.5%
Loss of Key Personnel 9 4.7%
Combination of Reasons 31 16.2%
Could Not Identify 45 23.4%
 192 100.0%
  
Panel B: Fair Value Method  
Discounted Future Cash Flows (DCF) 113 58.9%
Market Capitalization 7 3.6%
Multiples of Earnings  3 1.6%
All Three Methods 8 4.2%
DCF and Market Capitalization 11 5.7%
DCF and Multiple of Earnings 29 15.1%
Could Not Identify 21 10.9%
 192 100.0%
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TABLE 5.1 (Continued) 
  Impairment Obs. % 
 (N=192)  
   
Panel C: Quarter in Which Goodwill Impairment is Recorded 
1st Quarter 16 8.3%
2nd Quarter 25 13.0%
3rd Quarter 27 14.1%
4th Quarter 124 64.6%
 192 100.0%
 
Panel D: Number of Reportable Segments 
One Segment 52 27.1%
Two Segments 60 31.2%
Three Segments 41 21.3%
Four Segments 22 11.5%
More Than Four Segments 17 8.9%
 192 100.0% 
      
 
Note: 
1. This table provides distribution of the goodwill impairment sample. 
2. For observations having goodwill impairment in the multiple quarters, this study selects 
the largest amount of goodwill impairment to determine the quarter. 
 
  
TABLE 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics: Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
 
  Impairment   No Impairment  Mean Median 
 N = 192  N = 192  Differences Differences 
Variable Mean Median S.D.  Mean Median S.D.  |t-Stat| |z-Stat| 
     
EFFi,t-1 0.93 1.00 0.12 0.97 1.00 0.07     3.89***    3.48*** 
RETi,t-1 0.14 -0.08 1.08 0.68 0.17 2.18     3.08***    4.28*** 
CEOit 0.23 0 0.42 0.09 0 0.28     3.83***    3.76*** 
BATHit -0.13 0 0.52 -0.04 0 0.14     2.42**    3.15*** 
SMOOTHit 0.08 0 0.20 0.06 0 0.20     0.81    0.23 
SM_INCREASEit 0.12 0 0.33 0.26 0 0.44     3.56***    3.51*** 
SIZEi,t-1  5.10 5.18 2.48 5.24 5.15 2.27     0.60    0.20 
LEVi,t-1 0.28 0.19 0.41 0.21 0.17 0.30     2.01**    0.82 
     
Goodwill/Total Assets 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.17     1.95*    1.02 
Impairment/Goodwill 0.66 0.37 2.50     
Impairment/Total Assets 0.16 0.05 0.53     
                    
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  The t-statistics for mean 
differences and z-statistics for median differences are presented in absolute values. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
EFFi,t-1   Firm i’s relative efficiency score for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1  Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOit   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in the year of impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
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TABLE 5.2 (Continued) 
 
BATHit  A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in net income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 
to t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1, when the decrease is below the median of negative values of this 
variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase in net income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 
to t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1, when the increase is above the median of  positive values of this 
variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit A dichotomous variable, equal to 1 when the difference in net income before goodwill impairment between year t and t-
1, scaled by market value of equity the end of year t-1, falls in the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t-1 Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
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TABLE 5.3 
Descriptive Statistics: Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 
  Impairment   No Impairment  Mean  Median  
 N = 126  N = 126  Differences Differences
Variable Mean Median S.D.  Mean Median S.D.  |t-Stat| |z-Stat| 
      
DecEFFi,t-1 0.33 0 0.47 0.18 0 0.39     2.63***    2.60*** 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3 0.61 0 0.76 0.37 0 0.58     2.81***    1.94* 
%ChgEFFi,t-1 -0.03 0 0.17 -0.003 0 0.12     1.19    2.84*** 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 0 0 0.11 0.04 0 0.25     1.54    2.42** 
%ChgEFFi,t-3 -0.03 0 0.14 0.03 0 0.25     2.53**    3.59*** 
RETi,t-1 0.27 0.05 1.06 1.00 0.37 2.53     2.96***    3.91*** 
CEOi,t-1 0.18 0 0.39 0.06 0 0.24     2.91***    2.87*** 
MKBKi,t-1 3.98 1.71 23.59 4.42 2.55 22.79     0.15    4.28*** 
LEVi,t-1 0.26 0.18 0.42 0.18 0.17 0.20    2.11**    0.50 
              
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  The t-statistics for mean 
differences and z-statistics for median differences are presented in absolute values. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
DecEFFi,t-1   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when there is a decline in firm i’s relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1, and 
0 otherwise; 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3  Number of years in which firm i has a decline in the relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 prior to goodwill impairment 
recognition; 
%ChgEFFi,t-1   A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1; 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-2; 
%ChgEFFi,t-3 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-1; 
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TABLE 5.3 (Continued) 
 
RETi,t-1 Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOi,t-1 A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in a year prior to impairment reporting (year t-1), and 0 
otherwise; 
MKBKi,t-1 Market to book ratio at the end of year t-1; 
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Pearson Correlations: Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
 
  EFFi,t-1 RETi,t-1 CEOit BATHit SMOOTHit SM_INCREASEit SIZEi,t-1  LEVi,t-1 
         
EFFi,t-1 1.00        
         
         
RETi,t-1 0.1* 1.00       
 (0.05)        
         
CEOit -0.03 -0.09* 1.00      
 (0.57) (0.09)       
         
BATHit -0.002 -0.03 0.01 1.00     
 (0.96) (0.53) (0.82)      
         
SMOOTHit -0.2*** -0.04 0.09* 0.08 1.00    
 (0.0001) (0.45) (0.06) (0.14)     
         
SM_INCREASEit 0.11** 0.02 -0.03 0.11* -0.14*** 1.00   
 (0.04) (0.71) (0.57) (0.04) (0.007)    
         
SIZEi,t-1  0.16*** -0.11** 0.08 0.3*** -0.33*** 0.19*** 1.00  
 (0.002) (0.03) (0.10) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0003)   
         
LEVi,t-1 0.08 -0.07 -0.005 -0.15*** 0.23*** -0.07 -0.17*** 1.00 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.92) (0.002) (<0.0001) (0.19) (0.0009)  
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TABLE 5.4 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  P-values for two-tailed tests are 
in parentheses. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
EFFi,t-1   Firm i’s relative efficiency score for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1  Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOit   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in the year of impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
BATHit  A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in net income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 
to t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1, when the decrease is below the median of negative values of this 
variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase in net income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 
to t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1, when the increase is above the median of  positive values of this 
variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit A dichotomous variable, equal to 1 when the difference in net income before goodwill impairment between year t and t-
1, scaled by market value of equity the end of year t-1, falls in the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t-1 Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
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TABLE 5.5 
Pearson Correlations: Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 
 DecEFFi,t-1 DecEFF_Histi,t-3 %ChgEFFi,t-1 %ChgEFFi,t-2 %ChgEFFi,t-3 RETi,t-1 CEOi,t-1 MKBKi,t-1 LEVi,t-1 
          
DecEFFi,t-1 1.00         
          
          
DecEFF_Histi,t-3 0.80*** 1.00        
 (<0.0001)         
          
%ChgEFFi,t-1 -0.49*** -0.24*** 1.00       
 (<0.0001) (0.0001)        
          
%ChgEFFi,t-2 0.17*** -0.059 -0.21*** 1.00      
 (0.007) (0.35) (0.0007)       
          
%ChgEFFi,t-3 -0.23*** -0.26*** 0.53*** 0.69*** 1.00     
 (0.0003) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)      
          
RETi,t-1 -0.15** -0.13** 0.09 -0.05 0.03 1.00    
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.14) (0.46) (0.62)     
          
CEOi,t-1 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.08 1.00   
 (0.96) (0.18) (0.26) (0.12) (0.63) (0.22)    
          
MKBKi,t-1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 1.00  
 (0.52) (0.68) (0.98) (0.51) (0.55) (0.91) (0.71)   
          
LEVi,t-1 -0.009 0.05 0.22*** -0.15** -0.03 -0.04 -0.002 -0.07 1.00 
 (0.89) (0.44) (0.0004) (0.02) (0.59) (0.56) (0.97) (0.30)  
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TABLE 5.5 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.  P-values for two-tailed tests are 
in parentheses. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
DecEFFi,t-1   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when there is a decline in firm i’s relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1, and 
0 otherwise; 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3  Number of years in which firm i has a decline in the relative efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 prior to goodwill impairment 
recognition; 
%ChgEFFi,t-1   A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1; 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-2; 
%ChgEFFi,t-3 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-1; 
RETi,t-1 Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOi,t-1 A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in a year prior to impairment reporting (year t-1), and 0 
otherwise; 
MKBKi,t-1 Market to book ratio at the end of year t-1; 
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Determinants of Goodwill Impairment 
Tobit Regression: 
ittitiit
ititittitiit
LEVSIZEPROFITSM
GOODPOORCEORETEFFIMP
εβββ
ββββββ
++++
+++++=
−−
−−
1,81,76
5431,21,10
_
%
     (2) 
 
Logistic Regression: 
ittitiit
ititittitiit
LEVSIZEPROFITSM
GOODPOORCEORETEFFIMPAIR
εβββ
ββββββ
++++
+++++=
−−
−−
1,81,76
5431,21,10
_
    (3) 
    Tobit Regression   Logistic Regression   
     Marginal  WESML 
Predicted     Coeff  Coeff Effect Coeff 
Variable Sign    (t-Stat)   (z-Stat) (z-Stat) (t-Stat) 
       
Intercept ?  2.04***   4.33***   1.63 
  (3.99)  (3.18)  (1.05) 
       
EFFi,t-1 -  -2.34***   -4.93***  -1.23***  -4.43*** 
  (-4.07)  (-3.48) (-3.48) (-2.63) 
       
RETi,t-1 -  -0.17**   -0.23**  -0.06**  -0.30* 
  (-1.91)  (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.30) 
       
CEOit +  0.35***   1.11***  0.26***  1.14*** 
  (2.80)  (3.44) (3.89) (2.49) 
       
BATHit -  -0.95   -1.29**  -0.32**  -1.48* 
  (-1.04)  (-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.59) 
       
SMOOTHit +  -0.42   -0.50  -0.12  -0.26 
  (-1.14)  (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.28) 
       
SM_INCREASEit -  -0.26**   -0.81***  -0.20***  -0.84* 
  (-1.79)  (-2.73) (-2.88) (-1.57) 
       
SIZEi,t-1  ? 0.001   0.04  0.01  0.07 
  (0.04)  (0.79) (0.79) (0.72) 
       
LEVi,t-1 ?  0.39*   0.69*  0.17*  0.23 
  (1.79)  (1.94) (1.94) (0.44) 
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TABLE 5.6 (Continued) 
 
    Tobit Regression  Logistic Regression  
     Marginal WESML 
Predicted Coeff  Coeff Effect Coeff 
Variable Sign (t-Stat)  (z-Stat) (z-Stat) (t-Stat) 
       
No. of obs.  384  384  384 
Log likelihood  -370.60  -236.08  -112.75 
Likelihood Ratio           60.18***   
Pseudo R Square   0.11   
       
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  One-
tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
 
IMP%it  Firm i’s reported pre-tax goodwill impairment (measured as a positive sign) for 
year t, divided by goodwill at the end of year t-1 for impairment firms, and 0 for 
non-impairment firms; 
IMPAIRit  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i reports goodwill impairment for the 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise; 
EFFi,t-1   Firm i’s relative efficiency scores for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1  Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOit   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in the year of 
impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
BATHit  A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in net income 
before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at the end of 
year t-1, when the decrease is below the median of negative values of this 
variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase in net income 
before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at the end of 
year t-1, when the increase is above the median of  positive values of this 
variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the difference in net income before 
goodwill impairment between year t and t-1, scaled by market value of equity 
the end of year t-1, falls in the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t-1 Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
 
3. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and 
administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) and an output variable 
(sales). 
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TABLE 5.7 
Logistic Regression: Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Model 4.1 
Coeff 
Model 4.2 
Coeff 
Model 4.3 
Coeff 
Model 4.4 
Coeff  
Model 4.5 
Coeff 
       
Intercept ? -0.36* -0.37* -0.22 -0.12 -0.19 
  (3.03) (3.09) (1.30) (0.39) (0.97) 
       
DecEFFi,t-1 + 0.66**     
  (4.45)     
       
DecEFF_Histi,t-3 +  0.42**    
   (4.36)    
       
%ChgEFFi,t-1 -   -1.13   
    (1.24)   
       
%ChgEFFi,t-2 -    -1.46*  
     (2.16)  
       
%ChgEFFi,t-3 -     -2.08** 
      (4.14) 
       
RETi,t-1 - -0.30** -0.33** -0.32** -0.37*** -0.32** 
  (4.56) (5.06) (5.21) (6.15) (5.17) 
       
CEOi,t-1 + 1.13*** 1.05*** 1.09*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 
  (6.62) (5.73) (6.13) (6.86) (6.64) 
       
MKBKi,t-1 - -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
LEVi,t-1 ? 1.03* 1.00* 1.13** 0.93* 1.00* 
  (3.53) (3.18) (4.32) (2.74) (3.26) 
       
No. of obs.   252  252  252  252  252 
Log Likelihood  -160.46 -160.50 -162.10 -161.04 -159.05 
Likelihood Ratio   28.42***  28.35***  25.15***  27.27***  31.24*** 
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TABLE 5.7 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses.  Chi-square 
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
2. Model 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETDecEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,21,10  (4.1) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETHistDecEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,23,10 _  (4.2) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,21,10 %  (4.3) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,22,10 %  (4.4) 
itititititiit LEVMKBKCEORETChgEFFIMPAIR εββββββ ++++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,23,10 %  (4.5) 
 
3. Variable definitions: 
DecEFFi,t-1   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when there is a decline in firm i’s 
relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1, and 0 otherwise; 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3  Number of years in which firm i has a decline in the relative efficiency 
from year t-3 to t-1 prior to goodwill impairment recognition; 
%ChgEFFi,t-1   A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1; 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-2; 
%ChgEFFi,t-3 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-1; 
RETi,t-1 Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOi,t-1 A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in a 
year prior to impairment reporting (year t-1), and 0 otherwise; 
MKBKi,t-1 Market to book ratio at the end of year t-1; 
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
 
4. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) 
and an output variable (sales). 
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TABLE 5.8 
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis: Predictive Ability of Relative Efficiency 
 
Panel A: Decline in efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 (DecEFFi,t-1) 
 
  Resubstitution Method    Cross-validation Method  
Actual Model Classification   Model Classification  
Outcome 
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error   
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error 
        
No Impairment 92 34 36.51%  91 35 37.30% 
 73.02% 26.98%   72.22% 27.18%  
        
Impairment 58 68   59 67  
 46.03% 53.97%   46.83% 53.17%  
              
 
Panel B: Number of years in which a firm has a decline in efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 
(DecEFF_Histi,t-3) 
 
  Resubstitution Method    Cross-validation Method  
Actual Model Classification   Model Classification  
Outcome 
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error   
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error 
        
No Impairment 85 41 40.48%  83 43 41.67% 
 67.46% 32.54%   65.87% 34.13%  
        
Impairment 61 65   62 64  
 48.41% 51.59%   49.21% 50.79%  
              
 
Panel C: Percentage change in efficiency from year t-2 to t-1 (%ChgEFFi,t-1) 
 
  Resubstitution Method    Cross-validation Method  
Actual Model Classification   Model Classification  
Outcome 
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error   
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error 
        
No Impairment 97 29 35.71%  95 31 37.30% 
 76.98% 23.02%   75.40% 24.60%  
        
Impairment 61 65   63 63  
 48.41% 51.59%   50.00% 50.00%  
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TABLE 5.8 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Percentage change in efficiency from year t-3 to t-2 (%ChgEFFi,t-2) 
 
  Resubstitution Method    Cross-validation Method  
Actual Model Classification   Model Classification  
Outcome 
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error   
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error 
        
No Impairment 96 30 37.30%  93 33 39.29% 
 76.19% 23.81%   73.81% 26.19%  
        
Impairment 64 62   66 60  
 50.79% 49.21%   52.38% 47.62%  
            
 
Panel E: Percentage change in efficiency from year t-3 to t-1 (%ChgEFFi,t-3) 
 
  Resubstitution Method    Cross-validation Method  
Actual Model Classification   Model Classification  
Outcome 
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error   
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error 
        
No Impairment 97 29 34.13%  96 30 35.32% 
 76.98% 23.02%   76.19% 23.81%  
        
Impairment 57 69   59 67  
 45.24% 54.76%   46.83% 53.17%  
              
 
Panel F: Exclude measurement of relative efficiency 
 
  Resubstitution Method    Cross-validation Method  
Actual Model Classification   Model Classification  
Outcome 
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error   
No 
Impairment Impairment 
Total 
Error 
        
No Impairment 100 26 38.49%  98 28 39.29% 
 79.37% 20.63%   77.78% 22.22%  
        
Impairment 71 55   71 55  
 56.35% 43.65%   56.35% 43.65%  
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Note: 
1. The DEA Model for this analysis has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) 
and an output variable (sales). 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
DecEFFi,t-1   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when there is a decline in firm i’s 
relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1, and 0 otherwise; 
DecEFF_Histi,t-3  Number of years in which firm i has a decline in the relative efficiency 
from year t-3 to t-1 prior to goodwill impairment recognition; 
%ChgEFFi,t-1   A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-2 to t-1; 
%ChgEFFi,t-2 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-2; 
%ChgEFFi,t-3 A percent change in relative efficiency scores from year t-3 to t-1; 
 
3. The discriminant analysis also includes the following variables: 
RETi,t-1 Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOi,t-1 A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in a 
year prior to impairment reporting (year t-1), and 0 otherwise; 
MKBKi,t-1 Market to book ratio at the end of year t-1; 
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
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TABLE 5.9 
Sensitivity Analysis on Choices of Input/Output Variables in DEA Model 
 
Panel A: DEA Model Inputs (OE, CA, FA, INTAN), Output (S) 
 
     Tobit Regression   Logistic Regression     
       Marginal  WESML 
Predicted Coeff  Coeff Effect Coeff 
Variable Sign (t-Stat)   (z-Stat) (z-Stat) (t-Stat) 
           
Intercept ? 1.53 ***  2.55 ***   -0.07  
  (4.06)   (2.85)    (-0.06)  
           
EFFi,t-1 - -1.89 ***  -3.25 *** -0.81 *** -2.74 ** 
  (-4.53)   (-3.36)  (-3.36)  (-2.33)  
           
RETi,t-1 - -0.18 **  -0.22 ** -0.06 ** -0.29 * 
  (-1.98)   (-2.18)  (-2.18)  (-1.30)  
           
CEOit + 0.37 ***  1.09 *** 0.26 *** 1.13 *** 
  (3.01)   (3.37)  (3.79)  (2.45)  
           
BATHit - -0.75   -1.27 ** -0.32 ** -1.35 * 
  (-0.98)   (-1.90)  (-1.90)  (-1.50)  
           
SMOOTHit + -0.37   -0.41  -0.09  -0.22  
  (-0.96)   (-0.62)  (-0.55)  (-0.24)  
           
SM_INCREASEit - -0.24 **  -0.80 *** -0.20 *** -0.79 * 
  (-1.70)   (-2.69)  (-2.84)  (-1.49)  
           
SIZEi,t-1  ? 0.003   0.05  0.01  0.06  
  (0.09)   (0.93)  (0.93)  (0.68)  
           
LEVi,t-1 ? 0.44 **  0.75 ** 0.19 ** 0.28  
  (2.00)   (2.05)  (2.05)  (0.54)  
           
No. of obs. 384   384    384  
Log likelihood -368.71   -237.08    -113.45  
Likelihood Ratio    58.19 ***    
Pseudo R Square    0.11      
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TABLE 5.9 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: DEA Model Inputs (OE, AT), Outputs (S, OCF, IB) 
 
    Tobit Regression   Logistic Regression     
       Marginal  WESML 
Predicted Coeff  Coeff Effect Coeff 
Variable Sign (t-Stat)   (z-Stat) (z-Stat) (t-Stat) 
           
Intercept ? 1.17 ***  1.62 **   -0.98  
  (3.36)   (2.32)    (-1.00)  
           
EFFi,t-1 - -1.57 ***  -2.31 *** -0.58 *** -1.83 ** 
  (-4.03)   (-3.01)  (-3.01)  (-1.83)  
           
RETi,t-1 - -0.18 **  -0.24 ** -0.06 ** -0.32 * 
  (-1.98)   (-2.27)  (-2.27)  (-1.42)  
           
CEOit + 0.35 ***  1.06 *** 0.25 *** 1.10 *** 
  (2.90)   (3.28)  (3.67)  (2.42)  
           
BATHit - -0.95   -1.08 ** -0.27 ** -1.15 * 
  (-1.22)   (-1.75)  (-1.75)  (-1.34)  
           
SMOOTHit + -0.35   -0.35  -0.09  -0.12  
  (-0.89)   (-0.54)  (-0.54)  (-0.13)  
           
SM_INCREASEit - -0.21 *  -0.80 *** -0.20 *** -0.82 * 
  (-1.58)   (-2.71)  (-2.87)  (-1.54)  
           
SIZEi,t-1  ? 0.006   0.05  0.01  0.07  
  (0.18)   (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.70)  
           
LEVi,t-1 ? 0.38 *  0.63 * 0.16 * -0.03  
  (1.68)   (1.75)  (1.75)  (-0.06)  
           
No. of obs. 384   384    384  
Log likelihood -369.41   -238.62    -114.36  
Likelihood Ratio    55.11 ***    
Pseudo R Square    0.10      
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TABLE 5.9 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
EFFi,t-1   Firm i’s relative efficiency scores for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1  Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOit   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in the 
year of impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
BATHit  A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in net 
income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t-1, when the decrease is below the median of 
negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase in net 
income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t-1, when the increase is above the median of  
positive values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the difference in net income 
before goodwill impairment between year t and t-1, scaled by market 
value of equity the end of year t-1, falls in the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 
0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t-1 Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
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TABLE 5.10 
Sensitivity Analysis Using Conditional Logistic Regression 
 
    DEA Model 1 DEA Model 2 DEA Model 3 
 Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Variable Sign (Chi-Square) (Chi-Square) (Chi-Square) 
        
EFFi,t-1 - -3.86 *** -2.37 ** -1.95 ** 
  (5.98)  (4.59)  (4.69)  
        
RETi,t-1 - -0.38 ** -0.39 *** -0.38 *** 
  (5.30)  (5.63)  (5.45)  
        
CEOit + 1.33 *** 1.34 *** 1.37 *** 
  (11.76)  (11.99)  (12.06)  
        
BATHit - -2.46 ** -2.37 ** -1.9 ** 
  (3.32)  (3.41)  (3.43)  
        
SMOOTHit + 0.74  1.04  0.92  
  (0.41)  (0.96)  (0.75)  
        
SM_INCREASEit - -0.89 *** -0.87 *** -0.92 *** 
  (6.60)  (6.10)  (6.86)  
        
SIZEi,t-1  ? -1.81 *** -1.76 *** -1.73 *** 
  (8.62)  (8.26)  (8.45)  
        
LEVi,t-1 ? 1.46 ** 1.5 ** 1.59 ** 
  (3.98)  (4.29)  (4.83)  
        
No. of obs.  384  384  384  
Log Likelihood  -133.09  -93.6  -93.61  
Likelihood Ratio 81.06 *** 78.97 *** 78.95 *** 
                
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
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TABLE 5.10 (Continued) 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
EFFi,t-1   Firm i’s relative efficiency scores for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1  Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOit   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in the 
year of impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
BATHit  A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in net 
income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t-1, when the decrease is below the median of 
negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase in net 
income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t-1, when the increase is above the median of  
positive values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the difference in net income 
before goodwill impairment between year t and t-1, scaled by market 
value of equity the end of year t-1, falls in the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 
0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t-1 Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
 
3. The DEA Model 1 has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and 
administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) and single 
output variable (sales). 
 
4. The DEA Model 2 has four input variables (operating expenses; current assets; fixed 
assets; and intangible assets) and single output variable (sales). 
 
5. The DEA Model 3 has two input variables (operating expenses; total assets) and three 
output variables (sales; operating cash flows; income before extraordinary items). 
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TABLE 5.11 
Sensitivity Analysis Including One Segment Variable 
 
    Tobit Regression   Logistic Regression     
       Marginal  WESML 
Predicted Coeff  Coeff Effect Coeff 
Variable Sign (t-Stat)   (z-Stat) (z-Stat) (t-Stat) 
           
Intercept ? 2.15 ***  4.17 ***   1.83  
  (4.05)   (3.17)    (1.17)  
           
EFFi,t-1 - -2.20 ***  -3.9 *** -0.98 *** -3.8 ** 
  (-3.65)   (-2.82)  (-2.82)  (-2.20)  
           
RETi,t-1 - -0.16 **  -0.26 ** -0.07 ** -0.31 * 
  (-1.82)   (-2.30)  (-2.30)  (-1.32)  
           
CEOit + 0.29 **  1.11 *** 0.26 *** 1.08 ** 
  (2.26)   (3.37)  (3.81)  (2.31)  
           
BATHit - -1.27 *  -1.32 ** -0.33 ** -1.6 * 
  (-1.29)   (-1.79)  (-1.79)  (-1.56)  
           
SMOOTHit + -0.32   -0.39  -0.1  -0.09  
  (-0.86)   (-0.57)  (-0.57)  (-0.09)  
           
SM_INCREASEit - -0.28 **  -0.73 *** -0.18 *** -0.81 * 
  (-2.06)   (-2.38)  (-2.50)  (-1.52)  
           
SIZEi,t-1  ? -0.02   -0.03  -0.009  -0.008  
  (-0.53)   (-0.59)  (-0.59)  (-0.08)  
           
LEVi,t-1 ? 0.43 *  0.65 * 0.16 * 0.28  
  (1.94)   (1.71)  (1.71)  (0.53)  
           
OneSEGi,t-1 ? -0.43 ***  -1.1 *** -0.27 *** -1.13 *** 
  (-2.70)   (-4.34)  (-4.59)  (-2.62)  
           
No. of obs.  384   384    384  
Log Likelihood -366.4   -226.25    -108.9  
Likelihood Ratio    79.85 ***     
Pseudo R Square    0.15      
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TABLE 5.11 (Continued) 
 
Note: 
1. Statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
2. Variable definitions: 
EFFi,t-1   Firm i’s relative efficiency scores for the fiscal year t-1;  
RETi,t-1  Firm i’s stock returns over the fiscal year t-1; 
CEOit   A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has a change in CEO in the 
year of impairment reporting, and 0 otherwise;  
BATHit  A proxy for “unexpectedly low” earnings, equal to a decrease in net 
income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t-1, when the decrease is below the median of 
negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise;  
SMOOTHit A proxy for “unexpectedly high” earnings, equal to an increase in net 
income before goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t-1, when the increase is above the median of  
positive values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SM_INCREASEit A dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the difference in net income 
before goodwill impairment between year t and t-1, scaled by market 
value of equity the end of year t-1, falls in the interval [0.00, 0.02), and 
0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t-1 Firm i’s log of total assets at the end of year t-1;  
LEVi,t-1 Total debts divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; 
OneSEGit A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i has only one reportable 
segment, and 0 otherwise. 
 
3. The DEA Model has five input variables (cost of goods sold; selling, general, and 
administrative expenses; current assets; fixed assets; and intangible assets) and single 
output variable (sales). 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Efficiency Measurement for Two Inputs and One Output 
 
 
 
Note: 
1. Production function is represented as y = f(x1, x2); where y is an output; and x1, x2 are two 
inputs.  An isoquant QQ shows all combinations of two inputs that efficient firms can use 
to produce a unit of output. 
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FIGURE 2 
Pooled Sample and Subsample Frontiers 
 
 
 
Note:  
1. QQ represents the frontier isoquant from the pooled sample, while Q*Q* represents the 
frontier for the impairment firms.  Considering firm D, the technical efficiency relative to 
the pooled frontier is called an overall index (EI), which equals to OD’/OD. 
2. The efficiency of each firm which is calculated relative to its separate group’s frontier is 
called a within-group index (EIw).  The technical efficiency index for firm D relative to its 
own group equals to OD”/OD. 
3. A between-group index (EIb) that captures the difference in the frontier for the two 
groups is calculated as the ratio of the overall efficiency index to the within-group 
efficiency index such that EIb = EI/EIw.  
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FIGURE 3 
Effective Date of SFAS No. 142 Implementation 
1. December 31 year-end firms 
 
2. Firms with fiscal year-end of March 15 – December 15 
 
 
3. Firms with other fiscal year-end ( e.g. January 31, or February 28) 
 
 
(Source: Long 2005) 
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